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CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION 
COMMISSION 
CONSTITUTION REVISION 
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 
The purpose of this report is to provide historical perspective to the work and 
recommendations of the Commission. In most cases the issues studied by the Commission are 
identified and historical analysis is provided. The primary contributors to this work were Pat 
Ooley, graduate student of Public History at the University of California at Santa Barbara and 
Amanda Meeker, graduate student at California State University, Sacramento. As archive 
researchers for the Secretary of State's California State Archives, they made a substantial 
contribution to the understanding of the history of the many issues faced by the Commission. 
Their work was greatly appreciated. Two additional papers have been included: one deals 
with the fiscal system and the major changes that took place in 1933 and the other deals with 
the troubled history of the place of cities in California government structure. 
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STATE GOVERNANCE 
by Pat Ooley 
An Overview of the History of Constitutional 
Provisions Dealing with State Governance 
Although California's constitution has 
undergone wholesale revision and amendment 
since its inception in 1849, the work of the 
original framers remains imprinted in the 
organic law of the state. Responding to the 
urgencies of their time, the elected delegates 
who revised the constitution in 1879 expanded 
the document, adding nine new articles and 
some 8,000 words. Between 1966 and 1974, 
California voters authorized significant 
constitutional revisions recommended by the 
Constitution Revision Commission and 
proposed by the legislature. Since the 
introduction of the popular initiative in 1911, 
California voters have approved over 425 
amendments to the 1879 constitution. After 
significant revision and substantial amendment, 
and notwithstanding the inclusion of popular 
legislation, the fundamental organization of 
state government provided for in 
1849-executive, legislative, and judicial 
division of powers-remains intact. The 
purpose of this essay is to trace the 
development of sections of the Executive, 
Legislative and Initiative articles of the state 
constitution to their historic beginnings in 
California, hopefully revealing in the process 
the intent of both framers and revisionists.1 
The forty-eight men who met in Monterey in 
September of 1849 framed a.constitution for 
California in just forty-three days. They were in 
a hurry. Congress, embroiled and divided over 
slave versus free soil, had repeatedly failed to 
grant California territorial status. Californians, 
unable to organize a constitutional government 
without such authorization, were living under 
the laws existing in California at the time of the 
American annexation-a frontier application of 
Mexican civil law. International law, and the 
United States Supreme Court, held that the 
established laws of an acquired province must 
remain in force until superseded by a formally 
enacted state government. The time-tested 
systems of locally governing alcaldes and 
out-of-court arbitration of disputes had been 
successfully applied in Alta California since the 
Spanish administration. But what had 
functioned as government for a sparsely 
populated territory of Mexico's far northern 
frontier amounted to anarchy for the litigious, 
land-hungry Americans who were continuously 
arriving in gold-rush California. By the summer 
of 1849, the situation had become critical? 
President of the United States Zachary Taylor 
suggested a solution for California: frame a 
constitution and petition Congress directly for 
immediate statehood when it next convened. 
That is what California did. In just nine months 
(June 1849 to March 1850), Californians elected 
delegates to a constitutional convention; framed, 
distributed, and ratified a constitution; and 
elected a first legislature, which then elected 
two Senators to Congress. With constitutions in 
hand, Senators William M. Gwin and John C. 
Fremont, along with two popularly elected 
Representatives, petitioned Congress for 
statehood.3 
Although the Congressional debate over 
California's entrance as a free state edged the 
country closer to civil war and secured 
statehood only through sectionalist compromise 
(Compromise of September 9, 1850), California 
had at last acquired a constitutional 
government. As provided in Section Six of 
Article XIII, the constitution would become the 
organic law of the state when popularly ratified. 
By November 13, 1849, California voters had 
ratified the constitution and installed their first 
elected Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
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Legislature, and members of the House of 
Representatives.4 
Aware of the urgency to get the ratified 
document before Congress in time for its next 
session, but equally aware of the significance of 
their responsibility to their constituents and to 
posterity, the 1849 framers worked rapidly and 
diligently. Their principal reference, besides 
their individual political and legal expertise, 
was a "book of constitutions" containing the 
constitutions of the thirty United States and the 
federal constitution. Drawing primarily from the 
constitutions of Iowa and New York, and 
secondarily from the constitutions of Louisiana, 
Wisconsin, Michigan, Texas, and Mississippi, the 
delegates assembled a new treatise that reflected 
both contemporary political thought and the 
proven practices of other states with similar 
histories and experiences. When necessary, the 
delegates tailored laws to fit California's 
peculiar circumstances. 5 
In the thirty years that passed between 1849 and 
the constitutional convention of 1878-79, 
California and the nation had endured profound 
transformation. By the early 1870s, the United 
States had only recently emerged from the 
trauma of civil war and presidential 
assassination. Freed from wartime occupations, 
yet spurred on by wartime industry particularly 
in the north, the United States resumed its 
prewar expansion at an unprecedented pace. 
The nation had plunged headlong into the 
tumult that has historically marked the final 
three decades of nineteenth-century, maturing 
America: the opening and taking up of the 
"public domain" in the west, the exploitation of 
what seemed an inexhaustible supply of natural 
resources, construction and expansion of a 
mighty railroad network, the arrival of five 
million foreign immigrants since 1850, 
industrialization and urbanization, and the 
financial crash and depression of 1873.6 
The civil war had provided two important 
catalysts for .change in America-the ascendancy 
of the Republican party, and a proven federal 
supremacy over the states. Bolstered by federal 
laissez faire acquiescence and supported by 
federal grants, GOP industrialists and 
Page 4 -State Governance 
capitalists, such as the "Big Four" owners of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad in California, 
determined economic policy. A new corporate 
order had emerged for America, with significant 
social and political implications. Capitalist and 
industrialist expansion produced a large 
laboring class concurrently with a class of 
opulent wealth. The depression of 1873-78 
reduced many laborers to poverty. 7 
Holding to the doctrine that governments ruled 
by the consent of the governed, and that people 
instituted governments for their own benefit, 
citizens looked to government for remedy. But 
people increasingly perceived both federal and 
local government as corrupt and indecisive-the 
pawn of corporations and private interests 
whose unchecked speculations had triggered the 
financial crash and depression. The perception 
was not unfounded. Popular newspapers had 
implicated congressional and cabinet level 
officials in the Union Pacific-Credit Mobilier 
scandal (1872), and the Whiskey Ring bribery 
and tax evasion case (1874). State and municipal 
governments were even more seriously infected 
with the fraud and graft of party machines 
operating in such cities as New York (Tammany 
Hall), Philadelphia, Chicago, and Washington, 
D.C. In the west, settlers and newspapers 
accused federally appointed territorial 
governors and judges of acting in collusion with 
corporations and developers in the squandering 
of public lands. Territorial legislatures, such as 
Dakota's, were said to be cpntrolled by the 
railroads. 8 
By the mid 1870s, reform movements were 
coalescing across the nation. Organized labor, 
agrarian assoCiations, and women's suffrage 
groups were demanding, among other things, 
restrictions on the powers of state legislatures, 
and government regulation of corporations and 
monopolies. Reformers turned to government 
regulation, restriction, and limitation as means 
to an end. To the chagrin of more conservative 
elements, the instruments through which they 
enacted their reforms were their state 
constitutions. Beginning in 1872 and 
culminating during the Progressive era in 1913, 
constitutional conventions were revising and 
--------------------------------~ 
amending the fundamental law in at least 
twenty-six states. California's new state 
constitution of 1879 was one of many.9 
In the published debates of the 1849 
constitutional convention, delegates repeatedly 
stated that the fundamental law of a state 
should be brief, with most verbiage dedicated to 
delineating and restricting state powers, and to 
the distribution of power. Laws of a statutory 
nature, or laws of only contemporary 
significance, were best consigned to the statute 
books. The zealous revisionists of 1879, 
however, established a precedent for allowing 
statutory material to find its way into the 
constitution. The reform-driven necessity to 
instruct and restrict the legislature, 
municipalities, local governments, and 
corporations repealed the canon of 
constitutional brevity. Like other revised state 
constitutions, California's constitution increased 
in length-from approximately 7,300 to about 
15,000 words in 1879.10 
In his 1930 study of the California 1878-79 
Constitutional Convention, political scientist 
Carl Brent Swisher concluded that most of the 
reforms so earnestly expounded by the 1879 
revisionists went largely "unrealized" after the 
adoption of the new constitution. At the 1879 
fall elections, liberal and Workingmen reformers 
divided among themselves allowing a 
conservative Republican sweep of the legislature 
and executive branch. The 1880 legislature " 'of 
indefinite postponements'" effectively 
"sabotaged legislation proposed for the purpose 
of carrying into effect provisions of the 
constitution which were inimical to conservative 
interests." The prized Railroad Commission 
"proved as clay in the hands of the great 
corporations." Astute attorneys delayed 
enactment for many years of the provisions for 
taxing railroads by challenging them as 
unconstitutional in the courts. Corporations, 
including the Wells Fargo Express Company, 
brought suit challenging the Board of 
Equalization's power to equalize assessments 
and won. The provision which made lobbying a 
felony "was little more than a laughing 
stock." 11 
Proponents of reform had championed a new 
constitution for California, but after 1879, "the 
conservative interests by one means or another 
continued to play a dominant part in California 
law and politics." Even so, observed Swisher, 
"agitation did not cease ... for the interests of 
great numbers of the people were too vitally 
affected for that." 12 
For the nation, industrialization, capitalist 
expansion, and corporate growth persisted. 
Immigrants continued to arrive, expanding the 
labor force and intensifying urbanization. In 
1893, a depression more devastating than 1873 
settled on the country. Unemployed workers 
who marched to Washington for sympathy and 
redress met with government indifference and 
city police. By 1900, however, capital growth 
and investment had pulled the nation from 
depression. Corporate mergers created huge 
business entities, headed by men of fabulous 
wealth and powerY 
Contrasted with the opulence, however, were 
the urban ghettos of the working poor, the 
drudgery and danger of factory work, and child 
labor. Over time the reform impulse of the 1870s 
spread from labor and agrarians to urban 
intellectuals and activists, social workers, and a 
growing American middle-class. The new 
"Progressive" proponents of reform found 
expression in art, literature, muckrake 
journalism, and public forums. Beginning at 
municipal and state levels, the broad reforms of 
the Progressive movement gathered momentum 
as state after state enacted Progressive 
legislation. As governor of New York, 
Republican Theodore Roosevelt had successfully 
sponsored Progressive reforms. As President 
(1901 to 1909), Roosevelt helped bring 
Progressivism to the nationallevel.14 
South Dakota was the first state to adopt the 
initiative and referendum in 1898. By 1910, 
Utah, Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, Missouri, 
Michigan, Arkansas, and Colorado had 
duplicated South Dakota's reform enactment. By 
1910, the Progressive movement had gained 
enough authority in California to elect a "reform 
governor," Republican Hiram Johnson, and a 
Progressive legislature. On February 9, 1911, 
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Senate Constitutional Amendment 22, providing 
for the initiative and referendum, passed the 
Senate by a vote of thirty-five to one. The 
Assembly approved SCA 22 by a vote of 
seventy-two to zero one week later. At a special 
election held on October 10, 1911, California 
voters ratified the amendment to Section One of 
Article IV of the constitution by a vote of 
168,744 to 52,093.15 
Although it was not the intent of the 
Progressives, their "direct legislation" reforms 
exacerbated the constitutional brevity problem 
in California. The initiative process made the 
constitution much easier to amend. As a 
consequence, each election year's ballot added 
more statutory law to the constitution 
(excepting 1915, 1935, and 1939 when 
amendments were proposed but none ratified). 
Issues passionately supported by one generation 
became irrelevant to the next. Once etched into 
the organic law, however, enactments are not 
easily removed. By 1948, California's 
constitution had increased to 95,000 words.16 
Concurrent with the unbridled growth of the 
constitution came ballot measures asking 
Californians if a convention to revise the 
constitution should be called. In 1898, 1914, 
1920, and 1930 voters rejected the propositions. 
In December, 1930, the California Constitutional 
Commission established by Governor C. C. 
Young, reported that "constant amendment" 
of the organic law had: 
produced an instrument bad in form, 
inconstant in particulars, loaded with 
unnecessary detail, encumbered with 
provisions of no permanent value, and 
replete with matter which might more 
properly be contained in the statute law 
of the state. 
The Commission unanimously voted for 
revision.17 
In 1934, Californians approved the call for a 
constitutional convention by a vote of 705,915 to 
668,080. Interestingly, revisionists in California 
and in other states were asking for reforms 
similar to those of the present commission. 
According to a 1934 Bureau of Public 
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Administration fact-finding report for the 
California legislature, proposals included: more 
signatures required for initiative constitutional 
amendment than for initiative statute; adoption 
of a single-house legislature, new legislative 
sessions, and a closer relationship between the 
governor and the legislature (as promoted by 
the National Municipal League); elimination of 
any references to executive officers, except 
elected officials; "changes in the machinery" of 
county consolidation; an elective State Board of 
Education; and "alterations" in constitutional 
mandates regarding state allotments to schools. 
The legislature, failing to comply with the 
initiative directive, never provided for the 
conven tion.18 
By the mid 1940s, many Californians, including 
citizen's groups and members of the legislative, 
judicial, and executive branches of government, 
were again critically assessing the condition of 
the state's fundamental law document. In 1947, 
the legislature established an Interim 
Commission for the Revision of the California 
Constitution, composed of ten State Senators 
and ten members of the Assembly. Governor 
Earl Warren appointed a 300-member Citizen's 
Advisory Committee, which he instructed to 
investigate and address constitutional revision 
in statewide public hearings, and then report to 
the Interim Commission.19 
Alonzo L. Baker, political scientist and legal 
scholar who served on the Citizen's Advisory 
Committee, recalled that when the committee 
reported to the legislature in 1948, many 
members recommended "thorough and 
far-reaching revision." But, he added, "the 
twenty members from the Legislature who held 
the residual power would brook no such thing." 
Regarding the Legislative Interim Commission, 
Baker concluded: 
The only accomplishment of note done 
by this Interim Commission was to 
recommend taking out the 14,500 words 
providing for the San Francisco 
Panama-Pacific Exposition of 1915. 
Inasmuch as we were acting one-third of 
a century after that Exposition closed it 
was thought it would do no violence to 
---------------------------------~ 
the Constitution to eliminate the section! 
To be sure, such a portion of the 
Constitution was non-constitutional to 
begin with: it was a travesty on 
constitution-making to put it there in the 
first place. But such is life in California 
when it comes to its basic State 
document.20 
The reform movement did not go away, and, by 
the 1960s, various states were revising their 
constitutions. California, however, had first to 
hurdle the obstacle of legislative resistance to a 
constitutional convention. Both the 1849 and 
1879 framers had provided for major 
constitutional revision only by calling a 
constitutional convention (1849 Article X, 
Section Two, amended in 1853, and 1879 Article 
XVIII, Section Two). The California Legislature 
obviated the necessity of a convention by 
securing voter approval to amend Article XVIII, 
Amending and Revising the Constitution. The 
amendment authorized the legislature to act as 
a constitutional convention, allowing it to 
submit its own revisions to the electors for 
ratification. In November of 1962, California 
voters approved Proposition 7 (Assembly 
Constitutional Amendment No. 14, Statutes, 
1961, Resolution Chapter 222) by a vote of 
--- 21 2,901,537 to 1,428,034. 
Why had the legislature repeatedly resisted a 
constitutional convention? Baker contended that 
"the issue of apportionment of seats in the State 
and Federal Legislatures" was "the greatest 
single barrier to the much-needed revision of 
State Constitutions." Indeed, the 1934 Bureau of 
Public Administration report listed the 
"problem of apportioning the legislature" as an 
issue for constitutional revision?2 
In almost every state, legislatures reapportioned 
their own districts. Following the federal 
two-house model, many legislatures based 
representation in their lower houses on 
population, and in their upper houses on 
geography or counties. In addition, many states 
had not accounted for the great shift of 
populations from rural to urban areas in their 
apportionments, and had not reapportioned 
since the turn of the century. As a result city 
dwellers had become severely underrepresented 
at the state and federal levels. Why would a 
state legislature resist reapportionment? As 
Baker succinctly described it in 1964: 
politicians and office holders in many 
State Legislatures and in the 
Congress . . . have been elected to office 
from grossly malapportioned districts. 
Many of whom know their jobs are at 
stake, for in Congressional redistricting 
and in reapportionment of seats in the 
State Houses many incumbents will be 
on the outside looking in; their base of 
political operations "back home" will be 
considerably altered; perhaps swept 
away altogether?3 
As citizens or local government officials who 
petitioned for equal apportionment were 
repeatedly rebuffed by their state legislatures, 
they appealed to the courts. Several landmark 
Supreme Court decisions, culminating with 
Reynolds v. Sims (377 U.S. 533) in 1964, 
mandated a "both houses" rule for all state 
legislatures. Under the "equal protection" clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, both houses of a 
state legislature had to be based on population. 
By 1964, the Supreme Court had ordered "both 
house" reapportionment in the states of 
Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, New York, 
Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia. Although 
previous decisions handed down by the 
"liberal" Warren Court had disgruntled some 
Americans (school prayer, obscenity cases, 
school desegregation), a popular majority 
concurred with the "one person, one vote" 
doctrine.24 
California's 1849 and 1879 constitutions had 
each provided for popular representation in 
both houses of the legislature. The legislature 
was to determine districts, and to reapportion 
after every federal decennial census. The 1879 
constitution allowed one county to contain more 
than one district if the size of the population 
dictated (and the legislature would have to 
determine that fact), but no county could unite 
with another county to form one district. As we 
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have seen, by 1879 the process of urbanization 
in California had begun, but it had not achieved 
the massive proportions yet to come?5 
By 1960, while California's far northern counties 
of Alpine, Inyo, and Mono contained a 
combined population of 14,240, Los Angeles 
County had achieved urban sprawl with a 
population of 6,011,140 people. Even so, the 
state constitution still provided that no county 
could have more than one senator, and no 
senator could represent more than three 
counties. Calling California's Senate "the most 
grotesquely malapportioned in all the United 
States," Baker predicted in 1964 that the 
Supreme Court would "not long endure the 
present rank discrimination against California 
voters wherein one vote in the 28th Senatorial 
District (Alpine, Inyo, and Mono Counties) is 
worth 400 times as much as a vote in the 
38th District (Los Angeles County)." 26 
Following the Supreme Court rulings and based 
on a federal district court ruling that California's 
Senate was unconstitutionally apportioned 
(Silver v. Jordan, 241, F. Supp. 576, S.D. Cal. 
1964), the California Supreme Court ruled that 
both the Assembly and Senate had to 
reapportion by population (Silver v. Brown, 63 
Cal. 2nd 270). In October of 1965, the California 
Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1 which 
fashioned new Assembly and Senate districts. 
The California Supreme Court later ruled that 
California's congressional districts, as drawn in 
1961, were also unconstitutional and ordered 
reapportionment (Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal. 2nd 
452). Following the guidelines proposed by the 
United States Supreme Court, the California 
Legislature reapportioned its congressional 
districts in 1967?7 
By the 1966 elections, California had complied 
with the court ordered redistricting of Assembly 
and Senate districts. As Larry N. Gerston and 
Terry Christensen have observed, the new 
reapportionment "shifted half of the senate's 
seats from rural northern areas to southern and 
urban locations." California's 1966 legislature, 
with "twenty-two new senators and thirty-three 
first-term Assembly members," was "younger, 
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better educated ... more ideological," and not 
quite as white?8 
The California Legislature created the 
Constitution Revision Commission with 
Assembly Concurrent Resolutions No. 77 and 
No. 7 in 1963 (Statutes, 1963, Resolution Chapter 
181, and First Extraordinary Session, Resolution 
Chapter 7). The Assembly established the 
commission, administered by the Joint 
Committee on Legislative Organization, in order 
to implement the provisions of Proposition 7 
(November, 1962). The resolutions provided for 
a commission consisting of the Joint Committee 
on Legislative Organization, who would appoint 
not more than fifty citizen-members, three 
Senators, appointed by the Senate Rules 
Committee, and three Assembly Members, 
appointed by the Speaker. 29 
To facilitate its labor the Commission 
subdivided into article-committees which 
examined and revised the constitution 
article-by-article. Each committee reported its 
findings to the Commission which, acting as a 
Committee of the Whole, considered and finally 
adopted individual committee reports. The 
Constitution Revision Commission, which sat 
from 1964 to 1974, submitted two major reports 
of recommended revisions to the Legislature in 
1966 and 1968.30 
Beginning with Proposition 1A in November of 
1966, over the next nine year, the Legislature 
submitted fourteen constitutional amendments 
to the voters for their approval. Each ballot 
measure, encompassing the legislature-
approved recommendations of the Constitution 
Revision Commission, proposed amendments to 
individual articles or groups of articles of the 
constitution. All but four of the propositions 
passed at the polls. Its work completed, the 
legislature dissolved the Constitution Revision 
Commission in 1974 
(Joint Rules Committee Resolution 57, 
March 4, 1974)?1 
California and its constitution have weathered 
many changes in 146 years. Throughout, 
reformers and revisionists have seen fit to retain 
the basic organization of state government 
----------------------------~ 
provided for in the 1849 organic law. Reform 
and revision have, however, established two 
precedents for California that contradict the 
constitutional tenets of the original framers. 
Triggered by the 1879 revision and heightened 
by the 1911 "direct legislation" reforms, 
statutory law disorders the document. In 1964, 
Alonzo Baker reported in 1964 that seventy-five 
per cent of the California Constitution contained 
extraneous, non-constitutional material. The 
1966-1974 Constitution Revision Commission 
amendments tidied the clutter, but between 1974 
and 1993 voters approved ninety-seven of 151 
proposed constitutional amendments. A voter 
trend since 1990 has been to reject most 
propositions at the polls, but motivation seems 
to stem from the question "How much will this 
cost?" rather than "Does this really belong in 
the constitution?" 32 
The second contradictory precedent was born of 
the need to correct the first-wholesale revision 
without convening a constitutional convention. 
Article X, Section Two of the 1849 Constitution 
and Article XVIII, Section Two of the 1879 ' 
Constitution provided for constitutional revision 
only by means of a constitutional convention. 
With voter approval in 1962, the California 
Legislature amended the constitution to allow 
for legislature-constructed, partial revision. Like 
its 1963 predecessor, the California Constitution 
Revision Commission (established Statutes 1993, 
Chapter 1243, SB 16) is instructed to discover 
the defects of and recommend the needed 
reforms to certain provisions of the fundamental 
law of the state. 
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The Executive Branch 
Governor's Powers and the 
Lieutenant Governor 
The original framers made provision for a 
popularly elected Lieutenant Governor in 
Article V (Executive Department) of the 1849 
Constitution. Section sixteen provided for the 
election, length of term, and qualifications for 
the office (the same as the Governor), as well as 
for succession to the office of Governor in case 
of any disability of the Lieutenant Governor 
(President pro tempore of the Senate). Section 
seventeen stipulated the causes for the transfer 
of the powers and duties of the executive to the 
Lieutenant Governor such as resignation or 
death, and including absence from the state. 
The twenty-member Committee on the 
Constitution appears to have used the 1846 
constitution of New York as a model for the two 
sections because they are almost verbatim 
reproductions of sections six and seven of 
Article IV of that document. The California 
delegation adopted sections sixteen and 
seventeen of Article IV as reported by the 
committee, without debate, during both 
Committee of the Whole and second reading 
consideration of the executive article. At the 
final reading of Article V, "one or two verbal 
errors corrected, and the article then passed" for 
enrollment in the constitution.33 
At the 1878-79 revision, sections sixteen and 
seventeen, which had not been amended since 
their construction, became sections fifteen and 
sixteen of Article IV (Executive Department) of 
the 1879 document. In its report of the executive 
article, the Committee on the Executive 
Department had revised only the first of the two 
sections by adding a final clause stipulating that 
the Lieutenant Governor could not hold another 
office during his term. The second section, 
providing for the transfer of power and duties, 
remained unchanged from 1849. 
During Committee of the Whole consideration 
of the executive article, delegate James 
O'Sullivan attempted to strike out the new 
clause that had been added to section fifteen by 
the Committee on the Executive Department, 
but the house rejected his proposal. The 
convention adopted both sections fifteen and 
sixteen without further debate in Committee of 
the Whole, or during the first and second 
convention readings of the executive article?4 
The 1879 framers had preserved the 1849 
provisions for a popularly elected Lieutenant 
Governor who assumed the powers and duties 
of the executive when the Governor was out of 
the state. In 1879 at least twenty-two other state 
constitutions provided for a popularly elected 
Lieutenant Governor, and the same number of 
state constitutions stipulated the transfer of 
power when the Governor was out of the state. 
At the November 8, 1898, election voters 
approved Proposition Five (ACA 36), which 
amended sections fifteen and sixteen of Article 
V of the constitution. That portion of section 
fifteen, which provided for succession to the 
executive office (Lieutenant Governor, President 
pro tempore of the Senate), became part of 
section sixteen and was extended to include a 
third level of succession, Speaker of the 
Assembly. The 1879 revision of section fifteen, 
which prohibited the Lieutenant Governor from 
holding another office during his term, was 
deleted. Section sixteen retained the provision 
for the transfer of powers and duties to the 
Lieutenant Governor when the Governor left the 
state. Voters again amended section sixteen in 
1946 (Prop. 14, ACA 4), 1948 (Prop. 9, ACA 14), 
and 1958 (Prop. 7, ACA 5). Each amendment 
affected provisions of the section regarding 
succession to the office of governor. 
State Governance- Page 11 
---------------------------------~ 
The Constitution Revision Commission reported 
their recommendations for the executive Article 
V to the legislature in 1966. As proposed by the 
Article V Committee, the Commission deleted 
some "unnecessary" words and shortened 
section fifteen (new section eight) to two 
sentences: "The Lieutenant Governor shall have 
the same qualifications as the Governor. He is 
President of the Senate but has only a casting 
vote." Provision for the election of the 
Lieutenant Governor would be incorporated 
with section sixteen materials in new section 
nine?5 
The section sixteen order of succession to the 
executive office had, by 1966, been amended to 
(1)Lieutenant Governor, (2) President pro 
tempore of the Senate, (3) Speaker of the 
Assembly, ( 4) Secretary of State, and (5) 
Attorney General. In the new section nine, the 
Commission deleted the line of succession, 
allowing the legislature to determine "an order 
of precedence after the Lieutenant Governor." 
The Commission retained, without comment, 
the provision that the Lieutenant Governor 
"shall act as Governor" during the "absence 
from the state" of the Governor. 36 
Although they retained the instruction that "The 
Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor 
when a vacancy occurs in the office of 
Governor," the Commission noted that the 
constitution contained no provision for 
determining disability of the Governor, or the 
existence of a vacancy. "Concluding that 
decisions on these matters should be, as far as 
possible, free from political pressures," the final 
clause of section nine stated: "The Supreme 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all 
questions arising under this section." 37 
The legislature presented to the voters in 
Proposition 1A (ACA 13), the exact 
recommendations of the Constitution Revision 
Commission, except that they numbered the 
new sections nine and ten and added a final 
clause to section ten. After allowing for the 
Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine all questions, the new section 
concluded: "Standing to raise questions of 
vacancy or temporary disability is vested 
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exclusively in a body provided by statute." On 
November 8, 1966, Californians ratified 
Proposition 1A by a vote of 4,156,416 to 
1,499,675.38 
On November 5, 1974, voters ratified 
Proposition 11 (ACA 99) which amended 
sections nine and ten of Article V. The 
amendments deleted the gender specific 
pronouns "he" and "his," substituting the 
gender neutral"The Lieutenant Governor," and 
the possessive "Governor's" in their place. 
Sections nine and ten of Article V, Executive, 
have not been amended since 1974.39 
Research indicates that the issues before the 
present Constitution Revision Commission 
relating to the Lieutenant 
Governor-Governor's powers and duties 
passing to the Lieutenant Governor when the 
Governor leaves the state, and the separate 
elections of the Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor-have not been historically debated. 
The provisions in question, which date back to 
the 1849 Constitution, have not, until recently, 
been "issues." Since the first statewide elections 
in 1849, California voters have elected 
Governors and Lieutenant Governors of 
different political parties concurrently only 
seven times. More importantly, five of those 
occasions include the last five gubernatorial 
·elections since 1978.40 
1886 Governor Washington Bartlett Democrat 
Lieutenant Governor Robert W. Waterman Republican 
1894 Governor James H. Budd Democrat 
Lieutenant Governor Spenser G. Millard Republican 
1978 Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Democrat 
Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb Republican 
1982 Governor George Deukmejian Republican 
Lieutenant Governor Leo T McCarthy Democrat 
1986 Governor George Deukmejian Republican 
Lieutenant Governor Leo T McCarthy Democrat 
1990 Governor Pete Wilson Republican 
Lieutenant Governor Leo T McCarthy Democrat 
1994 Governor Pete Wilson Republican 
Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis Democrat 
-----------------------------------~ 
Perhaps, as Gerston and Christensen have 
suggested, the opposing-party phenomena can 
be assigned to the relative weakness of the 
Democratic and Republican parties in 
California. Perhaps, as Gerston and Christensen 
have suggested, the California electorate 
perceives and uses the separate-ballot election of 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor as a check 
on the power of the Governor. Whatever the 
cause or combination of causes, the trend is an 
historically recent one.41 
The Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and the State Board 
of Education. 
The original framers provided for a popularly 
elected Superintendent of Public Instruction in 
section one of Article IX, Education, of the 1849 
Constitution. Section one instructed the 
legislature to prescribe the election, duties, and 
compensation of a Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, who would serve a three-year term. 
In 1851, the legislature established the office of 
the Superintendent, and delineated the powers 
and duties of the elected position (Statutes 1851, 
Chapter 126, p. 491). In 1852, the legislature 
established a State Board of Education 
consisting of the Governor, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, and Surveyor General 
(Statutes, 1852, Chapter 53, p. 117). 
Section one of Article V, as reported by the 
Committee on the Constitution at the 1849 
constitutional convention, was copied from the 
1844 Constitution of Iowa, Article X, Section 
One. During Committee of the Whole 
consideration of the Education Article, John 
McDougal, delegate and future Governor of 
California, proposed to amend section one "that 
it be left to the Legislature to elect these 
superintendents." Delegate Morton McCarver 
responded that he "was decidedly in favor of 
placing every thing in the hands of the people, 
and particularly the subject of School 
Commissioners." McDougal withdrew his 
amendment and the house adopted the section 
as reported. During the convention second and 
third readings of the education article the house 
adopted section one, as originally reported, 
without debateY 
In 1862, California voters ratified a legislative 
amendment to section one of Article IX. The 
amendment increased the Superintendent's term 
of office to four years, and provided that the 
Superintendent be elected at the special 
elections for judicial officers (Statutes, 1862, 
C]::lapter 317, pp. 434-35, 579, 586). 
The 1879 framers maintained the provision for 
an elected Superintendent of Public Instruction 
in Article IX, Section Two of the new 
constitution. The new section changed the time 
of election to coincide with gubernatorial 
elections, and specified compensation to be the 
same as for the Secretary of State. Although the 
State Board of Education had been in existence 
since 1852, the 1879 framers did not specifically 
cite it in the final draft of the article. Sections 
three and seven of Article IX provided for the 
election of county superintendents and local 
boards of education. 
During Committee of the Whole consideration 
of section two as reported by the Committee on 
Education, lengthy debate ensued regarding the 
necessity of having a Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and also over the salary he should 
be paid. Delegates such as William F. White, 
who favored abolishing the office of 
Superintendent, argued "in the interest of 
economy." Thomas H. Laine, who called 
superintendents "mere parasites," wanted to 
reduce the salary below that of the Secretary of 
State. The office had cost the state $16,000. over 
the last two years. Volney Howard agreed that 
the education system in California had been 
"costing too much." John R. W. Hitchcock called 
the office "superfluous" and a "waste of 
money." Albert P. Overton complained that the 
school system had cost the taxpayers three 
million dollars and was "the ruination of the 
State." 43 
Delegate Joseph W. Winans, who chaired the 
Committee on Education, cited seventeen other 
state constitutions that specifically provided for 
a popularly elected Superintendent of Public 
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Education. Defending the section he argued that 
California's school system, with about 150,000 
youths enrolled, needed "a single executive 
head." Alexander Campbell warned: "It will not 
do to fritter away the powers of this officer, and 
distribute them here and there at random." It 
was "a false economy." Wilbur F. Heustis, 
Charles W. Cross, Jacob R. Freud, Marion Biggs, 
Eli T. Blackmer, and John T. Wickes defended 
the office of Superintendent as a necessary, 
laborious position of dignity, meriting a salary 
equal to the Secretary of State.44 
James S. Reynolds, a member of the Committee 
on Education, questioned the priorities of the 
delegation: 
Your committee [of the whole] has voted 
to prevent the counties, cities, and 
townships from contracting debts to 
build any school houses at alt but give 
them unlimited privileges of contracting 
debts for Court Houses and jails .... You 
have voted to increase the expense of the 
judiciary from one to two hundred 
thousand dollars per annum, and you 
are opposed to increasing the expenses 
of education. I will admit, sir, that this is 
consistent, for if you are not going to 
have any education you will need more 
judiciary; you will need more Court 
Houses, and you will need more jails. 
Why sir, we had better go to work and 
see how may more penitentiaries the 
State can afford to build. You will want 
some more penitentiaries.45 
The Committee of the Whole finally rejected 
Laine's proposal to cut the salary of the 
Superintendent below that of the Secretary of 
State, and Hitchcock's motion to strike the 
section completely. Section two, as reported by 
the Committee on Education, was adopted by 
the convention. The house adopted the section 
without amendment or further debate during 
the convention first and second readings. 
Section seven of Article IX as originally reported 
by the Committee on Education provided for 
the popular election of a State Board of 
Education consisting of two members elected 
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from each Congressional district. The 
Superintendent of Public Instruction would be 
ex officio President. Section eight delineated the 
duties of the State Board of Education, including 
adopting a series of textbooks, testing of 
teachers, and granting of certificates. In 
Committee of the Whole the convention deleted 
section seven entirely, without debate. They 
amended section eight (which then moved into 
position as section seven) by eliminating 
reference to the State Board of Education and 
substituting local Boards of Education, Boards 
of Supervisors, and County Superintendents. 
The "school book question/' which had vexed 
the legislature for some time (publishing 
lobbies), was better left to local school boards 
and county supervisors.46 
During the convention first reading, Blackmer 
attempted to amend section seven again by 
subjecting local decisions to the approval of the 
legislature. Arguing unsuccessfully that the 
section provided no uniformity or statewide 
standards for textbooks or teachers 
qualifications, Blackmer summarized: "This 
Convention has decided to do away with the 
State Board of Education. I voted against 
striking that out . . . because, in my judgement, 
it is a need of our system." The house rejected 
Blackmer's amendment and concurred with 
Committee of the Whole actions.47 
During the convention second reading, 
delegates again made failed attempts to allow 
legislative authority Thomas B. McFarland was 
in favor of striking out section seven "and 
leaving it to the Legislature to formulate a 
system which this Convention has failed to do." 
Morris M. Estee argued for a "State system" 
with uniform rules, laws, and regulations. "The 
educational interests of this State are the most 
important interests in the state. We ought to 
treat it with all the dignity that belongs to it." 
Future Congressman Marion Biggs accused 
Estee, who had argued against legislative 
control of the Railroad Commission, of political 
inconsistency. " 'Stand by your guns,' " he 
quoted to Estee, " 'and keep your powder 
dry.'" 48 
-----------------------------------~ 
In 1884, a constitutional amendment repealed 
section seven of Article IX and substituted a 
provision similar to the original report of the 
1879 Committee on Education. The State Board 
of Education, consisting of the Governor, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the 
principals of the state normal schools, 
administered the publication and distribution of 
a uniform series of textbooks. The legislature 
gained authority over county Boards of 
Education and county Superintendents. A 1912 
amendment to section seven extended 
legislative authority over the State Board of 
Education. The Legislature would provide for 
the election or appointment of a State Board of 
Education. 
In 1968 the Constitution Revision Commission 
reported their proposed revisions for Article IX 
to the Legislature. They noted that the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction "is elected 
statewide under existing provisions." The 
Commission proposed that "the Legislature may 
change the method of selection by two-thirds 
vote of the members of each house." Regarding 
the State Board of Education, the Commission 
reported: "The Legislature's power to determine 
the method of selection under existing 
provisions is preserved under the proposaL 
Statutes presently provide for the appointment 
by the Governor with Senate approvaL" At the 
November, 1968 elections, Proposition 1 
(ACA 30), encompassing the Commission's 
recommendations, failed at the polls.49 
California voters ratified Proposition 6 (ACA 60) 
on June 2, 1970. The amendment, which favored 
local choice of appropriate textbooks, reduced 
section seven to "The Legislature shall provide 
for the appointment or election of the State 
Board of Education and a board of Education in 
each county." (Proposition 8, 1976 added the 
present provision for joint county boards). 
Proposition 6 of 1970 also added the present 
section 7.5 which provides that the State Board 
of Education adopt textbooks for grades one 
through eight statewide, to be furnished 
without cost. Proposition 11 of 1974 repealed the 
gender specific "he" and "his" from section two, 
and Proposition 140 (Political Reform Initiative 
of 1990) limited to not more than two the terms 
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.50 
Insurance Commissioner 
Neither the 1849 nor the 1879 framers provided 
for an Insurance Commissioner, appointed or 
elected, in the California Constitution. The 
Legislature had provided for the office of 
Insurance Commissioner as early as 1868, but 
the office did not become an elected one until 
1988 when voters ratified Proposition 103. 
Proposition 103, an initiative statute, added 
Section 12900 to the Insurance Code which 
provided for the popular election of an 
Insurance Commissioner at gubernatorial 
elections. 
The history of the office of the Insurance 
Commissioner is statutory rather than 
constitutional. Chapter 300, which established 
the office of Insurance Commissioner, 
transferred the powers and duties relating to 
insurance companies in California from the 
State Controller to the new Commissioner 
(Statutes, 1867-1868, Chapter 300, p. 336). 
Insurance companies nominated the Insurance 
Commissioner at statewide conventions. The 
Governor either approved the nomination or 
appointed another person to serve annually. 
Section 368 of the Political Code, established in 
1872, provided for an Insurance 
Commissioner-an executive officer, appointed 
by the Governor, subject. to the approval of the 
Senate. In 1915, the Legislature amended 
Political Code Section 368 to provide that the 
Insurance Commissioner serve four-year terms. 
Provisions for the Insurance Commissioner were 
transferred from the Political Code to the 
Insurance Code when it was established in 1935 
(Statutes, 1935, Chapter 145). 
According to the text of the initiative statute, the 
"voter revolt" that lead to the construction and 
passage of Proposition 103 in 1988 resulted from 
"enormous increases in the cost of insurance," 
making insurance "unaffordable and 
unavailable to millions of Californians." 
Insurance "reform" was necessary because 
existing laws "inadequately" protected 
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consumers from the "excessive, unjustified, and 
arbitrary rates" of insurance companies. In 
addition to reforms such as rate roll backs, the 
initiative provided for an "accountable" 
Insurance Commissioner who would be 
popularly elected. Section Four of the initiative 
statute that added Section 12900 to the 
Insurance Code, read: "12900 (a) The 
commissioner shall be elected by the People in 
the same place and manner and for the same 
h G II 51 term as t e overnor. 
The question of whether popular election 
provides accountability or does not requires 
further inquiry, but an instructional story of 
Governor accountability is told in the 
unprocessed papers of the Insurance 
Commissioner at the California State Archives. 
The Watts Riots in Los Angeles of August 11-17, 
1965 had resulted in the destruction of 
$140 million in property.52 Soon after, business 
owners in or near the affected area began 
sending letters of complaint to the office of the 
Insurance Commissioner. Citing reasons of 
high-risk, insurance companies were cancelling 
the property insurance of the business owners. 
Similar riots had been set off in other cities in 
the country. In those tense, volatile times 
another riot could easily be sparked. In their 
letters to the Commissioner business owners 
explained that, without insurance, they risked 
financial ruin. 
The letters of reply from the Commissioner's 
office asserted that he was unable to help the 
business owners because the Commissioner did 
not have that type of regulatory authority over 
private insurance companies in California. The 
rebuffed and desperate consumers then 
petitioned the office of the person who, because 
he had appointed the Commissioner, was 
ultimately accountable. Correspondence began 
. to appear from Governor Pat Brown to the 
Insurance Commissioner inquiring about the 
situation, and offering suggestions for remedy. 
Administrative records of the Insurance 
Commissioner indicate that the office had soon 
established a review board and was considering 
the cases of the business owners with cancelled 
policies on an individual basis. 
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State Treasurer 
Section Eighteen of Article V, Executive 
Department, of the 1849 Constitution provided 
for the popular election of a Secretary of State, a 
Comptroller, a Treasurer, an Attorney General, 
and Surveyor General. The New York 
Constitution of 1846 (Article V, Section 1), which 
probably served as a model for the 1849 
framers, carried a similar provision for all of the 
above officers except the Surveyor General. 
During Committee of the Whole and 
Convention second reading consideration of the 
Executive article, debate focused on the 
necessity of a popularly elected Comptroller. 
The House did not question or debate the office 
of Treasurer. 
An 1862 legislative amendment changed the 
word "Comptroller" to "Controller," and 
provided for the election of all the named 
officers at the same time, place, and manner as 
the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Their 
terms of office would be the same as that of the 
Governor (Statutes, 1862, Chapter 317, pp. 
434-35, 582). The 1879 framers retained the 1849 
section as amended in 1862, making only a 
o-rammatical correction and relocating it to 
Section Seventeen of the Executive Article V. 
The House adopted the section without debate 
durino- Committee of the Whole consideration of 0 
the article, and during the Convention first and 
second readings. 
Between 1879 and 1966, the only constitutional 
amendments having any effect on the ofice of 
the Treasurer were those ratified in 1946, 1948, 
and 1958 (see above item one), which provided 
for a line of succession to the executive in case 
of the incapacity of the Governor or Lieutenant 
Governor. By 1946, the line of succession had 
extended down to the State Treasurer. As we 
have seen, as recommended by the Constitution 
Revision Commission, Proposition 1A of 1966 
repealed the existing line of succession and 
transferred the authority to determine 
succession to the Legislature. 
Besides the addition of the Lieutenant Governor 
to the list of popularly elected constitutional 
---------------------------------~ 
officers, the Constitution Revision Commission 
made no substantial changes to Section 
Seventeen (new Section Ten). Their 1966 draft 
report commented: "In order to obtain greater 
consistency in draftsmanship, the Lieutenant 
Governor was added to the list of officers in 
existing Section 17. Other changes are in 
phraseology only." 53 
Proposition 1A, ratified by the voters on 
November 8, 1966, contained the revision 
recommended by the Constitution Revision 
Commission (except that it had been 
renumbered Section Eleven): "The Lieutenant 
Governor, Attorney General, Controller, 
Secretary of State, and Treasurer shall be elected 
at the same time and places and for the same 
term as the Governor." Proposition 140, the 
Political Reform Initiative of November 6, 1990, 
added the final sentence to the present Section 
Eleven limiting each officer to two terms.54 
Board of Equalization 
The 1849 framers did not provide for a Board of 
Equalization, but they did mandate that taxes be 
equal and uniform throughout the state; that 
property be taxed according to its value; and 
that assessors be elected in the district or county 
in which the property is situated (Article XI, 
Miscellaneous Provisions, Section Thirteen). 
The provision, which was not part of the 
original draft report of the article, was first 
introduced by Henry W. Halleck of Monterey on 
behalf "of the southern members," during 
Committee of the Whole consideration of Article 
XL The section, probably drafted by Pablo de la 
Guerra of Santa Barbara, was similar to a 
provision in the Constitution of Alabama 
(Browne, Debates pp. 256, 364-65, 371). 
Debate over the section was lengthy, and had 
the effect of splitting the delegation 
geographically into north versus south. Because 
there was no "capitation tax," state tax revenue 
would necessarily come from property, or, more 
precisely, land. The larger land holders, 
therefore, would shoulder most of the tax 
burden. Shouldn't those persons who were 
earning money in the mines and who were the 
larger population be taxed, even though they 
did not necessarily own land? 
Concentrated principally in the southern part of 
the state, the Californio, ranchers had only a 
vague understanding of the Anglo-American 
valuation of land for taxation. For the 
Californios the value of their lands had been 
based on the cattle the land produced, rather 
than its potential as sub-divided real estate. 
Spanish and Mexican law prohibited the 
subdivision and sale of a land grant. It was 
important for the Californios to have locally 
elected assessors who understood their 
valuation. The Mexican delegates perhaps knew 
that the only way they could realize the 
Anglo-based assessed value of their land was to 
sell it. After considerable debate, the House 
concurred with the section, as adopted in 
Committee of the Whole and amended during 
the convention second reading (As adopted, 
Section 13 copied in part Section 27 of Art. XI of 
Texas's 1845 Constitution, provision for locally 
elected assessors added. Brown, Debates, pp. 
364-76). 
To facilitate the mandate for equal and uniform 
taxation the Legislature established the Board of 
Equalization in 1870 (Statutes, 1869-1870, 
Chapter 489, p. 714). The Board consisted of the 
Controller and two Governor-appointed 
members, serving at his pleasure, for a term of 
four years. After codification in 1872, provision 
for the Board of Equalization, its members and 
their salaries, could be found in Political Code 
Section 3696. 
In an ironic interpretation of the intent of the 
1849 framers, the California Supreme Court in 
1874 found that Section 3696 of the Political 
Code was unconstitutional (Houghton v. Austin, 
47 Cal. 646) .. The court removed the Board of 
Equalization's power to change property 
valuations of county assessors because Section 
Thirteen of Article XI of the constitution had 
mandated that assessors had to be elected in the 
district or county in which the property was 
located. An 1876 amendment to the Political 
Code provided for a State Board of Equalization 
which consisted of the Governor, Controller, and 
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Attorney General. The Legislature repealed the 
old provision for salaries (Statutes, 1875-1876, 
Chapter 577, p. 11). 
By making a constitutional provision for the 
Board of Equalization, the 1879 framers assured 
its continued existence and returned the 
authority that the California Supreme Court had 
stripped from it in 1874. The new Board 
consisted of the Controller and one member 
elected from each congressional district of the 
state, to serve four-year terms (Article XIIt 
Revenue and Taxation, Sections Nine and Ten). 
The 1879 debate regarding the Board of 
Equalization indicates that the convention did 
not question the necessity of the existence of the 
Board, or that the members should be elected. 
Debate focused on the number of Board 
members, and the power of the Board to change 
individual assessments. The statements of many 
delegates show a strong central motivation for 
interest in the Board of Equalization. Unlike the 
1849 Californios struggling to maintain a 
doomed livelihood, the 1879 reformers seemed 
determined to revitalize and strengthen the 
Board in preparation for corning battle. 
Powerful interests, such as the Southern Pacific 
Railroad and Miller and Lux, had already used 
the courts to render the Board impotent. The 
Board of Equalization had become another 
weapon of reform.55 
On November 4, 1884, voters ratified a 
constitutional amendment authorizing the 
Legislature to redistrict the state into four 
equalization districts, and to provide for the 
elections of Board of Equalization members 
from those districts rather than congressional 
districts. On November 8, 1910, voters ratified 
an amendment which deleted all but the first 
sentence of Section Ten of Article XIIt which 
maintained the 1849 provision for local 
assessment of property. The amendment also 
created a new Section Fourteen that greatly 
expanded the provisions taken from Section Ten 
regarding assessments of railroads. The new 
section, consisting of almost 2,000 words, 
delineated in great detail tax assessment for 
public utilities, personal property, and insurance 
companies in California. 
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Records of the Constitution Revision 
Commission indicate that as early as 1964, the 
Joint Committee on Legislative Organization, 
which administered the Commission, was 
scrutinizing the lengthy and ponderous Article 
XIII on Revenue and Taxation. 
Recommendations of the Commission made no 
substantive changes in the provision for an 
elected State Board of Equalization, however. By 
November 5, 1974, the Legislature had placed 
the work of the Revision Commission on the 
ballot. Proposition 8 (ACA 32) applied solely to 
Article XIII, deleting 8,200 words, and 
transferring many provisions to the statutes 
books. Sections Nine and Ten of the 1879 Article 
XIII essentially became new Sections Seventeen, 
Eighteen, and Nineteen of Article XIII of the 
present constitution. Proposition 140, "The 
Political Reform Act of 1980/' limited to two the 
terms of any Board of Equalization member. 
State Personnel Board 
There were no provisions for a civil service 
system in either the 1849 or 1879 constitutions. 
The system, which became constitutional in 
1934, had a statutory history prior to that time. 
The Legislature established a civil service 
system for California in 1913 (Statutes, 1913, 
Chapter 590, p. 1035). The State Civil Service 
Commission, a three-member body appointed 
by the Governor for four-year terms, was 
created to administer the system. The statute 
provided for the salaries of the commissioners, 
and included a proviso that a commissioner 
could be removed only by an Assembly and 
Senate concurrent resolution adopted by a 
two-thirds vote of each house. 
In 1921, the Legislature reorganized the State 
Civil Service Commission (Statutes, 1921, 
Chapter 601, p. 1020). One member would be 
designated as the executive, ex officio president 
and principal administrator. The statute outlined 
the duties of the two remaining members who 
were designated as associates, and established 
salaries. In 1925 the Legislature again 
reorganized the Civil Service Commission, 
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reducing it to one member with a higher salary 
(Statutes, 1925, Chapter 236, p. 391). In 1927 the 
Legislature reorganized the State Civil Service 
Commission still another time, changing it back 
to its 1921 configuration of three members and 
authorizing travelling expenses (Statutes, 1927, 
Chapter 43, p. 75). 
In 1929 the Legislature established a new 
Division of Personnel and Organization within 
the Department of Finance to administer the 
state civil service system. The statute transferred 
the former powers and duties of the State Civil 
Service Commission to the new Division of 
Personnel and Organization. Members of the 
Civil Service Commission, with the approval of 
the Director of Finance, would appoint the Chief 
of the new Division who was given the former 
duties of the executive of the State Civil Service 
Commission. The Department of Finance 
retained the State Civil Service Commission as a 
"quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial body." 56 
Proposition 7, the initiative constitutional 
amendment that established Article XXIV 
(State Civil Service) in 1934, created the State 
Personnel Board as its administrative head and 
abolished the Division of Personnel and 
Organization. The Board consisted of five 
members appointed by the Governor, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, for ten-year 
terms. The first Board would consist of the 
Director of Finance, the Legislative Counsel, and 
the Controller, as ex officio members, plus two 
Governor-appointed members. Members could 
be removed only by a two-thirds vote of each 
house of the Legislature, and compensation for 
members would be the same as for the previous 
Division of Personnel and Organization. The 
Board was "authorized to appoint an executive 
officer who should be a member of the state 
civil service, but not a member of the board." 57 
Proponents of civil service reform Proposition 7 
explained in the ballot arguments why members 
of the Personnel Board served ten-year terms: 
The act provides a nonpartisan Personnel 
Board of five members to serve ten-year 
terms so staggered that each new 
Governor will have but one appointment 
on a five-man board upon taking office. 
This four-to-one ration will be an 
effective means of preventing political 
interference with the efficient 
administration of State business.58 
In their consideration of Article XXIV for 
revision in 1965, the Constitution Revision 
Commission determined to "continue to provide 
for the Personnel Board," serving ten-year 
terms. 59 
Proposition 14 of 1970 (ACA 36), revised the 
Civil Service Article XXIV as recommended by 
the Constitution Revision Commission. The 
sections which had originally provided for 
membership and compensation and duties of 
the Personnel Board, Sections 2(a), (b), (c), and 
3(a), stayed substantially the same (except for 
the addition of 3(b)). Proposition 14 of 1976 
(ACA 40), which repealed Article XXIV and 
created the present Article VIII, maintained the 
1970 organization of the Personnel Board-five 
appointed members serving ten-year terms 
with a directive to enforce the civil service 
statutes-in Sections 2(a), (b), (c), and 3(a) 
and (b). 
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THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
Legislative Structure 
The framers of both the 1849 and 1879 
Constitutions provided for a two-house 
Legislature, consisting of a Senate and Assembly 
(Article IV, Legislative Department, Section 
One). Both conventions adopted the provisions 
without debate. The question of a unicameral 
legislature was not entertained. The federal 
government had instituted a bicameral 
legislature, and it was the adopted practice of 
the states. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
convention proceedings do not contain historical 
debate on the subject. 
As a champion of the newly constructed, and as 
yet unratified, Constitution of the United States, 
James Madison eloquently argued that 
bicameralism would help bring "order and 
stability" to the new government (The 
Federalist, No. 62). He advocated a "second/' 
"distinct" legislative branch as a check on the 
first branch. As unfortunately occurs in 
republican governments, Madison argued, 
elected representatives 
may forget their obligations to their 
constituents and prove unfaithful to their 
important trust. In this point of view a 
senate, as a second branch of the 
legislative assembly distinct from and 
dividing power with the first, must be in 
all cases a salutary check on the 
government. It doubles the security to 
the people by requiring the concurrence 
of two distinct bodies in schemes of 
usurpation or perfidity, where the 
ambition or corruption of one would 
otherwise be sufficient.60 
The Articles of Confederation (1778) had 
provided for a single-house Congress of 
"annually appointed" representatives from the 
various states who served no more "than three 
years in any term of six years." Madison's 
treatise, as much an indictment of the Articles as 
a defense of the new Constitution, offered the 
upper house of senators serving six-year terms 
as a check on the "important errors" of 
short-term, unmotivated legislatures. 
[N]o small share of the present 
embarrassments of America is to be 
charged on the blunders of our 
governments .... What indeed are all 
the repealing, explaining, and amending 
laws, which fill and disgrace our 
voluminous codes, but so many 
monuments of deficient wisdom; so 
many impeachments exhibited by each 
succeeding against each preceding 
session.61 
Every state election changed one-half of the 
congressional representatives. The "rapid 
succession of new members," no matter how 
qualified they were, led to capricious "public 
councils." A Senate would provide "some stable 
institution in the government." Inconstant 
nations, like inconstant people, fall victim to 
their own "unsteadiness and folly." America, 
Madison lamented, "is held in no respect by her 
friends ... is the derision of her enemies; 
and . . . is a prey to every nation which has an 
interest in speculating on her fluctuating 
councils and embarrassed affairs." 62 
"Mutable policy" had proven even more 
disastrous internally. The "sagacious, the 
enterprising, and the moneyed few" gained 
unfair advantage "over the industrious and 
uniformed" masses by following and investing 
in fluctuating commerce and revenue laws. 
Inconstancy and instability "poisons the 
blessings of liberty itself." 
It will be of little avail to the people that 
the laws are made by men of their own 
choice if the laws be so voluminous that 
they cannot be read, or so incoherent 
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that they cannot be understood; if they 
be repealed or revised before they are 
promulgated, or undergo such incessant 
changes that no man, who knows what 
the law is today, can guess what it will 
be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule 
of action; but how can that be a rule, 
which is little known, and less fixed? 63 
"No government," Madison concluded, "any 
more than an individual, will long be respected 
without being truly respectable; nor be truly 
respectable without possessing a certain portion 
of order and stability." The document that 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay had so diligently defended proved 
successful. An indisputable masterpiece of 
organic law, the Constitution of the United 
States commanded the respect of many nations. 
It's provisions for such institutions as 
bicameralism helped bring order and stability to 
America.64 
Warning the delegation against "legislative 
enactments" in the organic law, and reminding 
them that the people had charged them with 
preparing "a system by which they can enact 
laws for themselves," delegate Charles T. Botts 
said at the 1849 convention: "No civilized 
people pretend to pass laws without at least 
making them run the gauntlet of two Houses, 
differently constituted." By 1849, when the 
framers of California's first constitution set 
about their work, Madison's doctrine of 
bicameralism had become as inviolable as the 
federal constitution itself.65 
As we have seen, after the turn of the century, 
the issue of reapportionment had prevented 
constitutional revision by convention in 
California. The reapportionment problem also 
opened the discussion for unicameral 
legislatures. According to David W. Brady and 
Brian J. Gaines 'there have been a dozen serious 
efforts to bring unicameralism to California." 
Differing "in myriad respects," each successive 
proposal has "had less to do with 
unicameralism than some other proposed 
change." As early as 1913, regional tensions 
brought on by the reapportionment issue had 
"manifested in various plans to re-organize the 
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legislature." In 1913 and 1915, legislators 
proposed unicameral constitutional 
amendments in both the Senate and Assembly. , 
If they got as far as a vote, however, the bills 
failed 
to get the necessary two-thirds majority 
(1913-SCA 73, ACA 91; 1915-SCA 16, 
ACA 38).66 
The 1920 census clearly revealed the results of 
urbanization-the majority of Americans lived 
in cities. In California, seventy percent of the 
population lived in the San Francisco Bay area 
counties and in the cities of Los Angeles County 
and adjacent southern counties. In 1910, 
thirty-four percent of California's population 
lived in the Bay Area counties, thirty-two 
percent lived in the southern counties. By 1920, 
the shift that would define California's future 
urban concentration had begun. Los Angeles 
and the south, with a population of 1,346,600, 
had overtaken San Francisco and the north's 
population of 1,069,541 (thirty-nine percent and 
thirty-one percent respectively of the total state 
population of 3,426,861).67 
After 1920, apportionment standoffs in the 
California legislature occurred at two levels: 
urban versus rural, and north versus south. For 
the next forty-four years, until the federal and 
state supreme courts decided the issue for the 
legislature, the apportionment battle and 
accompanying plans for legislative 
reorganization continued. Unicameral legislative 
constitutional amendment~, if they did reach a 
vote and many did not, never won the 
necessary two-thirds majority (SCA 18, 1921; 
SCA 34, 1923; SCA 12, 1925; SCA 6, ACA 69, 
1935; SCA 21, ACA 28, ACA 33, 1937; ACA 24, 
1939; ACA 17, 1941).68 
In 1934, when California voters approved a call 
for a constitutional convention (the one that the 
legislature never enacted), several states were 
appraising unicameralism. By 1936 unicameral 
bills had been considered in twelve states. The 
following year twenty-one states considered 
over forty such proposals. Nebraska had 
adopted a non-partisan, single-house legislature 
in 1934, but was the only state to ever actually 
enact that reform.69 
------------------------------~ 
Brady and Gaines have noted that after 1964, 
unicameralism continued to resurface as a 
popular reform into the early 1970s. Issues that 
had always underscored the debate became the 
defining issues after reapportionment settled. 
Before 1964, 
Proponents looked to unicameralism to 
improve: (1) efficiency; (2) economy, and 
(3) responsibility. Moreover, the claim 
was often made that the legacy of Hiram 
Johnson's Progressive governorship was 
an increase in "executive control and 
leadership" that left the two-house 
legislature "unwieldy and cumbersome." 
Economy became a "relatively minor issue" 
after 1964. "The central issues, instead, were 
efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in 
executive-legislative relations." 70 
In the March 1965 staff report of the 
Constitution Revision Commission to the 
Executive Committee of that body, 
recommended revisions to Section One, Article 
IV included only simplification of language and 
deletion of statutory material. Bicameralism was 
not addressed. 
The language of existing Section 1 which 
vests legislative power in the Legislature 
and reserves initiative and referendum 
powers to the people has been 
simplified. The provision requiring every 
statute to have an enacting clause as 
specified has been deleted; it is to be 
placed in the Government Code because 
it does not involve a basic constitutional 
right. 
Following a "more rational organization of 
Article IV" the Commission recommended 
removal of the lengthy material added to section 
one in 1911 (Initiative and Referendum) to the 
end of the article.71 
The revision ratified by the voters in 1966 
(Proposition 1A) is today' s simplified Section 
One: 
The legislative power of this State is 
vested in the California Legislature 
which consists of the Senate and 
Assembly, but the people reserve to 
themselves the powers of initiative and 
referendum: 
The lengthy initiative and referendum materials 
were removed to the end of Article IV sections 
twenty-two through twenty-six.72 
Shorten Legislative Sessions 
The 1849 constitutional framers provided for 
annual sessions of the legislature, commencing 
on the first Monday of January, but did not 
stipulate how long each session should run 
(Article IV, Legislative Department, Section 
Two)'. The section as reported by the Committee 
on the Constitution copied Iowa's 1844 
constitution in wording and structure, except 
that the space for "annual" or "biennial" was 
left blank to be determined by the convention. 
Iowa's constitution of 1844 provided for biennial 
legislative sessions (Article IV, Section Two). 
During Committee of the Whole consideration 
of the section debate centered on the question of 
annual or biennial sessions. Delegates William 
M. Gwin, Oliver M. Wozencraft, Morton M. 
McCarver, Jacob R. Snyder, and Elam Brown 
argued for biennial sessions. Gwin and 
Wozencraft asserted that annual sessions would 
be expensive and lead to excessive legislation. 
Gwin noted that all the new states had biennial 
sessions-Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Tennessee, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, 
Wisconsin, and Michigan. In Iowa a legislator 
got two dollars a day for a maximum of fifty 
days, and one dollar a day after that. The 
expense would be much greater in inflationary 
California. McCarver asked how the revenue 
would be raised to defray the expense of an 
annual legislature? A land tax would be 
"oppressive" to the limited land owners, and a 
capitation tax "revolting." Brown feared 
speedily enacted and repealed laws. Laws need 
time to be tested. Additionally, no matter how 
wealthy California was, the worst policy a new 
state could adopt was "to establish an expensive 
system of government." 73 
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Delegates Robert Semple, Myron Norton, Henry 
W. Halleck, Charles T. Botts, Edward Gilbert, 
and Winfield S. Sherwood favored annual 
sessions. Semple argued that biennial sessions 
would not allow enough time to enact an entire 
code of laws for California. It would be 
"impossible" to keep legislators at the capital 
for more than two or three months a year. "The 
rapid progress of affairs in this country, and the 
great value of time, would render a longer 
session impracticable." Norton exclaimed "We 
have no laws here." Regarding the expense, 
"What of that?" California had proportionate 
means. "We have great wealth here." 74 
Halleck asserted that "If there is a country in the 
world, at the present time, that requires the 
Legislature to meet at least once a year, it is 
California." The Legislature had to enact new 
laws to provide for the "peculiar circumstances" 
of California. In addition, there was an 
"immense emigration directing its course into 
California." If necessary limit the length of each 
session "to a certain number of days or 
months," but keep the sessions annual.75 
Botts feared that biennial sessions would leave 
too much power to the Governor in the interim. 
The people of California "will not be content 
that any one man power should govern them in 
retracting or improving the laws which they 
may make." Regarding the expense, everything 
was expensive in California. The people were, 
however, "the most wealthy in the world." 
Gilbert reminded Gwin that all of the biennial 
states that he named had seven to thirty years 
experience as territories, allowing time to 
establish and work out their first laws. 
"Nothing but annual sessions would answer the 
demands of the community" for the repeal and 
replacement of the "repugnant" system now in 
place?6 
The convention, in Committee of the Whole, 
adopted annual sessions. Gwin tried to amend 
the section during the convention second 
reading with "until otherwise provided by law." 
The proviso allowed the legislature or the 
people the opportunity to change to biennial 
sessions after a few years without having to 
amend the constitution. After the same debate 
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as occurred in Committee of the Whole the 
delegation rejected Gwin's amendment by a 
vote of eight to twenty-five. By 1862 Section 
Two had been amended to change to biennial 
sessions commencing on the first Monday in 
December rather than January. The amendment 
(Chapter 317, Statutes, 1862) also limited 
legislative sessions to 120 days.77 
The 1879 framers adopted biennial legislative 
meetings, but changed the commencement back 
to the first Monday in January. With the 
exception of the session following ratification of 
the constitution which could run 100 days, 
regular sessions of the legislature could not 
exceed sixty days without a loss in pay. The 
delegation added a final clause to the new 
Article IV Section Two prohibiting the 
introduction of any bill after fifty days from the 
commencement of any regular session without a 
two-thirds vote of the members. (The first 
session was allowed ninety days). 
During the 1878-79 debates a general mood of 
distrust and loss of faith with the legislature 
prevailed. The Workingmen delegates had run 
on the platform: "There shall be no special 
legislation by the state legislature, and no state 
legislature should meet oftener than once in 
every four years." Workingmen delegates 
William F. White, and Charles C. O'Donnell, and 
Non-Partisans George A. Johnson, and Edward 
Martin spoke in favor of "quadrennial" sessions. 
Calling the legislature a "most expensive body," 
White said that his constituents "have felt the 
greatest anxiety to have them adjourn." 
Legislators were becoming professional, "going 
into politics as a business." If the legislature met 
only once in four years, the "office hunters" 
would "be obliged to go at some honest 
employment." 78 
Johnson and Martin spoke in the interests of 
economy and popular sentiment. Although 
quadrennial sessions were a "novelty," Johnson 
believed "a better class of men" would be 
elected, "and the interests of the people of this 
State will be looked after better than they are at 
present." Martin said that his constituents 
favored the legislature meeting once in four 
years. "In fact," he added, "they do not care if it 
----------------------------------~ 
never meets. They can get along without it." 
Noting that there wasn't a "State in the Union," 
or "a civilized government in creation" where 
the legislature met only once in four years, the 
convention rejected the quadrennial proposal?9 
Section Two, as originally reported by the 
Committee on the Legislative Department, 
prohibited any regular session from exceeding 
sixty days, except the first session called after 
the adoption of the constitution which could 
meet for eighty days. Non-Partisans George V. 
Smith, Walter Van Dyke, and Jonathan V. 
Webster, and Workingmen delegate Henry 
Larkin, preferred that the constitution limit the 
pay of legislators rather than the length of 
sessions. Smith believed that limiting pay to 
sixty days would keep regular sessions short. 
More important than economy, short sessions 
were desirable because "the longer the 
Legislature that is not doing good work is in 
session the more chance there is for evil." 
Additionally, "[t]he policy has been in most of 
the states to reduce the time of service." 80 
Van Dyke argued that if you limit the time of 
the session the legislature "would be driven in 
the last few days to consider the most important 
legislation," resulting in "hasty and ill 
considered" laws. By limiting compensation 
"you accomplish the whole purpose, and then 
let the terms be continued until the work is 
completed ... properly and in order." If the 
legislature was facing a "matter of great 
importance," Webster concluded, "they should 
not be cut-off from enactment of good laws by a 
constitutional provision." But, if you cut their 
pay after a specified time, the legislature was 
"not likely to stay longer than is absolutely 
necessary to enact the legislation which is 
before them." 81 
David S. Terry and Joseph A. Filcher, 
Non-Partisan members of the Committee on the 
Legislative Department, defended the section 
they had drafted. Filcher stated that the popular 
reforms demanded were already in the section 
as reported. "The evil of special legislation is 
aimed at. The lobby influence is aimed at." No 
delegate had proposed any improvement. He 
asked the convention to quit "trifling" with the 
section and "get on to other and more important 
business." Workingmen delegate Charles 
Beerstecher sarcastically proposed an 
amendment: "There shall be no Legislature 
convened from and after the adoption of this 
Constitution, in this State, and any person who 
shall be guilty of suggesting that a Legislature 
be held, shall be punished as a felon without the 
benefit of clergy." The section as amended 
limited the pay rather than the time of regular 
sessions to sixty days, and increased the (pay) 
limit of the first session from eighty to 100 
days.82 
During the 1878-79 debate, the belief that 
limiting the legislature would shift excessive 
power to the executive resurfaced. Echoing 1849 
delegate Charles T. Botts' sentiment that an 
unassembled legislature leaves only the 
governor, Workingmen delegate Peter J. Joyce 
mistrusted his party's call for quadrennial 
sessions. Corrupt corporations advocate 
abolition of legislatures and "go in for putting 
power in the hands of the Governors." The 
legislature had passed corrupt bills, but, he 
wanted to know, "how many of these corrupt 
bills have ever been vetoed by the Governors of 
this State?" Larkin, who preferred annual over 
quadrennial sessions, said "[t]he policy of a 
republican government" was to "bring the 
representatives a little nearer to the people." He 
believed in "bringing the Government as near to 
the people as possible." He did not believe in 
"leaving it to the Governor." 83 
Filcher stated that his "most vital objection" to 
the proposals of the convention regarding 
legislative sessions was "the idea of so long 
absenting the people from those who have 
power over them." The convention could not 
afford to endorse such a policy. 
The idea that the administration and the 
Legislature could come in here 
simultaneously and go out together is 
not a good one. The administration 
would be absolutely left to itself during 
its term. Assuming that the Governor 
should become implicated in some 
nefarious practices, I ask you what 
power there is under such a system to 
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reach him? You provide that the 
Governor may be impeached, but as 
soon as the sixty days of the Legislature 
are over he is left to himself. One of the 
best features of our government is that 
the officers are frequently brought face to 
face with those whom the people elect to 
scrutinize their action. The oftener you 
can send up persons directly from the 
people, and in this capacity legislators 
come, to look into and examine the 
affairs of the State, and confront the 
officers enlisted with power by the 
people, the better your government.84 
At the special election of October 10, 1911 which 
provided for initiative and referendum, voters 
ratified a constitutional amendment to Section 
Two which provided for bifurcated biennial 
legislative sessions. Each session, beginning in 
January as provided in 1879, commenced in 
odd-numbered years and continued for thirty 
calendar days only. After a mandatory 
"constitutional recess" of not less than thirty 
calendar days, both houses of the legislature 
reassembled for the second part of the session. 
The first part of the session was for the 
introduction of bills, and only urgency measures 
were passed. After the recess the legislature 
considered the bills presented in January. No 
new bills could be introduced without a 
two-thirds vote of both houses. The 
constitutional recess was instituted in order to 
provide time for the public to read and analyze 
measures that had been introduced durincr the b 
first thirty days. 85 
Between 1947 and 1966 the legislature met in 
annual general and budget sessions. A 
November 5, 1946 constitutional amendment to 
Article IV, Section Two switched the legislature 
back to annual sessions. General sessions 
commenced in the odd-numbered years, and 
budget sessions commenced in the 
even-numbered years. General sessions 
remained bifurcated with a thirty-day bill 
introduction period, a thirty-day recess, 
followed by an unspecified period to consider 
the bills introduced in January. Budget sessions 
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convened on the first Monday in March in the 
even-numbered years.86 
A 1949 constitutional amendment limited the 
second half of the general session to 120 
calendar days, exclusive of the recess. The 
amendment also restricted the budget session to 
thirty calendar days, consideration of the 
following fiscal year's Budget Bill and its 
appropriate revenue acts, approval or rejection 
of city and county charters and charter 
amendments, and acts necessary for session 
expenses. 87 
A November 6, 1956 constitutional amendment 
added subdivision (c) to Section Two or Article 
IV which changed the meeting date of the 
budget session to the first Monday in February. 
After the Budget Bill was introduced during a 
budget session, both houses could take a 
thirty-day recess, and then reconvene for a 
session not to exceed thirty days. Between 1958 
and 1966, the legislature was able to pass the 
Budget Bill without reconvening in 
extraordinary sessions only once in 1960.88 
On November 4, 1958 voters ratified Proposition 
9 (ACA 36), which abolished the constitutional 
recess and limited general sessions to 120 
calendar days, not includincr Saturdavs and b J 
Sundays (in effect allowing 166 total days). 
Proposition 9 also prohibited any bill, other than 
the Budget Bill, to be heard by committee or 
acted upon until thirty calendar days after its 
introduction, a three-fourths vote of the house 
necessary to override the provision. The 
thirty-day, bifurcated session initiated in 1911 
intended that the public have an opportunity to 
review bills before they were acted upon. Since 
that time, however, the number of bills 
introduced increased, leaving the state printer 
no time to publish them all for public use. 
Increasing the session to 120 days allowed the 
introduction of bills to be spread out, and the 
printer more time to publish.89 
The March 1965 Staff Report of the Constitution 
Revision Commission to the Executive 
Committee indicates that the Committee wanted 
to institute two-year legislative sessions, but 
recommended annual sessions instead. 
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Although lengthy, that portion of the report is 
reproduced here because it illustrates intent and 
explains why the Committee changed its course. 
As a result of the State's growth its 
problems have become so numerous and 
substantial that they should not await 
the reconvening of the Legislature every 
two years in a session open to general 
legislation, or the discretion of the 
Governor. With each biennium the 
special or II extraordinary" session which 
has met concurrently with the budget 
session in the even numbered year, the 
list of items which the Governor 
authorizes the Legislature to consider 
has lengthened. Special sessions with 
purported "limited" agendas virtually 
have become 11 general" sessions, and the 
revision recognizes that fact. 
Based on the procedure in the U. S. 
Congress, the Alaska, Massachusetts and 
Michigan Legislatures, among others, 
there was some sentiment for annuat 
regular sessions of unlimited duration. 
Jockeying for favorable position and the 
ever-present log jams of legislation 
toward the end of each session would be 
avoided. However, legislator-members of 
the Commission favored a limitation on 
session length. They pointed out that 
based on their experience unlimited 
sessions would be politically unsaleable 
because they would require even greater 
compensation for legislators than the 
members of the public would approve 
and would require elimination of the 
long-standing California tradition of the 
''citizen-legislator." 
The Legislature would be established as 
a continuous body for a two-year period 
in the same manner as the United States 
Congress. This will permit legislation yet 
unconsidered at the end of the first 
annual session to carry-over until the 
next regular session. Similar procedure is 
followed in the U. S. Congress and in the 
Michigan Legislature, among others. 
Printing costs and time would be 
saved .... 
However, the existing provision was 
retained following a conference with the 
Governor and the members of the 
Executive Committee. It is anticipated 
that annual sessions without restriction 
as to subject matter of legislation will 
diminish the need for special 
extraordinary sessions except in genuine 
emergency situations.90 
The final recommendation of the Staff Report 
parallels the provision of the constitutional 
amendment placed before the voters the 
following year: 
[The new section] replaces subdivisions 
(a) and (c) of existing Section 2 and 
provides for the convening annually of a 
session of the Legislature limited to 120 
calendar days (exclusive of Saturdays 
and Sundays). At present such a session 
meets only once every two years in the 
odd-numbered year. The present 
distinction between regular ("general") 
and regular ("budget") sessions has been 
eliminated because the latter which 
occurred once a biennium in the even 
numbered year, has been abolished. 
There will be only one type of regular 
session; it will be annual and general 
legislation may be considered.91 
Proposition 1A of November 8, 1966 (ACA 13) 
repealed Section Two of Article IV and 
substituted it with new Section Three. Although 
the 1965 Revision Commission might have 
recommended the two-year sessions that we 
have today, in the end, Proposition 1A did not 
go that far. 
Sec. 3. (a) The Legislature shall meet 
annually in regular session at noon on 
the Monday after January 1. A measure 
introduced at any session may not be 
deemed pending before the Legislature 
at any other session. 
The provision abolished the budget session, and 
eliminated the 120-day time limit. Convening on 
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the first Monday after January 1, the sessions 
were of unlimited duration in which any type of 
bill could be introduced. After all bills had been 
decided on, the legislature recessed for thirty 
days, and then reconvened to consider vetoed 
bills.92 
Proposition 4 (ACA 95) "reorganized" the 
Legislature into two-year sessions. Ratified by 
the voters on November 7, 1972, it enacted the 
changes originally wanted by the Constitution. 
Revision Commission seven years earlier. 
Proposition 4 amended Section 3 (a) of Article 
IV to its present construction. In their 
supporting argument for the amendment, 
Assembly Speaker Bob Moretti, Assembly 
Republican Leader Bob Monagan, and Senate 
Republican Leader Fred Marler advised voters 
that the proposal would "streamline" legislative 
operations. "It will result in reforms in 
operations, greater efficiency, more 
responsiveness to the public and some modest 
recurring savings estimated at several hundred 
thousand dollars." 93 
Time Bills Must be in Print 
The earliest constitutional reference to the 
printing of bills can be found in Article IV, 
Section Fifteen of the 1879 Constitution. Section 
Fifteen, as originally reported by the Committee 
on the Legislative Department, provided that all 
bills must be "read at length" on final passage, 
but the section did not provide for three 
readings or printing of bills. 
During Committee of the Whole consideration 
of the section, Workingmen delegates John D. 
Condon and James S. Reynolds proposed 
amendments to Section Fifteen which would 
mandate that bills be read "on three several 
days in each house," and that they be printed 
with amendments before passage. After 
encountering opposition from members of the 
Committee who drafted the section, Reynolds 
defended the amendments. Every man's 
experience at the convention showed him the 
necessity of printing bills. "It is impossible for a 
member to understand what he is voting for, or 
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what the provisions of a bill are, by hearing 
them read at the desk." The object of 
considering a bill "on three several days, before 
being put upon its final passage" was "to 
prevent hasty legislation." The amendments 
were not intended to "hamper" legislation, "but 
to compel it to be done decently and in order, 
after the legislation has been considered." 
Reynolds later added further support to his 
argument by showing that at least twenty-one 
states had put similar provisions in their 
constitutions.94 
In defense of the amendments Charles 
Beerstecher noted that hasty legislation had 
been "the curse of this State, and the curse of 
several States in this Union." He could not 
understand the objections to the provision. "A 
bill is introduced and kept in the hands of the 
Clerk, and he reads it, and it is put upon its 
passage, and no one sees the bill until it is 
enrolled." Often, "an entirely different bill is 
enrolled than the one passed." The section, as 
amended, was "a guard put on the Legislature." 
The delegation adopted Section Fifteen, as 
amended, in Committee of the Whole and in the 
convention first and second readings.95 
As we have seen, the thirty-day stipulation first 
appeared in Section Two of Article IV with the 
adoption of the Progressive amendments at the 
October 10, 1911 special election. The 
"constitutional recess" of the bifurcated 
legislative sessions was intended to "give the 
public time to read and analyze measures 
introduced during the first thirty days." Section 
Fifteen had already provided that bills be 
printed after introduction. People had thirty 
days to procure a copy of the printed bill and 
contact their legislator regarding its 
provisions. 96 
On November 4, 1958 voters ratified Proposition 
9 (ACA 36) which amended Article IV, Section 
Two. As discussed above, this amendment 
abolished the split legislative session and the 
"constitutional recess," and extended general 
sessions to 120 calendar days, not including 
Saturdays and Sundays. Proposition 9 also 
mandated that no bill, other than the Budget 
Bill, could be heard by any committee or acted 
----------------fl 
on in either house for thirty calendar days 
following introduction. 
Writing in favor of the proposition, Assembly 
members Allen Miller, and Charles Conrad, and 
Senator John F. McCarthy argued that, although 
the 1911 amendment was well intentioned it had 
ceased to be functional. 
[T]he tremendous increase in legislative 
problems resulting from the rapid 
growth and development of our State 
has caused such a flood of bills that the 
State Printer is unable to get them into 
print until the end of the recess and the 
public has little time to study them. 
Further, the split session has led to the 
mass introduction of bills before the 
recess, which results in little chance to 
work out details of any proposal. This 
means that many bills are in skeletal or 
"spot bill" form and convey only that 
the author has in mind some 
unidentified change in the law on a 
particular subject. Such bills mean little 
to the public, and must be later amended 
and reprinted-all of which is 
time-consuming and expensive.97 
The amendment allowed ninety days for the 
introduction of bills, giving legislators time to 
properly prepare bills before printing. Saturdays 
and Sundays could be used to confer with 
constituents and answer public inquiries. 
Proponents promised voters that the Legislative 
Counsel would maintain a "digest" of every 
measure introduced. With the extended bill 
introduction period, the Legislative Counsel 
could keep the index and digest current during 
the whole session. "This would allow you [the 
voter] to examine the index and digest at any 
time to determine whether legislation you are 
interested in has been introduced." People 
would have thirty days after introduction to 
determine the effect of a bill.98 
Although the Constitution Revision 
Commission initially wanted to eliminate the 
thirty-day waiting period in their 
recommendation to the legislature, they 
subsequently changed their opinion. The Article 
IV "Staff Report" of 1965 described the process 
which led to their final recommendation. 
[T]he 30-day waiting period for action on 
bills after their introduction at regular 
sessions of the Legislature has been 
retained .... Initial drafts of Article IV 
eliminated this restriction because the 
waiting period was regarded as 
ineffective against the alleged evil it 
sought to prevent: lack of notice of the 
content of pending legislation. The 
Legislature could waive the 30-day delay 
by a three-fourths vote, and it did not 
prevent the use of the "skeleton" bill or 
"author's amendments" which could 
alter the entire bill without subjecting it 
to further delay. No other state 
constitution contains a similar restriction 
on the progress of a bill. 
However, the provision was restored on 
the advice of legislator-members of the 
Commission. They pointed out that in 
1958 the 30-day bill waiting period was 
substituted for the former 30-day recess 
which occurred after the first month of 
general session in odd-numbered years. 
That recess was used for the printing of 
the bills introduced in the first four 
weeks of the session; it also allowed 
various groups to review pending 
legislation. Eliminating the 30-day period 
would remove a protection that was 
intended to be retained when the 
bifurcated session itself was abolished. 
Additionally a proposal to shorten the 
30-day period to 20 days insofar as 
committee action on legislation was 
concerned was rejected in 1962. The 
League of California Cities and others 
indicated they still needed the full 30 
days to review legislation and to notify a 
widely scattered membership of the 
pendency of measures in which they are 
interested. 99 
As recommended by the Constitution Revision 
Commission, Proposition 1A (ACA 13) of 
November 8, 1966 repealed Section Two of 
Article IV and transferred that portion of 
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subdivision (a) (containing the thirty-day 
stipulation) to Section Eight, subdivision (a). 
The language went largely unchanged, except 
for modernizing phraseology. The 1879 Section 
Fifteen providing for three separate readings 
and printing of bills substantially became new 
Section Eight, subdivision (b). Subdivisions (a) 
and (b) of Section Eight have not been amended 
since that time. 
Retirement System 
The current constitutional provision which 
restricts legislative retirement entitlements 
(Article IV, Section 4.5) is less than five years old 
(November 6, 1990). Enactments governing 
legislative retirement have been largely 
statutory, and they have originated relatively 
recently (approximately 1947). Discussion 
concerning the issue of legislative retirement 
has developed only in the recent past. But, if the 
issue is approached from the question should 
legislative service be considered a career 
occupation?, debate can be traced to the 1849 
constitution. 
There are no specific references to legislative 
retirement in the 1849 or 1879 constitutions. The 
1849 framers provided for per diem and 
travelling expenses of legislators and 
constitutional officers only temporarily, until the 
first legislature could establish salaries by 
statute (Article XIIt Schedule, Section Fifteen). 
When the Committee on the Constitution 
reported the section, they left the dollar figures 
blank so that the convention could determine 
the amounts in Committee of the Whole. Many 
delegates supported a fairly high figure. The 
duties of government officers were "onerous," 
and "high salaries would command the 
requisite talent." The cost of living in the 
inflationary environment of gold rush California 
was astronomical. The people would sanction 
high salaries.100 
Delegate William M. Gwin argued that if they 
did not establish low salaries the expenses of 
government would be enormous and oppressive 
to the tax payers. He said, "I have never known 
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an office of honor in the United States where the 
incumbent makes anything out of it, or even 
sustains himself upon the salary." Charles T. 
Botts, who inferred that Gwin was 
electioneering with a popular issue (low 
salaries), responded: "there are honorable places 
which are kept for the rich of the land, and ... a 
poor man cannot afford to accept them." A low 
salary "requires a man of other means to accept 
an office which will not of itself sustain him." 
The Governor of the state "could not sustain 
himself on $6,000 a year," but if he was "worth 
millions" he could "hold the highest office of 
state in the gift of the people." 101 
In all new governments, Gwin retorted, 
expenditures usually surpass revenues. He did 
not wish to reserve public office to rich men, but 
immoderate salaries led to expensive 
government and "burdensome taxes on the 
people." The provisions were only temporary, 
and many "competent men" were "ready and 
able" to occupy the offices already. If the 
salaries were too low the legislature could 
increase them later. "I do not desire to fix the 
salaries below what is proper," Gwin concluded, 
"nor do I wish to make a political hobby in 
connection with this matter." 102 
For legislators, the convention settled on the 
same pay they had fixed for 
themselves-sixteen dollars per diem, and 
sixteen dollars for every twenty miles travelled. 
Compared to Iowa's two dollars per diem and 
two dollars per twenty miles, and New York's 
three dollars per diem and one dollar per ten 
miles, California's allowance seems extravagant. 
When fixing their own compensation, however, 
the delegates settled on a moderate sixteen 
dollars, the average daily earnings of a 
"mechanic" in the inflated California 
economy.103 
In 1849 public office was not considered to be 
an occupation. Serving as an elected official was 
an honor. Political office brought status and 
influence to a man, but it also carried great 
responsibility, and frequently, a strain on 
personal resources. It was an honor and a duty 
to serve, but the service was not a primary 
means of support. The sentiment of the age is 
--------------------------------~ 
probably best reflected in delegate Robert 
Semple's observation regarding annual 
legislative sessions. It would be "impossible to 
keep members of the Legislature more than two 
or three months at the seat of Government." 
Legislators would have their private 
occupations to tend to. "The rapid progress of 
affairs in this country, and the great value of 
time would render a longer session 
impracticable." 104 
The 1879 debate indicates that political office 
was still not considered to be occupational. Per 
diem and mileage was to be left to the 
legislature to decide, but was not to exceed 
eight dollars per day, ten cents per mile, and 
twenty-five dollars for contingent expenses per 
session (Article IV, Section Twenty-Three). 
Committee of the Whole debate focused on 
setting the salary high enough to attract the 
proper talent, and to support a respectable 
lifestyle in Sacramento, away from home, 
family, and business. When setting 
compensation limits, delegates were less 
concerned with per diem and mileage than with 
recent abuses of contingent expense funds. 
The debates indicate that a propensity towards 
career politics had begun to develop in the 
nation, but the delegates who spoke of it 
attached dishonor to the trend. During 
Committee of the Whole debate on sessions of 
the legislature, Workingmen delegate William F. 
White explained why he supported quadrennial 
sessions: 
I find in the old State of Pennsylvania 
they are tired of these political bodies 
meeting. The young men of the country 
are turning into politicians as a business. 
If there was but one session in four years 
these ~en would die out between the 
four years and be obliged to go at some 
honest employment. All the young men 
are looking to politics as a means of 
livelihood. I would rather that one of my 
sons would carry a hod for a living than 
to take the best office in the gift of this 
State. Therefore, I would like to see 
something done to check this office 
hunting.105 
Political office was an honor and a duty, a "gift" 
of the people or of the state. It was not an 
occupation. 
Until the 1966 revision of Article N, the 
constitution had provided that the Legislature 
set its own compensation by statute, but the 
constitution had stipulated a ceiling. Any raise 
beyond that ceiling required a popularly 
approved constitutional amendment. By 1924, 
Section Twenty-Three of Article IV limited 
legislative salaries to $100. a month 
(substantially lower than 1879's eight dollar per 
diem if they worked twenty days per month). 
In 1949 legislative salaries were raised to 
$300. a month. By 1954, subdivision (b) of 
Section Two, Article IV set legislative salaries 
at $500. a month. That figure held until the 1966 
revision.106 
Voters had approved a constitutional 
amendment which directed the Legislature to 
provide a retirement plan for state employees as 
early as 1930 (Article IV, Section 22a added 
November 4, 1930). The following year, the 
Legislature established by statute a State 
Employees Retirement System for California 
(Statutes, 1931, Chapter 700, p. 1442). In 1939 the 
Legislature extended the scope of the State 
Employees Retirement Law to include city, 
county, and school district employees who 
wished to participate (Statutes, 1939, Chapter 
954). Developing in the statutes and outside the 
strictures of the constitution, by 1947 the 
Legislature had established a retirement system 
for its own members (Government Code Section 
9359 et. seq.). 
On November 4, 1958, voters rejected 
Proposition Five, a Senate Constitutional 
Amendment which would have allowed the 
Legislature to fix legislator's salaries at an 
amount not to exceed "the average salary of 
county supervisors in the five most populous 
counties" (approximately $10,080. in 1958). 
Supporting the amendment, State Senator James 
A. Cobey argued that public officer's salaries, 
subject to constant review, did not belong in the 
constitution. Every change required 
constitutional amendment. A majority of states, 
the United States Congress, and the Model 
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Constitution of the National Municipal League, 
provided for legislative salaries by statute rather 
than by constitutional provision. The Joint 
Legislative Committee on Legislative Procedure, 
California Conference on State Government, 
Committee on American Legislatures of the 
American Political Science Association, and the 
1957 California Citizens Legislative Advisory 
Commission supported the amendment.107 
The arguments of State Senator John A. Murdy, 
Jr., who wrote against Proposition Five, reflected 
the seriousness of the reapportionment issue in 
1958. He also provided a contemporary opinion 
of legislative retirement benefits. Malappor-
tioned districts caused pay inequities. A senator 
representing over five million people in Los 
Angeles County had a much larger work load 
than a senator representing a smaller county of 
100,000 people, but both senators made the 
same salary. Conversely, it was more difficult for 
an Assembly Member to cover a sparsely 
populated rural district than an urban area. 
Additionally, the Legislature determined the 
salaries of supervisors, "directly or indirectly," 
in the five biggest counties, excepting San 
Francisco which was regulated by charter.108 
Higher pay, asserted Murdy, Jr., would have a 
"great liberalizing impact" on the "already 
generous legislative retirement system." 
The present terms of the State 
Retirement System permits a Legislator 
to retire at 75% of his salary if he has 
had fifteen years of service and has 
reached sixty-three or over. This same 
retirement formula would apply on any 
increased salary, not only to Legislators 
retiring in the future, but would be 
retroactive to those who have already 
retired. 
Extended to public officers, provisions of the 
State Retirement System appear to indicate 
countenance of legislative careers. The defeat of 
Proposition Five may show, however, that 
popular disapproval of political occupation 
prevailed, keeping legislative office less than 
lucrative. Or perhaps Senator Murdy, Jr. 
reflected popular sentiment when he 
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commented "Whether it is possible to buy 
statesmanship by offering salary inducement is 
still an unsolved problem." 109 
In 1966, California voters passed Proposition 1A 
(ACA 13), which removed constitutional 
provisions for legislative compensation and 
made them statutory in 1966. The 1965 report of 
the Constitution Revision Commission, which 
recommended this legislative course of action, 
provides an important analysis of the 
post-reapportionment compensation/ retirement 
issue. 
Since 1954 as each of numerous attempts 
to increase salaries has failed, the 
California legislators have found other 
means of increasing both their 
perquisites (by way of perdiem and 
mileage or state-leased automobiles and 
a generous pension plan geared to the 
cost of living index) and their efficiency 
(by way of staff assistance and similar 
aids) until it is now possible for: 
(1) A legislator to retire after 30 years of 
service and receive more in 
retirement than the constitutionally 
stipulated salary he received as an 
incumbent; and 
(2) The press to estimate-in however 
misleading a manner-that a single 
legislator may have the equivalent of 
$25,000 in state funds for his 
individual use in any odd-numbered 
year (including salary, per diem, 
mileage . . . or leased automobile 
and credit card, district office 
allotment, postage, secretarial 
assistance, and telephone). (The 
implication frequently conveyed is 
that the legislators pocket this entire 
amount . . . . For the most part the 
latter items reimburse the legislator 
for his out-of-pocket expenses; the 
cost of living in the capital during a 
session is high). 
To the unthinking voter these figures are 
appalling-made no less appealing by 
attempts to misrepresent them. The 
---------------------------------~ 
present impasse on legislators' 
compensation has been characterized as 
follows: 
"That the citizen of California should be 
so stubbornly resistive to adequate pay 
for a man who copes with the problems 
of a three billion dollar budget and the 
intricacies of the technical legislation 
essential to the largest state in the nation 
is equally dismaying to the legislator ... 
Thus fringe benefit begets salary 
stalemate and voter opposition to 
legislative carte blanche begets 
fringe." 110 
The Commission then proposed an "open, 
rational approach to legislators compensation:" 
(1) A substantial increase in salary 
commensurate with the legislator's 
status as a member of the third and 
coequal branch of government with 
the executive and judiciary 
recognizing that the job of legislator 
is in fact virtually full-time; and 
(2) A program of constitutional and 
statutory restraints on legislative 
self-indulgence as to perquisites 
other than annual salary. 
Only with the adoption of a 
compensation program outlined above 
will the California legislator be able to 
justify to the public at election time that 
he is worthy of his hire and thus open a 
new era of mutual respect between the 
California citizen and his Sacramento 
representative that both deserves. 111 
By 1965, the commission asserted, twenty-eight 
states had legislative compensation rates set by 
statute, without constitutional limitation. The 
United States Congress had always enjoyed that 
privilege. When was California to join the fold? 
Echoing the sentiments and fears of the 
constitution's framers, the commission 
concluded: 
If the Legislature is to meet annually for 
approximately six months, it will be 
necessary to compensate the Members 
adequately to permit them to be away 
from their usual occupations. While the 
California voter has been conditioned to 
the concept of the "citizen-legislator" 
over the years, membership in the Senate 
and Assembly, with each biennium, is 
becoming more than a part-time 
vocation.112 
Proposition 112 of June 5, 1990 (SCA 32) 
repealed the 1966 legislative compensation and 
retirement statute (Chapter 163) that ratification 
of Proposition lA had authorized (Ch. 163, 
Statutes, 1966, 1st Extraordinary Session, pp. 
721-29). Five months later, initiative 
constitutional amendment Proposition 140 
(Term Limits) limited legislative salaries and 
operating expenses, and restricted legislative 
retirement benefits by constitutional provision. 
In 1965 the Constitution Revision Commission 
asserted that membership in the Legislature was 
becoming "more than a part-time vocation." 
Twenty-five years later, however, a popular 
initiative amended the constitution to assert that 
"service in the Legislature" was "not ... 
intended as a career occupation." Section 4.5 of 
Article IV today prohibits the Legislature from 
accruing more pension and retirement benefits 
than are already provided by statute. 
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THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 
The great legacy of the Progressive Reform 
Movement in California, Senate Constitutional 
Amendment No. 22, passed in the Senate on 
February 9, 1911 by a vote of thirty-five to one, 
Senator Leroy A. Wright of San Diego casting 
the only dissenting vote. On February 16, the 
Assembly passed the amendment with 
seventy-two votes in favor and no dissenting 
votes. Placed before the voters at a special 
election called by Progressive Governor Hiram 
Johnson on October 10, 1911, the people ratified 
the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 
constitutional amendment by a vote of 168,744 
to 52,093 (see endnote 15). 
Since the addition of the Initiative and 
Referendum to the Constitution in 1911 (Article 
IV, Section One, 1 (a), (b), (c), (d)), the provision 
has gone through two constitutional revisions. 
Following the recommendations of the 
Constitutional Revision Commission in 1965, the 
legislature placed Proposition 1A (ACA 13) on 
the November 8, 1966 ballot. The popularly 
ratified amendment which revised the 
Legislative Article IV, repealed the 1911 Section 
One and subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d), and 
relocated them to the end of Article IV, 
commencing with Section Twenty-Two (a) and 
continuing through Section 26 (see endnote 72). 
On June 8, 1976, voters ratified Proposition 14 
(ACA 40). The amendment reorganized 
provisions related to voting, the initiative, 
referendum, and recall, which were "scattered 
throughout the Constitution," under a single 
article. As a result, current Article II-titled 
Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and 
Recall-contains the original1911 amendment, 
fairly intact, except for modernized phraseology 
and simplified structure.113 
Constitutional Amendments/Ballot 
The language of current subdivision (c) of 
Section Eight, Article II has not substantially 
changed. 
1911, Article IV, Section One (paragraph two, 
sentence two, sixth clause): 
the Secretary of State shall submit the 
said proposed law or amendment to the 
Constitution to the electors at the next 
succeeding general election occurring 
subsequent to 130 days after the 
presentation aforesaid of said petition, or 
at any special election called by the 
Governor in his discretion prior to such 
general election. 
1966, Article IV, Section Twenty-Two, 
subdivision (c): 
The Secretary of State shall then submit 
the measure at the next general election 
held at least 131 days after it qualifies or 
at any special statewide election held 
prior to that general election. The 
Governor may call a special statewide 
election for the measure. 
Constitution Revision Commission Draft Report, 
1965 Comments: 
a new procedural section replacing 
various similar provisions in existing 
Section 1 dealing specially with each 
type of initiative petition. The Secretary 
of State must submit initiative statutes or 
constitutional amendments at special or 
general elections; the Governor may call 
special elections for this purpose. 
Existing language requires submission of 
pending initiative measures at any 
special election called for placing 
measures proposed by the Legislature 
before the electorate. Legislative Counsel 
indicated the provision was unnecessary 
because section requires that the 
Secretary of State present any pending 
measures to the electorate at the next 
succeeding election whether it be special 
or general, called by the Legislature or 
by the Governor. Legislative Counsel 
Opinion No. 6865, Aug. 27, 1964Y4 
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1976, Article II, Section Eight, subdivision (c): 
[unchanged from 1966] 
The primary election, established in 1909, was in 
effect at the time that the Progressives drafted 
the amendment in 1911. They used only the 
terms "general" or "special" when referring to 
an election. General elections are those held in 
November. 
Amending Statutory Initiatives 
The language of current subdivision (c) of 
Section Ten, Article II has changed principally to 
modernize phraseology and simplify structure. 
1911, Article IV, Section One, (paragraph six, 
sentence two) 
No act, law, or amendment to the 
Constitution, initiated or adopted by the 
people, shall be subject to the veto 
power of the Governor, and no act, law 
or amendment to the Constitution, 
adopted by the people at the polls under 
the initiative provisions of this section, 
shall be amended or repealed except by 
a vote of the electors, unless otherwise 
provided in said initiative measure; but 
acts and laws adopted by the people 
under the referendum provisions of this 
section may be amended by the 
Legislature at any subsequent session 
thereof. 
1946, Article IV, Section One, subdivision (b) 
Laws may be enacted by the Legislature 
to amend of repeal any act adopted by 
vote of the people under the initiative; to 
become effective only when submitted to 
and approved by the electors unless the 
initiative act affected permits the 
amendment or the repeal without such 
approval. The Legislature shall by law 
prescribe the method and manner of 
submitting such a proposal to the 
electors. 
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1966, Article IV, Section Twenty-Four, 
subdivision (c) 
The Legislature may amend or repeal 
referendum statutes. It may amend or 
repeal an initiative statute by another 
statute that becomes effective only when 
approved by the electors unless the 
initiative statute permits amendment or 
repeal without their approval. 
Constitution Revision Commission Draft Report, 
1965 Comments: 
consolidates portions of the sixth 
paragraph of existing Section 1 with 
existing Section lb. No substantive 
change has been made; language has 
been simplified and phraseology 
improved. The last sentence of existing 
section lb is unnecessary in view of 
proposed subdivision and has been 
deleted. Section lb was added to the 
Constitution in 1946 to eliminate any 
question as to the power of the 
Legislature to propose to the people an 
amendment to a statute adopted under 
the initiative process.115 
1976, Article It Section Ten, subdivision (c) 
[unchanged from 1966] 
Legislative Review of Initiatives 
There is no applicable current constitutional 
reference to legislative review of initiative 
constitutional amendments or initiative statutes. 
(Legislative enactment of initiative statute~ and 
constitutional amendments seems contradictory 
since initiatives are the popular equivalent of 
statutes and constitutional amendments which 
originate in the legislature). The closest 
reference to legislative review of popular 
initiatives can be found in the "indirect 
initiative." 
-----------------------------~ 
The Progressives provided for two initiative 
processes in the 1911 constitutional amendment: 
the direct initiative and the indirect initiative. 
The direct initiative is in use today, but for lack 
of use, the Constitution Revision Commission 
recommended that the indirect initiative be 
abolished in 1965. Proposition 1A (ACA 13), 
ratified by the voters on November 8, 1966 
repealed the indirect initiative provision (Article 
IV, Section One, paragraph three). 
Using the indirect initiative, voters could 
propose legislation to the legislature. Qualifying 
petitions had to contain signatures of registered 
voters equal to five percent of the votes cast for 
Governor at the last general election. The 
Secretary of State sent the petition to the 
legislature, which had forty days to either enact 
or reject the unchanged initiative, or amend it. If 
the Legislature approved the proposal without 
amendment, it became law. If the Legislature 
did not approve the proposal without 
amendment or if the Legislature rejected it the 
Secretary of State had to submit it to the voters 
at the next general election. The indirect 
initiative also provided for competing legislative 
enactments on the same subject. 
The text of the indirect initiative as originally 
drafted and ratified in 1911 follows (note the 
provision for legislative competing enactments 
in the section): 
Upon the presentation to the Secretary of 
State, at any time not less than 10 days 
before the commencement of any regular 
session of the Legislature, of a petition 
certified as herein provided to have been 
signed by qualified electors of the State 
equal in number to 5 per cent of all the 
votes cast for all candidates for Governor 
at the last preceding general election, at 
which a Governor was elected, 
proposing a law set forth in full in said 
petition, the Secretary of State shall 
transmit the same to the Legislature as 
soon as it convenes and organizes. The 
law proposed by such petition shall be 
either enacted or rejected without change 
or amendment by the Legislature, within 
40 days from the time it is received by 
the Legislature. If any law proposed by 
such petition shall be enacted by the 
Legislature it shall be subject to 
referendum, as hereinafter provided. If 
any law so petitioned for be rejected, or 
if no action is taken upon it by the 
Legislature within said 40 days, the 
Secretary of State shall submit it to the 
people for approval or rejection at the 
next ensuing general election. 
The Legislature may reject any measure 
so proposed by initiative petition and 
propose a different one on the same 
subject by a yea and nay vote upon 
separate roll calt and in such event both 
measures shall be submitted by the 
Secretary of State to the electors for 
approval or rejection at the next ensuing 
general election or at a prior special 
election called by the Governor, in his 
discretion, for such purpose. All said 
initiative petitions last above described 
shall have printed in 12-point black-face 
type the following: "Initiative measure to 
be presented to the Legislature." 
In its 1965 Draft Report, the Constitution 
Revision Commission succinctly explained why 
it recommended repeal of the indirect initiative: 
Because the percentage of signatures 
required for proposing an initiative 
statute has been reduced and because 
there have been but four instances where 
an indirect initiative-that is, a petition 
to the Legislature, not to the people-has 
been utilized (and only once 
successfully), the Commission 
recommends repeal of the indirect 
initiative procedure.116 
It is perhaps applicable to this inquiry to note 
that the Constitution Revision Commission had 
considered insertion of some provision for 
judicial review of initiatives and referendums in 
the constitutional amendment of 1966, but 
decided not to proceed. Commission comment 
follows: 
Inclusion of a provision for judicial 
review of the initiative (or referendum) 
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petition or ballot title and summary was 
considered. It is not necessary to include 
such a provision because an elector 
already has that right. Legislative 
Counsel Opinion No. 6863, Sept. 14, 
1964. Also it is inadvisable to stipulate 
the standard of accuracy or impartiality 
for the petition or ballot title and 
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summary. The required standard should 
be left to the courts in the event an 
elector petitions for review of either 
item. Additionally, any requirement that 
the ballot title and summary be identical 
with that appearing on the petition 
should be added to the Elections 
CodeY7 
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STATE BUDGET AND FISCAL PROVISIONS 
by Amanda Meeker 
An Overview of the Early Years of the Budget Process 
The budget was not a major part of the 1849 
California constitution, nor did the issue much 
engage the framers in debate. They made some 
brief provisions for a fiscal system, most of 
which they borrowed from other states' 
constitutions. 
Without debate, they adopted a provision from 
the Iowa state constitution that money could 
only be drawn from the treasury through 
appropriations made by law.1 They did not 
include specifics on the appropriations process. 
The one major fiscal provision outside of 
taxation was that the state could not contract 
any debt in excess of $300,000. There was some 
debate on the amount to be specified in this 
section, which was initially set at $100,000, a 
sum borrowed from the Iowa constitution.2 The 
committee actually declared that it was "not 
particular" about the sum, but "thought it 
necessary to specify some definite amount." 3 
Some members of the convention felt that the 
$100,000 limit was too low, especially since it 
would be some time before a tax could be 
collected for the new government. Others 
disagreed for various reasons. One delegate 
opposed any public debt at all, arguing that "if 
we could not carry on our State Government 
without contracting a debt of that magnitude, 
we were certainly starting wrong." 4 Two men 
optimistically opined that in all likelihood no 
debt at all would be created after the 
government got on its feet, no matter what 
amount the Constitution permitted.5 The 
convention finally settled on the sum of 
$300,000 as a compromise between the initially 
proposed $100,000 and a counterproposal of 
$500,000. 
The constitution did allow for exceptions to this 
provision, however. In cases of war, invasion, or 
insurrection the limit could be automatically 
exceeded. These exceptions would have been 
particularly relevant to the framers since the 
territory had very recently been wrested from 
Mexico, and since troubles with Native 
Americans persisted. It was in fact used to 
justify the issuance of Indian War bonds in 
1852.6 In addition, the limit could be exceeded if 
the state passed a law "for some single object" 
that included specifications of the ways and 
means to discharge the debt within twenty 
years. Such a law could take effect only if a 
majority of voters ratified it. 
The optimists who predicted that the new state 
would remain free of debt were incorrect; by 
December 1850 the total state debt amounted to 
$485,460.28, and by the next December it 
exceeded $2 million? The exceeding of the 
constitutional limit for the most part was not 
occasioned by war or insurrection, nor had the 
voters ratified it or even been asked to consider 
it. Yet it continued to climb. Finally, a farmer 
who opposed the building of a new road took 
the matter to court, and in 1855 the California 
Supreme Court declared all debt in excess of 
$300,000 unconstitutional.8 In order to maintain 
its good standing, the state had to pay off the 
debts as quickly as possible. 
When a new constitution was adopted in 1879, 
several of the old fiscal provisions were retained 
while more specific provisions regarding the 
budget were added. Despite the apparent 
inadequacy of the 1849 Constitution's debt 
clause, the delegates to the 1879 Constitutional 
Convention retained the $300,000 state debt 
limit. The prohibition against government debt 
reflected the delegates' general distrust of the 
legislature. In the same vein, the delegates 
added various specific prohibitions against state 
spending. For example, they prohibited any 
public money from being used to support 
sectarian causes. Each general appropriation bill 
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was to include only items to pay the salaries of 
state officers, the expenses of state government 
and institutions under government control. One 
delegate drew upon his own experience in the 
legislature to explain the problem they sought to 
avoid by this clause. He noted that people 
wanting state funds for their causes would "get 
their friends in the legislature to demand that 
these appropriations be included, or they will 
fail to appropriate anything for the sustenance 
of the state government." 9 Another agreed: 
"The general appropriation bill must be acted 
upon and passed by itself. It should not be 
cumbered up with extraneous matter that 
would delay its passage until the last moments 
of the session." 10 
Another change was made at the 1879 
convention regarding the budget process. The 
1849 constitution had provided for annual 
legislative sessions, accompanied by annual 
budgets, primarily because the framers at 
Monterey felt that the new state would have a 
great deal of business to attend to, at least for 
the first few years. By 1862, however, the pace 
had slowed, and the legislature switched to 
biennial sessions and budgetsY The 1879 
constitution retained the biennial schedule. This 
move went along with a general feeling that 
minimal government was best. No one wanted 
career politicians representing them in the 
legislature. 
In the years since the 1879 convention, issues 
concerning the state debt have sporadically 
reemerged. In 1908 an amendment changed the 
period in which the debt would have to be 
repaid from twenty years to seventy-five. Then 
in 1956 the period was revised downward again 
to fifty years, based on the reasoning that in 
seventy-five years the interest payments would 
exceed the principal paymentsY A 1962 
amendment put further strictures on the 
creation of debt by requiring a two-thirds vote 
in each house of the legislature, instead of a 
simple majority, before a bond measure could be 
submitted to the voters. 
The budget process was changed significantly 
by a 1922 initiative amendment. Sponsored by 
the Commonwealth Club of California, it 
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instituted an appropriations process much the 
same as it exists todayY The governor was to 
submit a budget bill to the legislature within the 
first thirty days of the session. In order to 
remedy the problems that had arisen when the 
legislature had formerly appropriated money 
without having to consider the funds available 
to meet the appropriations, the governor's 
budget was to be accompanied by a statement 
of estimated revenues for the biennium.14 A 
budget bill was then to be introduced into each 
house. This bill was the only one that could 
include more than one item of appropriation. As 
a matter of expedience, the governor was given 
the power to reduce or eliminate any items of 
expenditure in the budget bill passed by the 
legislature. Maryland's budget process, which 
had been adopted in 1916, served as a model for 
California's new executive budget. It was 
suggested that the new process would "save 
money because all appropriations will be 
handled in a business way, duplications 
prevented, and extravagance avoided." 15 
A major overhaul of the state's fiscal system 
occurred in the 1933 with the Riley-Stewart 
amendment. The state was, of course, in the 
midst of a severe depression, and many people 
were finding it more and more difficult to pay 
their property taxes. The amendment's focus 
was on changing the system of taxation, but it 
also affected the budget. It provided that funds 
for the public school system would be set aside 
before any other appropriations were made, 
thus making the budget process somewhat less 
flexible by increasing the percentage of state 
spending that was constitutionally fixed. 16 The 
goal of this provision was to shift some of the 
school tax burden from the counties to the 
stateY Another provision divided state and 
local taxation by designating that tax revenues 
from certain professions could be used only for 
state purposes, while freeing those professions 
from local taxation.18 Most important for the 
budget process was the provision that general 
fund appropriations for any biennium, 
excluding school appropriations, could not 
exceed by more than 5 percent the appro-
priations for the previous biennium unless 
approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of 
---------------------------------~ 
the legislature.19 Since budget growth after 1933 
almost always exceeded 5 percent, this 
provision made the budget bill essentially 
require a super-majority for passage. 
Riley-Stewart also provided that not more than 
25 percent of total appropriations could be 
raised through property taxes. The 
consequences of the Riley-Stewart amendment, 
though significant, were not necessarily 
intended. Its backers primarily wanted relief 
from "confiscatory" property taxes, though 
increasing the proportion of state aid for schools 
and slowing government spending were also 
important.20 In 1962 an amendment removed 
the 5 percent formula, instead simply calling for 
a two-thirds vote on the budget bilL This move 
merely recognized the existing effect of the 
Riley-Stewart provisions. As the ballot argument 
in favor of the measure pointed out, "the 
removal of the formula will not change the 
practical effect of this constitutional provision." 
The amendment was included with several 
other deletions to "remove obsolete, 
superfluous, or superseded provisions." 21 
Unprecedented growth during World War II 
made an annual budget seem necessary to 
"eliminate excessive spending and waste in 
government." The biennial budget forced 
legislators to guess up to two years in advance 
what expenditures would be necessary and 
what revenues would be available, a task 
that seemed increasingly difficult in the 
"fast-moving world" of the 1940s. In the 
biennium 1943-45, budget estimates had been 
off, resulting in excess revenues of over 
$200 million.22 As a result, an amendment was 
adopted that provided for an annual budget, to 
be introduced within the first thirty days of the 
general session, held in odd-numbered years, 
and within the first three days of the budget 
session, held in even-numbered years. 
Amendment backers argued that an annual 
budget would allow the people more control 
over state finances and would allow the 
legislature to meet unforeseen emergencies?3 In 
1949 the budget session was limited to thirty 
days in order to make lawmakers "get down to 
the brass tacks work of the session sooner." 24 
Through the work of the constitution revision 
commission, in 1966 a general overhaul of the 
article on the legislature abolished the separate 
budget session. Instead, the legislature was to 
meet in annual general sessions, at which the 
budget would be considered along with general 
legislation. 
The two-thirds vote requirement regarding the 
budget drew considerable debate at the 
meetings of the constitutional revision 
commission in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966 the 
minority position argued that "what they 
intended in 1933 was that the annual financing 
plan could be passed by majority vote" while 
only excess appropriations would require a 
two-thirds vote. They also pointed out that "in 
most cases where extraordinary majority votes 
are required, the presumption is that we would 
be better off having no action at all in the event 
that any substantial minority so desires," while 
it was imperative to pass a budget.25 The 
majority of the commissioners, however, 
concluded that the two-thirds vote was 
necessary to protect the different interests of 
urban versus rural and north versus south.26 
The topic resurfaced in 1970, when several 
commission members expressed opinions that 
the provision was anachronistic, while others 
suggested that the requirement might be a 
violation of the federal constitution. In another 
context, the California Supreme Court had 
recently ruled that giving one-third of the voters 
the power to veto a measure effectively gave 
them double the voting power of the other 
voters?7 As one commissioner put it, "our 
commission, whose function is to create a 
modern, revised constitution, cannot vote to 
include an unconstitutional provision." 28 
Additionally, they recognized that the 
two-thirds vote requirement "is going to subject 
the minority party, whichever party it is, to the 
temptation to vote to some extent on purely 
partisan considerations on the single most 
important proposal that comes before the 
legislature year by year." 29 Another impetus for 
the discussion on the issue in 1970 was the fact 
that the legislature had the year before, for the 
first time, failed to enact a budget by July 1, the 
start of the fiscal year. Several commissioners 
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advocated a majority vote for the budget based 
on the fact that the super-majority vote had 
"proved to be in effect a political weapon in the 
hands of the legislative r::hinority." 30 Others, 
however, argued that it was the only means the 
minority party had to stop unwanted 
appropriations, and that if the vote 
requirements were changed, "the next thing you 
are going to have is the simple majority on bond 
issues on the ballot and the taxpayers again will 
be at the mercy of those people who don't own 
any property." 31 The amendment as ultimately 
ratified did not change the super-majority 
requirement. 
Another amendment of 1970 allowed the 
legislature to raise interest rates on unsold 
bonds in order to increase their marketability. 
The goal was to make sure that 
already-approved bonds to finance various state 
projects would be sold. As the amendment's 
proponents pointed out, the only alternative, an 
unpleasant one, was "pay-as-you-go financing" 
and higher taxes.32 
Yet another 1970 amendment required the 
governor to submit the budget within the first 
ten days of the legislative session, instead of 
within thirty days, and required the legislature 
to pass a budget by June 15, two weeks in 
advance of the new fiscal year. This action was 
based on the failure of the legislature to enact a 
budget by the start of the fiscal year in 1969 and 
1970. The amendment's supporters surmised 
that the extra three weeks in January would 
allow legislators more time to consider the 
budget and that the early mandatory deadline 
would force the legislature to enact the budget 
in plenty of time before the fiscal year began.33 
As recent events have demonstrated, problems 
with the budget have continued despite these 
changes. 
A major part of the problem with the budget 
process has been that although related to the 
budget bill, the budget implementation bills are 
governed by what is known as the single-subject 
rule and must be considered individually, rather 
than as a package. Since the 1849 Constitution, 
all bills except for the budget have been 
required to pertain to a single subject, which 
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must be expressed in its title, a requirement 
borrowed from the Iowa constitution and 
adopted by the California delegates without 
debate. The framers thereby sought to prevent 
wily legislators from getting provisions enacted 
by hiding them in popular legislation. Most 
delegates to the 1879 convention, with their 
anti-legislature sentiments, also believed 
strongly in the necessity of such a provision. As 
one explained, "in the careless way in which 
legislation is carried on, mischievous provisions 
may slip in, unless you have such a provision as 
this in the Constitution." 34 An opposing 
argument unsuccessfully countered that since 
they were providing that bills would be read on 
three different days, "no member of the 
Legislature could be voting under a trick." 35 
The provision as it stood in the first 
constitution, however, had not been entirely 
successful. One delegate to the 1879 convention 
described having seen a bill on a general subject 
that included, somewhere near the middle, a 
provision to purchase a toll-bridge across the 
Sacramento River.36 Another delegate pointed 
out that while in some instances there was 
legitimate reason to join two subjects in one bill, 
as it stood in the old constitution the whole bill 
would be void if it contained more than one 
subject. He cited a case in the previous 
legislative session in which a bill was declared 
void because it dealt with both the maintenance 
of booms in the Elk River and the removal of 
obstructions from that river.37 Based upon such 
arguments, the convention concluded that if 
such legislation were passed, the portion not 
expressed in the title would be void, while the 
rest of the law would remain valid. 
The application of the single-subject rule to the 
budget trailer bills has also resulted in 
confusion. Although the budget bill itself may 
be enacted, some important part of the 
legislation necessary to make the budget work 
can be omitted. To address this issue, a 
proposition was submitted to the voters in 1993 
that would have permitted the budget trailer 
bills to be consolidated into one bill. Proponents 
argued that the amendment would promote 
timely passage of the budget and would stop 
---------------------------------~ 
special interests from "exploiting the 
fragmented budget process." The opposition 
countered that the amendment would make it 
easier to raise taxes because it would make the 
budget bill harder to understand, an argument 
that the voters evidently found sufficiently 
convincing to reject the proposition.38 
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Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's 
Fiscal System During the Great Depression 
Abstract 
In the midst of the Great Depression, California 
engaged in a massive restructuring of its tax 
system, reducing the reliance on the property 
tax and introducing sales and income taxes. Our 
analysis suggests that this restructuring, which 
included a voter referendum, was primarily 
driven by a desire to change the mix rather than 
the level of taxation. Nonetheless, by 
introducing new taxes that had a higher revenue 
elasticity than the existing taxes, California 
created a revenue system that allowed the rapid 
growth of spending to continue. 
Economic historians have been keenly interested 
in the acceleration of governments' growth 
during the Great Depression. Robert Higgs 
argues that both the size and powers of 
government grow during perceived crises and 
that the Great Depression provides a classic 
example of this phenomenon.1 John Wallis 
highlights both the growth of federal 
government at the expense of local government 
and the growth of state government during the 
1930s.2 He emphasizes the incentives provided 
by federal grants to change the nature of and 
size of government programs, particularly in the 
area of agricultural price supports and public 
welfare. 
In this paper, we focus on an alternative 
explanation for the growth of state government 
in the 1930s: the modernization of the tax 
systems that occurred during the very early part 
of the Great Depression. Voters, legislators, and 
government officials transformed state and local 
fiscal systems throughout the United States 
during the Great Depression. Retail sales taxes 
were introduced at a rapid rate during this 
period. Of the 46 states that now have retail 
sales taxes, 24 initiated them during the 1930s, 
the vast majority by 1933? Many states also 
introduced personal income taxes during this 
period. No other decade in this century has 
witnessed as dramatic a set of changes in state 
tax structures and fiscal systems generally. 
Since the fiscal changes in the states occurred 
early in the 1930s, they potentially could 
constitute a third independent factor leading to 
the growth of government. The majority of these 
changes occurred before the bulk of the federal 
grant programs were implemented. To the 
extent that the modernization of the state tax 
systems permitted higher, sustained revenue 
growth by increasing the elasticity of the tax 
systems, they can also account for the "ratchet" 
effect emphasized by Higgs whereby the growth 
of government powers continues after the crisis 
appears to end. 
What led to the modernization of state tax 
systems in the 1930s? Robert Haig and Carl 
Shoup discuss the variety of economic and 
political factors that led to the adoption of the 
sales tax throughout the country during this 
period.4 Along with a team of researchers, they 
closely analyzed the economic and political 
developments in the states. Based on this 
detailed research they believed it was not 
possible to explain the spread of the sales tax 
with reference to a single source of revenue or 
expenditure.5 
Other research highlights the diversity of factors 
that led twenty states to adopt broad based sales 
taxes between 1931 and 1938. Based on an 
econometric investigation, Kim Rueben suggests 
that states with more severe employment 
declines and strict balanced budget 
requirements were more likely to adopt sales 
taxes.6 In general, however, she found only 
weak effects from economic variables. Jens 
Jensen, a contemporary observer, emphasized 
the role of property tax limitations? He pointed 
out that in 1934 all eight states that had 
previously adopted property tax limitations had 
enacted retail sales taxes as compared to only 
nine of the other 40 states.8 
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Because of these conflicting perspectives, it is 
valuable to examine in- depth the fiscal history 
of an important state. The changes in the 
California fiscal system during the 1930s were 
as dramatic as anywhere in the country. In 1933, 
voters approved an initiative measure (the 
Riley-Stewart constitutional amendment) that 
quickly led to a major restructuring of the entire 
state and local system, the immediate 
introduction of a retail sales tax, and the 
introduction of a personal income tax two years 
later. The fiscal system enacted in California 
during the 1930s has persisted in its basic 
structure through today.9 These changes have 
allowed real per-capita state expenditure to 
grow by a factor of approximately 10 from 
1929/30 to 1989/90. 
A close examination of the California experience 
reveals that this fiscal transformation was 
neither preordained nor intended as a means to 
allow government to grow. Although the 
restructuring of the fiscal system did allow 
government to grow rapidly over the next 
several decades, raising additional revenue was 
not the intention behind most of the fiscal 
changes undertaken during the Great 
Depression. Voters were primarily interested in 
changing the mix of taxes, indeed provisions for 
expenditure limitations were part of the 
Riley-Stewart amendment 
The actions that were taken during this period 
were dramatic, unpredictable, and potentially 
risky. For example, the 1933 Riley-Stewart 
initiative required the state to give up its 
principal revenue source for financing the 
General Fund at a time in which it was widely 
acknowledged that there was a large General 
Fund deficit and without an explicit source to 
replace the lost revenue. On the same ballot, 
voters also overwhelmingly rejected a measure 
to use proceeds from the state's special fund 
(replete with revenue from taxes on gasoline) to 
redeem highway bonds and meet interest 
payments. 
Four factors emerge from a careful examination 
of California's fiscal history during the early 
phases of the Great Depression that are crucial 
to understanding the fiscal transformation. First, 
there was an extremely rapid growth of 
government expenditures during the late 1920s 
and continuing into the 1930s. The growth of 
these expenditures was common knowledge but 
political actors deemed some of this expenditure 
growth "uncontrollable." Second, the state's 
taxation of utilities was widely viewed as 
unsatisfactory and there were strong advocates 
of change in the name of pure tax reform. Third, 
intergovernmental relations were central to the 
debate. The role of the state in financing 
elementary and secondary education was a key 
focus of political controversy. Finally, and 
closely related to the question of 
intergovernmental relations, were issues 
concerning the structure of taxation. There was 
general support for property tax relief but deep 
divisions over the sources of revenue to support 
this relief and over the mechanisms that needed 
to be enacted to ensure that the property tax 
reform was to be lasting. 
This article explores the role of these four 
factors-expenditure growth, pure tax reform, 
intergovernmental relations, and, most 
importantly, a change in the desired mix of 
taxation-in California's fiscal transformation. It 
also examines the consequences of the 
modernization of the tax system for closing the 
deficits that emerged during the 1930s and 
sustaining revenue growth which allowed for 
large increases in government spending in later 
years. 
The following sections analyze the fiscal 
structure prior to the Great Depression, the 
rapid growth of government spending, the 
voting behavior for the Riley-Stewart initiative, 
and possible fiscal alternatives to major 
structural changes in taxation. The article 
concludes by contrasting traditional political 
histories of California during the Great 
Depression with its innovative and tumultuous 
fiscal history. We also reflect on the implications 
of the change in elasticity of the state's tax 
system for its future economic growth. 
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An Overview of California Fiscal History 
During the Depression 
In the period 1929/30, total state revenue 
was approximately $114.6 million of which 
$65.3 million was in the general fund and 
$49.3 million was in special funds that were 
pnimarily for motor vehicle related 
expenditures. Tax revenues for the general fund 
came principally from four sources: gross 
receipts taxes on public utilities (52.5 percent), 
inheritance and gift taxes (17.8 percent), the 
bank and corporation franchise tax (10.5 
percent), and the insurance gross premiums tax 
(10.2 percent). Special fund revenues were 
largely derived from taxes on motor fuels and 
motor vehicles.10 Local governments were 
primarily financed from the property tax. Cities, 
counties, and special districts would each level 
their own property taxes. 
The most unusual part of the this tax structure 
was the heavy reliance on a gross receipts tax on 
utilities to provide general revenues. This tax 
originated in 1910 from a prior tax reform effort 
There were difficulties with the tax from its 
beginning. The primary problem was that the 
relationship of net income to gross receipts 
varied across classes of utilities, varied across 
different sizes of utilities within the same class, 
and also varied over time. In 1929, a tax 
commission documented these differences 
thoroughly and recommended abolishing the 
gross receipts tax. The commission advocated 
that utility property be returned to local 
government tax rolls but be assessed by the 
state to insure equal treatment across local 
jurisdictions. These recommendations were 
rejected by a 1931 joint legislative committee; 
nonetheless there were well- documented 
difficulties with the gross receipts tax. 11 
By the early 1930s, demands for property tax 
relief became pronounced. The primary demand 
was for increased state aid for elementary and 
secondary schools, a policy that had been 
recommended by the 1931 tax commission. 
Groups supporting property tax relief and 
increased state aid placed an initiative on the 
8 November 1932 general election ballot This 
initiative not only provided property tax relief 
but permitted the introduction of personal 
income taxes and a sales tax. It was defeated by 
a nearly 2-1 vote. 
Early in the next year, Governor Rolph faced the 
first state fiscal crisis of the depression. At the 
end of fiscal year 1930/31, the state had a 
general fund surplus of approximately 
$31.5 million. By January of 1933, this surplus 
had disappeared and a $10 million deficit 
balance was projected for June 1933. The 
governor's budget message in January also 
predicted an additional deficit of $66 million for 
the 1933-35 biennium if no actions were takenY 
The governor's own proposals were ignored and 
the legislature worked through the spring in 
fashioning a budget and the language for the 
Riley-Stewart initiative. 
The Riley-Stewart initiative, which the voters 
approved in a special election on 27 June 1933, 
had four main components: public utility 
property was to be returned to local property 
tax rolls and the gross receipts tax abolished in 
1935; the state would provide additional 
support for elementary and secondary schools; 
limits were to be placed on expenditure 
increases both at the state and local levels; and 
the Legislature was to be authorized to raise 
additional revenue to meet the cost for school 
aid. The source of this revenue was not 
described in the initiative but it was generally 
acknowledged that a sales tax would be 
necessary. 
After the Riley-Stewart amendment passed by 
nearly a two to one margin, the Legislature 
faced an enlarged state deficit from the 
additional school aid. It quickly adopted a retail 
sales tax based on New York's model and also 
gassed a personal income tax. The personal 
income tax was vetoed by the governor. There 
were other revenue increases as well, but these 
were insufficient to cover expenditures during 
the biennium and the state fiscal situation 
continued to deteriorate. 
In the beginning of 1935, Governor Frank 
Merriam estimated that the carryover general 
fund deficit balance would be $29 million and 
Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depressiop -Page 59 
---------------------------------~ 
that an additional $95 million was needed to 
balance his proposed budget The deficit was 
exacerbated by the loss of the gross receipts tax. 
He proposed an increase in taxes of $107 million 
that included instituting a personal income tax 
and raising the sales tax rate from two percent 
to three percent These changes constituted 
roughly half of the total tax increase with the 
remainder coming from increases in rates of 
other taxes. The Legislature adopted his policy 
and Merriam was able to return in two years 
without asking for a tax increase.13 During the 
late 1930s, the state again incurred large deficits 
but they were quickly erased during the 
build-up and early phases of World War II. No 
other taxes were introduced during the 1930s. 
The state did have to borrow extensively during 
the 1930s and began issuing registered warrants 
in November of 1933 at an initial interest rate of 
5 percent, a rate comparable that paid on AAA 
corporate bonds. (Short-term US securities paid 
less than 1 percent) Initially there was no public 
market for the warrants but most banks did 
accept them. The outstanding stock of registered 
warrants reached a peak of over $98 million in 
July of 1940; shortly thereafter a rapidly 
improving economy created fiscal surpluses that 
allowed the warrants to be retired.14 
The Growth of Government Expenditure 
The budget crises of the early 1930s were 
precipitated by the rapid growth of spending 
relative to revenue. During this period, there 
was also a vigorous debate over whether 
government expenditures were controllable. 
General Fund revenues and expenditures-the 
most common measure of the fiscal health of the 
state-are available on a consistent basis only 
for the 1930s. During the 1920sthe only 
consistent series for government spending is 
based on the "cost of government." 15 The 
primary difference between cost of government 
and what is termed state expenditures is the 
treatment of funds which are merely shifted 
from one state account to another state account 
Such transfers are counted as state expenditures 
but not as costs of government Thus, cost of 
government is an accurate measure of funds 
leaving state coffers. Tables 1 and 2 report data 
on General Fund revenues and 
expenditures-the focus of budget crises-while 
Table 3 reports data on expenditures from 
1926-36 based on the cost of government series. 
Table 1 summarizes nominal and real growth in 
General Fund expenditures and revenues which 
occurred from the 1929/30 through the end of 
the 1930s. The top panel contains the nominal 
figures. There were three distinct fiscal periods: 
rapid growth of revenues and expenditures in 
the 1920s, sharply reduced growth of revenues 
in the early 1930s, and a later resumption of 
growth of revenues and expenditures through 
the remainder of the decade. 
This basic pattern also applies to real 
magnitudes. From 1925/26 through 1929/30, 
real total spending (as measured by the cost of 
government) rose by an average of 11 percent 
per year. From 1930/31 through 1932/33, real 
General Fund expenditures grew by 14 percent 
while revenues fell by 8 percent The increases 
were greater and the declines were less in 
constant dollars than in current dollars because 
of the price deflation that occurred in the early 
1930s. For 1932/33 through 1940/41, real 
General Fund spending grew by 10 and real 
revenues grew by 18 percent. 
Another common way of measuring budget 
trends is in expenditure or revenues per $100 of 
personal income. Table 2 presents these trends 
from 1929/30 through the 1930s. From 1929/30 
to 1933/34, General Fund expenditures per $100 
of state personal income rose each year. The 
increase in General Fund expenditures was from 
about $1.29 to $3.23. Total state expenditures 
(not included in this table) followed a similar 
pattern. 
From 1929/30 to 1933/34, total state revenues 
per $100 of personal income also steadily drifted 
up and then continued to rise to over $5.20 by 
1937/38. Similarly, General Fund revenues were 
considerably higher per $100 of personal income 
in 1933/34 ($2.51) than in 1929/30 ($1.29), and 
reached $3.60 by 1937/38. 
In summary, expenditures and revenues 
increased at rapid rates prior to the depression. 
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During the early years of the 1930s, revenues 
did decline, but expenditures continued to rise, 
especially in constant-dollar terms. Expenditures 
and revenues as a share of the state's economic 
base also rose during the first half of the 1930s, 
and revenues per $100 of personal income 
continued to rise throughout most of the 
decade. These findings indicate that, over the 
course of the decade, neither reducing state 
expenditures nor reducing assistance to local 
governments were the primary tools used to 
deal with the fiscal crises spawned by the 
depression. Debt and the introduction of new 
taxes were the policy tools chosen. 
The rapid growth of spending in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s triggered a debate as to whether 
government spending was actually controllable. 
As noted above, this was a period of rapid 
growth for the California state budget. In the 
four years after 1925, total state spending 
rose by 45 percent. By 1931, it had risen by 
70 percent. 
As the Great Depression set in, state spending 
did not slow appreciably; it continued to grow 
at an average of 8 percent per year in 1930-1932. 
While in nominal terms it appears that the state 
did rein in spending to some degree, real 
spending increased sharply because the price 
level fell in the early years of the depression. 
Thus, the onset of the Great Depression did little 
to slow the growth of state spending. However, 
it did have a very large impact on the overall 
budget situation because state revenues 
deteriorated sharply in the early 1930s. 
In the late 1920s, tax revenues were rising by an 
average of 11 percent per year. Since the overall 
budget was in surplus during this time, there 
was more than enough additional tax revenue to 
pay for the increased spending. However, in the 
early 1930s, total tax revenues fell by an average 
of 1 percent per year resulting in large deficits. 
It was not any particular part of the budget that 
was growing. Spending was increasing across 
the board. Table 3 reports the growth rates of 
nominal spending (using cost of government 
series) by programmatic category as well as 
total and average growth rates for selected 
periods. In the late 1920s, construction and 
corrections were growing the fastest In the early 
1930s, protection, regulation, and benevolence 
grew at a particularly rapid rate. 
Government officials frequently claimed that the 
budget crisis was out of their control. In his 
budget message in 1933, Governor Rolph 
lamented that "existing laws call for 
expenditures which make it impossible for the 
Chief Executive alone to solve the problem of 
presenting a balanced budget without increasing 
taxes. . . . The Governor of the State of 
California has control over only approximately 
27 percent of the total budget The remaining 
73 percent of expenditures is fixed by law, in 
other words, by the Legislature and the people. 
Even though the Governor should desire to 
reduce materially this 73 percent of the 
expenditures he is without power to do so." 16 
However, the definition of "fixed" charges in 
the above statements is rather elastic. It 
conflates two different types of expenditure. 
Certain charges were fixed by the California 
Constitution, for example, interest payments 
and education expenditures. It is legitimate to 
consider these expenditures beyond the control 
of the Legislature. However, the definition of 
fixed charges used above also encompassed 
what today is commonly called continuing 
appropriations. These expenditures were 
established by the Legislature in previous years 
and thus could be changed or eliminated by the 
Legislature. Examples of these types of 
expenditures included aid to the blind, aid to 
the aged, aid for vocational education, aid for 
adult education, salaries of Superior Court 
judges, and subsidies to hospitals for 
tuberculosis. 17 
What portion of the budget was constitutionally 
fixed and thus truly beyond the control of the 
Legislature? Using the Reports of the State 
Controller, we calculated the fixed charges 
during this period.18 Until1934, only about 
30 percent of all state spending was 
constitutionally fixed. However, a better 
measure of the role of fixed spending focuses on 
the General Fund since the budget crisis was a 
crisis of the General Fund. Until 1934, close to 
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half of the total expenditures from the General 
Fund were constitutionally fixed. The 
Riley-Stewart Amendment increased this 
percentage for subsequent years. Out of these 
fixed expenditures, nearly 80 percent went to 
education and another 16 percent were paid out 
as interest The budget problems cannot be 
blamed on rapid growth in fixed spending; from 
Table 3 we can see that spending on education 
grew at a slower rate than the overall budget 
Fixed charges were only part of the problem. 
There was clearly a deep-seated reluctance to 
change the "continuing appropriations." 
California residents and public officials had 
become accustomed to growing public 
expenditures. 
Understanding the Riley-Stewart 
Amendment 
The single most critical event in California's 
fiscal history during the depression was the 
passage of the Riley-Stewart constitutional 
amendment. As noted above, California 
immediately adopted a retail sales tax after the 
amendment's passage and a personal income 
tax two years later. These changes put in place a 
revenue system that would permit rapid growth 
in government for decades. However, 
developing an elastic revenue system was not 
the motivating factor for the passage of 
Riley-Stewart it emerged as a response to 
growing voter discontent over the property tax 
during the Great Depression. 
As personal income fell during the depression, 
property tax delinquencies rose in California as 
they did throughout the country. California 
experienced less severe problems than did many 
other jurisdictions. In Los Angeles County, for 
example, the percentage of uncollected levies 
rose from 4.3 percent in 1931-32 to 10.1 percent 
in 1932-33. This was a far cry from the 
experience in the midwest with a 37.6 percent 
rate in Milwaukee in 1931-32 and a 40.6 percent 
rate and widespread tax resistance in Chicago in 
1931-32.19 Nonetheless, there were persistent 
demands for property tax relief emerging in 
California. 
As Haig and Shoup and Stockwell discuss, real 
estate interests began to promote limitations on 
ad valorem taxation, county officials sought 
state relief from mandated school expenditures 
which they believed should be assumed by the 
state and financed with a sales tax, and farm 
interests favored personal income taxation.Z0 
These groups finally coalesced around 
Proposition 9 which was placed on the general 
election ballot of November 8, 1932. 
This initiative would have provided relief to 
counties for elementary and secondary school 
which would have enabled the counties to 
reduce property taxes. However, it also 
introduced both a personal income tax and a 
selective sales tax, as well as mandated that 
teachers' salaries be a fixed percentage of total 
educational expenditures. 
Critics attacked the proposal along several 
dimensions, in particular arguing that this 
amendment increased mandated expenditures 
in bad economic times.Z1 Furthermore, the issue 
was poorly "fram~d" for the voters.22 The 
measure as it appeared on the ballot 
emphasized new taxes, new spending, and 
ear-marked expenditures for teacher salaries. 
No mention was given to the potential for 
substantial property tax relief that would occur 
as counties were relieved of required support 
payments for schools. Proposition 9 was 
defeated by a vote of 1,1144,449 to 552,738. 
In early 1933, Governor Rolph faced the 
daunting task of developing a budget plan for 
the 1933-35 biennium. As noted above, on a 
current-law basis there was a $66 million dollar 
deficit plus a $10 million deficit carryover from 
the prior biennium. His proposed budget aimed 
to close these gaps without tax increases. His 
recommendations included $24 million in 
reductions in operating budgets and 
streamlining, $23 million transferred from the 
special highway fund to the General Fund, a 
constitutional amendment to reduce state funds 
to schools ($12 million) and another amendment 
to allow funds from a state education 
permanent fund to be used for operating 
purposes ($11 million).Z3 
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The Director of Finance, Rolland Vandegrift, 
provided the justification for these policies. 
First, some of the funds transferred from the 
highway fund were to be used to pay principal 
and interest on highway bonds and thus were 
appropriate uses for funds raised by user fees. 
The remainder of the money transferred from 
the highway fund was premised on the notion 
that the highway fund could achieve equal 
economies to that which the Governor would 
obtain from the general fund operating budget 
This transfer was appropriate, he argued, 
because we "should be more concerned with the 
welfare and happiness of the individual citizen 
than we are concerned with the building of 
inanimate roads." 24 
The most controversial part of the budget was 
the proposed twenty percent reduction in state 
funds for schools from $30 to $24 per pupil. 
Vandegrift offered two arguments in support of 
this reduction. First, there had been over a thirty 
percent fall in the general price level since 1924 
when the $30 amount was placed into the state 
constitution. Second, he saw no reason why the 
schools could not make twenty percent savings 
as the governor proposed for the rest of the 
government 
Almost every component of the governor's plan 
was highly unpopular with either legislators or 
the public. For example, in the June 1933 
election, voters overwhelming rejected the 
notion that highway funds should be used for 
General Fund purposes when they voted down 
the seemingly innocuous measures to pay 
principal and interest on highway bonds from 
special funds. The San Francisco Chronicle 
regularly editorialized against what it perceived 
to be this raid on highway funds during the 
period preceding the election.Z5 Its position was 
perhaps not too surprising given that both the 
Bay Bridge and Golden Gate Bridge were under 
construction. To voters and legislators, 
reductions in state support of the schools would 
inevitably mean higher property taxes. Teachers 
also opposed the plan. Since salaries were a 
high proportion of school costs, maintaining 
property tax rates would have required large 
nominal wage reductions. 
The governor's plan was ignored by the 
Legislature. The State Controller, Ray L Riley, 
and a member of the Board of Equalization, 
Fred E. Stewart, assumed leadership in the 
crisis.Z6 They offered an initial plan which was 
substantially changed by the Legislature but 
nonetheless bore their names. The resulting 
constitutional amendment, which we have 
previously described, was offered to the voters 
in a special election on 27 June 1933. 
Unlike Proposition 9, this measure was ideally 
framed and, indeed, seemed to promise 
something for all parties. It emphasized 
property tax relief through the reduction in 
school expenditures by counties and an increase 
in the property tax base. Local expenditure 
limits were designed to force counties to lower 
rates and not increase spending with the higher 
tax base. The utility industry would be free of 
the gross receipts tax and assessed by the state 
at a rate comparable to that for local property. 
And despite the fact that new taxes were clearly 
on the horizon, the nature of the taxes was 
sufficiently ambiguous so that debates about the 
relative desirability of income versus sales taxes 
could be postponed. 
Althouo-h the ultimate effect of the passage of b 
the Riley-Stewart amendment was to develop an 
elastic tax system that would permit the growth 
of government, at the time the support for the 
initiative was based on very different 
considerations. While the proponents of 
Proposition 9 (real estate interests, farm 
interests, and county officials) also supported 
Riley-Stewart, there were new proponents as 
well. Utility interests favored Riley-Stewart 
because it abolished the gross receipts tax. In 
addition, some parties supported Riley-Stewart 
in order to restrain government growth. 
Taxpayer organizations emphasized the state 
and local expenditure limitations and saw this 
as a method to restrain government Proponents 
of the measure, such as the State Chamber of 
Commerce stressed expenditure limitations 
I • 27 
along with taxpayer property tax rehef. 
On the other hand, some parties viewed this as 
a change in the mix or composition of taxes, 
away from the property tax to a sales tax. It was 
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commonly recognized that the passage of 
Riley-Stewart would bring forth additional state 
taxes. The strongest opposition in San Francisco 
was from the Retail Dry Goods Association 
which opposed a retail sales tax; other 
opposition was not well organized.Z8 
One way to address the question of whether the 
voters were primarily seeking changes in the tax 
mix or reductions in the size of government is to 
analyze the voting behavior across counties.Z9 
There are two parts to our analysis. 
We first establish that the vote across counties 
was consistent with the direct economic 
interests of the voters. The counties differed in 
the extent to which they would benefit from the 
state assumption of school expenditures and the 
return of public utility property to the tax rolls. 
Variables measuring these differences can 
capture the relative gain from changes in the 
mix of taxation. The regressions assume 
implicitly that consumers, who ultimately 
would bear the burden of a retail sales tax, take 
its effects into account as voters.30 We also 
include other background variables in our 
baseline regression to capture differences in 
voter sentiment across the counties. 
We then examine the effects of variables 
designed to explore whether the voters also 
wanted smaller government To capture this, we 
use the fact that the counties differed on the 
absolute level of local property taxation and the 
rate of growth of property tax rates. If voters 
desired a lower level of government awe 
hypothesize that those counties with either the 
highest tax rates or, alternatively, the most rapid 
growing tax rates would be the ones most likely 
to vote for the measure. These regressions 
implicitly assume that tastes are the same across 
the counties; if tastes for public services 
differed, higher tax rates could be associated 
with a greater demand for public services. 
We now turn to the specification of the baseline 
regression which establishes that voters were 
cognizant of their economic interests. The 
dependent variable in this regression is the 
percentage of votes in each of the 58 counties in 
favor of the Riley-Stewart measure. The first 
two independent variables we include are 
designed to capture the differences in 
ideological positions across counties. These can 
be viewed as proxies for "fixed effects" in the 
attitudes of voters across counties. The two 
variables we chose were the percentage of "yes" 
votes for Proposition 9 and the percentage of 
registered Republicans. The support for the 
prior proposition captures the degree of general 
sentiment for radical reform of the property tax 
system. The Republican variable captures the 
significant but unobserved differences evident 
in voting behavior in prior elections between 
members of the two parties. 
The next two variables in the baseline regression 
capture the tax-mix variables. The first is the 
ratio of average daily attendance in elementary 
schools to the total population. This measure 
captures the benefits from the state assumption 
of county school costs. The second variable is 
the estimated percentage decrease in property 
tax rates from the return of utility property to 
the rolls. These estimates are derived from data 
from the Board of Equalization that was 
published in Tax Digest in July of 1935?1 The 
other series used in the regressions are also from 
Tax Digest. Before discussing the results of this 
regression and subsequent tests, there are two 
econometric issues that should be addressed. 
First, the counties differ sharply in size, Los 
Angeles County having over 2 million people 
and Alpine County only 241. Although the 
variables are scaled relative to population, there 
is the potential for heteroskedasticity. Tests for 
heteroskedasticity were not significant; 
nonetheless, the results reported below are 
robust to alternative corrections for 
heteroskedasticity?2 Second, the dependent 
variable is constrained to lie between zero and 
one. Regressions using the transformation in 
where x is the percentage "yes" vote, which 
allow the dependent variable to be 
unconstrained, yielded similar results. 
The first column of Table 4 reports the baseline 
regression. It has an adjusted R-squared of 
32 percent and significant coefficients for the 
prior Proposition 9 vote, the percentage of 
Republican registrants in the county, and the 
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two tax mix variables. One way to measure the 
electoral significance of the variables is to 
calculate the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in each of the variables on the vote 
count A one standard deviation increase in the 
Proposition 9 vote would increase the 
Riley-Stewart vote by 2.9 percentage points 
while a one standard deviation increase in the 
percentage of Republicans would have a 
2.5 percentage point effect. Similar calculations 
for the two tax mix variables-average daily 
attendance and utility property-lead to a 4 and 
2.6 percentage point effect-respectively. 
The model does significantly over predict the 
percentage "yes" vote for San Francisco. But it 
would be hard to find a simple model that 
would fit San Francisco since its percentage 
"yes" vote was 36 compared to the statewide 
percentage of 62. San Francisco did have a very 
low ratio of school children to overall 
population-7.3 percent compared to the 
statewide average of 12.8 percent with a 
standard deviation of 2.1 percent. It also had a 
relatively low percentage of utility property that 
would be returned to the rolls. Although we 
could find no mention of the school age effect, 
editorials in San Francisco (as well as Los 
Angeles) remarked that the elimination of the 
gross receipts tax would hurt urban areas. 
The remaining columns of Table 4 test for the 
hypothesis that the voters wanted lower 
government by including alternative measures 
of the size or growth rate of the local tax 
burden. None of these variables are statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels. 
Tests were run for the total property tax burden 
(including counties, cities, schools and special 
districts) in 1934-35; the county tax rate in 
1932-33 (adjusted for assessment ratios in 
counties); and the growth of the county tax rate 
between 1929-30 and 1932-33. The growth rate 
variable was the closest to being statistically 
significant (its p- value was 0.20) but its 
coefficient was small and negative. The mean 
change in this variable in the sample was .60 
which translates into a decrease in the 
Riley-Stewart vote of .47 percentage points. 
Since San Francisco was and is both a city and a 
county, its tax rate exceeded the other county 
measures. To insure that this one observation 
did not distort the regression, we effectively 
removed the observation by adding a dummy 
variable for San Francisco and then testing the 
1932-33 county tax rate. The tax rate was still 
not significant Alternative measures of fiscal 
distress (based on failures to meet debt 
obligations) were also not significant 
There were several other measures on the ballot 
including one allowing special funds from the 
gasoline tax to be used to pay principal and 
interest on highway bonds. This latter measure 
was more prominent in the newspapers than the 
Riley-Stewart amendment and the total number 
of voters on this measure exceeded total votes 
on Riley-Stewart by 4.3 percent However, the 
percentage vote by county on this measure had 
no explanatory power for the Riley-Stewart vote 
in the baseline regression. This continued to be 
true even when all the other variables were 
excluded from the regression. We also tested the 
robustness of our results by excluding the 
Proposition 9 variable and adding a dummy 
variable for the urban counties of Los Angeles 
and San Francisco. These alternative 
specifications did not change the basic results. 
The regressions suggest that the vote was 
consistent with the direct economic interests of 
the counties and that there is no evidence in 
support of the view that voters were trying to 
reduce the size of government. These results 
suggest that the local expenditure limitations in 
Riley-Stewart were a means of insuring property 
tax relief, not a device to cut the existing 
provision of government services. However, 
local expenditure limitations provided 
important psychological support because of one 
technical feature of the initiative. The 
Riley-Stewart amendment called for assessment 
at "full cash value" because when utility 
property was returned to the property tax rolls 
it needed to be assessed at similar values across 
counties. Since assessments averaged forty-four 
percent of market value statewide, there was 
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fear, manifest in newspaper editorials, that 
existing rates would be maintained and 
property tax bills would soar. Expenditure 
limitations would prevent this from occurring. 
As it turned out, the Board of Equalization 
chose a 50 percent assessment ratio as "full cash 
value." 
Two cautionary notes about the results. First, 
our test for whether voters wanted to change 
the mix of taxation or reduce the size or growth 
of government is contingent upon our proxies 
for variables measuring government's size or 
growth. We do not have direct observations on 
voters' preferences for the size of government 
Second, the regression results do not address the 
issue of whether the Riley-Stewart amendment 
was engineered by politicians seeking to create a 
more elastic tax structure to allow government 
spending to continue at rapid rates. While this 
is an intriguing possibility (in that spending 
grew rapidly in the 1930s), there is no direct 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Indeed, the 
politicians would have had to have fooled the 
taxpayer groups who were adamant about the 
expenditure limitations in the amendment. 
There were suggestions, however, that the Board 
of Equalization supported Riley-Stewart because 
it gave it a new tax to administer (the retail sales 
tax) and because the creation of the Franchise 
Tax Board in 1929 had sharply reduced the 
powers of the Board.34 
Alternative Budget Strategies 
Were the budget problems of the 1930s 
avoidable? We previously showed that 
California state expenditures grew appreciably 
in the early 1930s while tax revenues declined. 
Could a more modest expenditure pattern have 
avoided the budget crisis altogether or was the 
drop in tax revenues so severe that budget 
problems were inevitable? 
Entering the decade of the 1930s, there was a 
surplus balance in the General Fund of about 
$33 million. By 1933, annual current year 
deficits had depleted this surplus. This 
depletion of the General Fund surplus balance 
could have been avoided if the Legislature had 
restrained spending in the 1930s. Suppose the 
Legislature had frozen real spending at its 1930 
level, thereby maintaining the expenditure 
increases of the 1920s. In that case, the General 
Fund would have made it through the Great 
Depression without a crisis. (See Table 5, 
columns on consent real expenditure). There 
would have been a small deficit in 1933, but its 
small size coupled with surpluses in earlier 
years would have resulted in a General Fund 
surplus balance in 1933 that was larger than that 
in 1930. 
Since population was growing in the early 
1930s, freezing the aggregate level of real 
spending may not be the appropriate 
experiment Suppose instead that the Legislature 
froze spending at the 1930 level of real per 
capita expenditures. This allows for a higher 
level of spending in every year than in the 
previous experiment In this case, the 1933 deficit 
would have been larger than if real spending 
was frozen and the surpluses in the other years 
would have been smaller. However, the 
year-end General Fund surplus would still have 
risen between 1930 and 1933. Thus, the 
Legislature could have avoided the rapid 
depletion of the General Fund surplus balance 
in the early years of the depression with 
moderate restraint on spending increases. 
While the General Fund was experiencing 
persistent, large deficits, the Riley-Stewart 
amendment overhauled the tax system. We 
know that the changes brought about by 
Riley-Stewart did not immediately eliminate the 
General Fund deficits. Did the Riley-Stewart 
changes aggravate or alleviate the imbalance in 
the General Fund? 
Riley-Stewart affected both expenditures and tax 
revenues. On the tax side, the gross receipts tax 
was phased out and replaced by sales and 
income taxes. On the expenditure side, 
additional spending on education was · 
mandated. 
To determine what would have happened in the 
General Fund if Riley-Stewart had not been 
enacted, we need to make several estimates. 
First, we need to project what education 
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spending would have been in the absence of the 
additional mandates of Riley-Stewart We do 
this by assuming that education spending 
behveen 1934 and 1940 would have grown at 
the same rate as it did in the years 1925 to 
1933-specifically, 5.67 percent per year. 
On the tax side, we need to project the revenues 
from the gross receipts tax in the years 1936 to 
1940. To make these projections, we estimate the 
relationship between gross receipts tax revenue 
and income for the years 1919 to 1935 and use it 
to project gross receipts revenues for the next 
five years?5 We obtained the best fit by 
regressing the log of gross receipts revenue on 
both the level and change in the log of income. 
The resulting regression was: 
Log(Tax) = -4.12 + .89[Log (lncome)]1.32[Log(.D.Income)] 
(2.53) (0.31) (0.48) 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.52 [standard errors in parentheses] 
Both the income and change in income variables 
are significant at the five percent level. 
These forecasts from the regression are only 
meant to be a rough estimate of the projected 
gross receipts tax. None of the qualitative results 
that follow depend on the precise numbers 
generated by the forecast For example, adding 
two standard errors of the regression to the 
forecast does not alter the qualitative results. In 
every year in which we project a deficit using 
the regression we also obtain a deficit using the 
tax series plus twice the standard error. The 
actual revenue raised from the income and sales 
taxes were much larger than any plausible 
forecast of the gross receipts tax. 
To obtain the projected tax revenues in the 
absence of Riley-Stewart, we subtract actual 
sales and income tax revenues from total 
revenues and add our gross receipts tax 
projection. General Fund balances without 
Riley-Stewart and under alternative 
assumptions are reported in Table 5. 
From 1930 to 1940, the General Fund ran an 
actual cumulative deficit of $116 million. By our 
projections, in the absence of Riley-Stewart, the 
cumulative deficit over this period would have 
been significantly higher, S356 million. 
Moreover, while the actual budget showed 
surpluses in 1937 and 1938, in the absence of 
Riley-Stewart there still would have been 
significant deficits. Thus, while Riley-Stewart 
did not eliminate the budget crisis, it did 
significantly alleviate the crisis. 
The final counterfactual question we want to 
ask is whether restrained spending throughout 
the 1930s would have made Riley-Stewart 
unnecessary. We can do this by comparing our 
projected tax revenues in the absence of Riley-
Stewart to the nominal spending levels that 
would have existed if spending had been held 
to the 1930 level in real or real per capita terms. 
The last two columns in Table 5 report the 
cumulative deficit in both of these cases. With 
spending frozen at the 1930 real per capita level, 
the General Fund would have run small deficits 
from 1933 to 1935, but not nearly large enough 
to deplete the $33 million surplus which existed 
in 1930. Moreover, by the end of the decade, 
the year-end surplus would have grown by 
$137 million. Freezing spending at the aggregate 
1930 real level would have resulted in an even 
larger surplus. 
The state budget crisis of the 1930s could have 
been avoided by spending restraint The 
depression would have caused small deficits in 
the early 1930s, but the surplus that existed in 
1930 was large enough to weather the crisis. 
Such spending restraint would have prevented 
the need for registered warrants. 
Given that the Legislature did increase 
spending, it is clear that the Riley-Stewart 
amendment reduced the General Fund deficits. 
The revenues from sales and income taxes were 
larger than the loss of revenue from the gross 
receipts tax and the increased spending on 
education combined. 
These estimates, of course, assume that 
spending was largely unaffected by the passage 
of Riley-Stewart It is possible that the additional 
revenues from Riley-Stewart allowed spending 
to grow faster than it would have otherwise 
grown. This is a question of the causal relations 
of taxing and spending which is quite difficult 
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to address. However, to the extent that spending 
was increased, the deficit-reducing impacts of 
Riley-Stewart would naturally have been 
reduced. 
Conclusion 
There are several ironies in California fiscal 
history in the 1930s. First, traditional political 
histories fail to recognize the radical changes 
that occurred. Second, we see another instance 
of the law of unintended consequences: actions 
taken by voters to change the mix of taxation 
allowed the government to grow rapidly in 
future decades. 
The conventional political history of California 
takes a dim view of the achievements of the 
Republican governors in the early 1930s. For 
example, one historian remarked that James 
Rolph Jr. was originally a Progressive but ''his 
nineteen years had remade him into a typical 
business-oriented Republican, and the 
ceremonial functions of his office had converted 
him into a glad-handling official greeter who 
exuded irrepressible confidence and 
optimism." 36 During his campaign for governor 
in 1930, he told voters to "smile with Sunny 
Jim." Although this historian looked more 
favorably upon the next governor Frank 
Merriam, he noted that Merriam is "usually 
written off as a 'reactionary' by most historians 
(mainly because he used the National Guard 
against striking longshoreman in San Francisco 
in 1934 and state highway patrolman against 
Salinas lettuce strikers in 19 36) or as a 
do-nothing conservative who caused California 
to "mark time" in its struggle against the Great 
Depression while the rest of the nation was 
marching forward under the glorious banner of 
the New Deal." 37 
Instead, the typical heroes of California political 
history in the 1930s were Upton Sinclair, leading 
the EPIC (End Poverty in California) movement 
in a failed attempt at the governorship, and 
Culbert L. Olsen, the Democratic governor at 
the end of the 1930s. Olsen had supported 
'Sinclair and looked on his time as governor as 
an opportunity to redirect politics in California. 
His administration ended in failure partly 
because he was "oblivious to the fact that the 
national New Deal was over when he took 
office in January 1939" and that Democrats 
(many of whom were quite conservative) only 
controlled one house of the State Legislature?8 
From the vantage point of fiscal history, the 
administrations of Rolph and Merriam were far 
from conservative; indeed, they were radical. 
This period witnessed a dramatic change in 
intergovernmental relations, a sharply reduced 
reliance on the property tax, and the 
introduction of two potent new taxes, the sales 
tax and the income tax. To be sure, Rolph and 
Merriam did not act alone. They were assisted 
by other state officers and members of the 
Legislature. But they clearly supported major 
and innovative efforts to restructure the fiscal 
system. 
Undoubtedly the most significant fiscal legacy 
of this period was that it reduced reliance on the 
property tax and led to the adoption of income 
and sales taxation. Similar transformations were 
taking place in 0ther states. Although it appears 
that voters in California did not recognize this 
at the time, their desire to reduce the property 
tax burden put into place an extremely elastic 
tax system, thereby permitting a rapid 
expansion of government in California since the 
1930s. A change in the mix of taxes led to an 
increase in overall revenues. From 1929 to 1945, 
assessed valuations increased in the state by 
21 percent while personal income increased by 
148 percent The base for the sales and income 
tax expanded much more rapidly than the base 
for the property tax. This provides an example 
of what Higgs terms the "ratchet" effects from 
fiscal crises. In this case, the ratchet arose from 
fundamental changes in the tax base. 
Page 68- Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression 
ENDNOTES 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. No. (September, 1996) The Economic History Association. All 
rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
James E. Hartley is Assistant Professor of Economics at Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. 
01075. Steven M. Sheffrin is Professor of Economics and Director, Center for State and Local Taxation, 
University of California, Davis, Davis, Ca. 95616. J. David Vasche is Director of Economics and Fiscal 
Forecasting in the Office of the Legislative Analyst of California, Sacramento, Ca. 95814. 
A version of this paper was presented at the conference "Fiscal Crises in Historical Perspective," 
hosted by the All-UC Group in Economic History. The authors would like to thank participants at 
that conference for their comments. We also would like to thank Paul Rhode for assisting us in 
finding data sources for California. 
Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan. 
2 Wallis, "Birth of Old Federalism." 
3 Ebel and Zimmerman "Sales Tax Trends," p. 8. 
4 Haig and Shoup, Sales Tax. 
5 Ibid., p. 16. 
6 Rueben, "Political Economy." 
7 Jensen, "Property Tax Limitations." 
8 Ibid., p. 6. 
9 The most significant modification occurred with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 which 
limited property taxation and increased the role of state expenditures. 
10 See Tables 1-5, Assembly Interim Committee, 1947, pp. 122-27. 
11 Stockwell, Studies in California, p. 38. 
12 Authors' calculations based on the Assembly Journal, January 17, 1933, pp. 468-69. The ending 
year surplus for 1930-31 of $31.5 million was the contemporaneous estimate. 
13 See his budget addresses in the Assembly Journal, January 22, 1935, pp. 261- 274 and January 14, 
1937, pp. 223-31. 
14 Report of the State Controller, 1941/42, p. xii. 
15 This data is available from the Reports of the State Controller. 
16 Assembly Journal, 1933, p. 467. The State Controller made similar claims much earlier. 
17 Assemblv Journal, 1933, pp. 470-74. 
18 The State Controller's Reports included tables showing the cost of government which were 
divided into "Fixed Charges" and "Under Legislative and Administrative Control." The ratios in 
the text are fixed charges divided by total spending. 
19 For data on delinquencies, see Tax Digest, 1935, p. 29. Bieto, Taxpayers in Revolt, provides an 
in-depth discussion of the organized tax resistance movement in the midwest. 
Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression -Page 69 
--------------------------------~ 
20 Haig and Shoup, Sales Tax, p. 291 and Stockwell, Studies in California, p. 164. 
21 See Moresco, "Proposed School Tax," pp. 307-13, for a discussion of other difficulties with the 
proposition. 
22 For a recent discussion of these issues, see Sheffrin, "Perceptions of Fairness." 
23 Assembly Journal, 17 January 1933, pp. 466-76. 
24 Vandegrift, "Taxes Must Be Reduced/' p. 120. 
25 San Francisco Chronicle 5 June 1933 p. 8 and 20 June 1933 p. 12. 
26 In analyzing fiscal developments in California, we concur with Brownlee, "Tax Regimes," in 
finding an independent role for political actors in determining actual outcomes. 
27 Haig and Shoup, Sales Tax, pp. 290-94 and Stockwell, Studies in California", pp. 163-75. 
28 Haig and Shoup, Sales Tax, p. 293. 
29 This approach is in the spirit of Attiyeh and Engle "Testing Some Propositions," pp. 131-46 in their 
work on the passage of Proposition 13. 
30 We do not, however, have any variables that differentiate the burden across consumers in the 
different counties. 
31 The 1934-35 county tax rate (which did not contain the utility property) was first adjusted to make 
the assessed value equal to 50 percent of market value, which was the level at which all property 
was eventually equalized. This was compared to the estimate of rates after the introduction of 
utility property. 
32 In other regressions, the data was weighted by the square root of the population. This places large 
weight on the observations from Los Angeles and San Francisco. The same variables were 
significant in the weighted as unweighted regressions and no other variables were significant. 
33 See Los Angeles Times, 25 June 1933 p. 8 and San Francisco Chronicle 17 June 1933 p. 10. 
34 Haig and Shoup, Sales Tax, pp. 291-92. 
35 The income series used for this estimate is realized income from the National Industrial 
Conference Board, Economic Record which is available from 1919 to 1938. For 1939 and 1940, we 
regressed this series on the income series from the U.S. Department of Commerce which is 
available beginning in 1929 and used the regression to make estimates for the last two years. None 
of our qualitative results change if we just use the Commerce series but the sample period for the 
regression will be very short The Conference Board series allows us to have an additionalll years 
of data. 
36 Putnam, Modern California Politics, p. 15. The prior governor, C. C. Young, was a Progressive 
Republican but his support for prohibition prevented him from winning re-election. 
37 Ibid., p. 22. 
38 Ibid., p. 25. 
Page 70- Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression 
--------------------------------~ 
REFERENCES 
Assembly Interim Committee On State and Local Taxation, Report, January, 1947, California State 
Printing Office, Sacramento. Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation, A Resume of 
California's Tax Structure 1850-1955 15 March 1956, Assembly of the State of California, Sacramento. 
Assembly Journal various issues 1931-37, Assembly of the State of California, Sacramento. 
Attiyeh, Richard and Robert F. Engle, "Testing Some Propositions About Proposition 13," National 
Tax Journal, XXXII, (June 1979): 131-146. 
Baskerville, Harry H., "Control of Local Expenditures," Tax Digest", v.14, n.4, (1936): 124-27. 
Bieto, David T., Taxpayers in Revolt, Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1989. 
Brownlee, Elliot, "Tax Regimes and National Crisis in the United States: An Institutional Overview," 
Paper presented at All U.C. Conference on Fiscal Crises in Historical Perspective, 1994, mimeo, UC 
Santa Barbara. California Taxpayers' Association, "Action is Needed-Not Tears," Tax Digest, v.15, 
n.12, (1937): 399-400. 
Ebel, Robert D. and Christopher Zimmerman, "Sales Tax Trends and Issues." In Sales Taxation, edited 
by William F. Fox, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger,: 3-25, 1992 
Haig, Robert Murray and Carl Shoup, The Sales Tax in the American States, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1934. 
Higgs, Robert, Crisis and Leviathan, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Jensen, Jens P., "Property Tax Limitations," Tax Policy 2 (February 1935) .2-9. 
Kidner, FrankL., California Business Cycles, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1946. 
Los Angeles Times, 25 June 1933. 
Morosco, A. H. "Proposed School Tax Amendment," Tax Digest, v.lO, n.9 (1932): 307-13. 
National Industrial Conference Board, Economic Record, 8 September 1939. 
Putnam, Jackson K., Modern California Politics, San Francisco: Boyd & Fraser Publishing Compariy, 
1980 
Reports of the State Controller, various issues, Sacramento, Ca. 
Reuben, Kim S., "The Political Economy of State Sales Tax Adoptions: 1930-1938," Paper presented at 
All U.C. Conference on Fiscal Crises in Historical Perspective 1994, mimeo, M.I.T. 
San Francisco Chronicle, various dates. 
Sheffrin, Steven M., "Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy." In Progressivity and 
Income Inequaliy, edited by Joel Slemrod, 309-40, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Stockwell, Marvel M., Studies in California State Taxation 1910-1935, Berkeley, California: University 
of California Press, 1939. 
Tax Digest, various issues, 1931-1938, Los Angeles, California 
Vandegrift, Rolland A., "Taxes Must Be Reduced," Tax Digest, v.ll, n.4 (1933) : 118-121. 
Wallis, John Joseph, "The Birth of the Old Federalism: Financing the New Deal: 1932-1940," this 
JOURNAL, 44, no. 1 (1984): 139-159. 
Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression -Page 71 
----------------------------------~ ----------------------------------
TABLE 1 
CALIFORNIA STATE EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES 
DURING THE 1930s 
Current Dollars 
Expenditures Revenues 
Fiscal 
General Fund General Fund 
Year $ Millions Percent Change $ Millions Percent Change 
1929/30 65.3 - 65.3 -
1930/31 69.1 6.0 69.5 6.4 
1931/32 76.6 10.7 59.8 -13.9 
1932/33 76.5 -0.1 50.1 -16.3 
1933/34 107.3 40.3 83.2 66.1 
1934/35 112.5 4.8 110.0 32.2 
1935/36 142.9 27.0 127.0 15.4 
1936/37 145.0 1.4 159.7 25.8 
1937/38 163.1 12.5 177.0 10.8 
1938/39 207.8 27.4 170.8 -3.5 
1939/40 200.4 -3.6 178.1 4.2 
1940/41 184.8 -7.8 200.0 12.4 
Constant 1982 Dollars 
Expenditures Revenues 
Fiscal 
General Fund General Fund 
Year $ Millions Percent Change 5 Millions Percent Change 
1929/30 427.2 - 427.8 -
1930/31 485.7 13.7 488.3 14.1 
1931/32 591.6 21.8 462.3 -5.3 
1932/33 629.8 6.5 412.6 -10.8 
1933/34 886.2 40.7 687.0 66.5 
1934/35 909.8 2.7 889.3 29.5 
1935/36 1143.1 25.6 1015.5 14.2 
1936/37 1126.7 -1.4 1241.5 22.3 
1937/38 1245.6 10.5 1351.3 8.8 
1938/39 1604.0 28.8 1318.5 -2.4 
1939/40 1548.8 -3.4 1376.2 4.4 
1940/41 1390.9 -10.2 1506.3 9.5 
Source: Report of Assembly Interim Committee, 1947. 
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Fiscal 
Year 
1929/30 
1930/31 
1931/32 
1932/33 
1933/34 
1934/35 
1935/36 
1936/37 
1937/38 
1938/39 
1939/40 
1940/41 
TABLE 2 
EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES PER $100 
OF PERSONAL INCOME 
Dollar Amounts Per $100 Of Personal Income 
Expenditures Revenues 
General Fund Total General Fund 
1.29 2.26 1.29 
1.52 2.68 1.54 
2.09 3.51 1.63 
2.43 3.93 1.59 
3.23 4.80 2.51 
3.03 4.49 2.96 
3.31 4.69 2.94 
2.97 4.48 3.27 
3.32 4.96 3.60 
4.23 5.83 3.48 
3.76 5.31 3.34 
2.92 4.33 3.16 
Total 
2.27 
2.73 
3.05 
3.16 
4.09 
4.44 
4.52 
4.75 
5.21 
5.12 
5.01 
4.69 
Source: Report of Assembly Interim Committee, 1947. 
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TABLE 3 
GROWTH RATES IN COST OF GOVERNMENT FOR MAJOR 
DIVISIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
(all values expressed as a percent) 
Regula- Construe- Edu- Develo~- Total 
Year hve tive cational menta Protective Benevolent Curative Corrective Penal Cost 
1925/26 9.91 24.66 6.98 -4.34 -3.37 -18.07 8.26 0.28 9.08 9.64 
1926/27 17.61 0.35 5.58 -24.38 --0.41 36.55 -5.76 7.26 20.87 5.07 
1927/28 3.87 7.64 7.55 0.54 6.70 -8.87 19.74 12.10 7.24 6.72 
1928/29 13.52 76.39 6.55 -25.46 63.15 -5.57 -3.94 44.08 6.53 17.65 
1929/30 10.66 12.92 10.41 -13.70 175.67 49.03 10.81 -8.47 17.61 12.47 
1930/31 91.85 5.23 --0.94 9.09 22.75 60.72 -1.53 4.05 10.75 4.11 
1931/32 2.82q 13.02 6.68 4.71 -12.04 -2.10 19.39 -10.43 6.48 6.07 
1932/33 -3.19 -22.02 2.60 -7.25 -41.07 14.31 -22.76 -18.27 -19.89 -7.59 
1933/34 -9.50 9.64 82.87 -10.86 -42.30 -2.19 4.31 -20.58 2.59 31.08 
1934/35 14.05 --0.52 0.86 23.73 25.63 25.90 -8.00 2.32 6.40 4.29 
1935/36 7.92 3.47 --0.75 7.45 7.31 769.56 46.82 5.75 -4.61 18.86 
Average: 
1925/26-
1928/29 11.23 27.26 6.66 -13.41 16.52 1.01 4.57 15.93 10.93 9.77 
Average: 
1929/30-
1931/32 35.11 10.39 5.38 0.03 62.13 35.89 9.56 -4.95 11.61 7.55 
Average: 
1925/26-
1921/32 21.46 20.03 6.12 -7.65 36.06 15.96 6.71 6.98 11.22 8.82 
Budget Category Share in 1929/30 Description/Example 
Regulative 3.08 Regulatory Boards and Commissions; Dept. of Health; Dept. of Industrial Relations 
Constructive 24.47 Public Works; Division of Highways; San Francisco Harbor Commission 
Educational 34.01 Schools, Elementary through University 
Developmental 1.76 Department of Agriculture; Mining Bureau 
Protective 3.91 Department of Natural Resources; Flood Control 
Benevolent 1.16 Aid to Veterans, Orphans and Blind 
Curative 4.98 Mental Health 
Corrective 0.89 I Correctional Schools 
Penal 1.78 Prisons; police 
Source: Reports of the State Controller. 
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TABLE 4 
RILEY-STEWART REGRESSIONS 
Dependent Variable: Percent Yes Vote 
Baseline 
Variable Model Regressions With Added Variables 
Constant .55 .62 .63 .60 
(.19) (.19) (.18) (.19) 
Percent Vote for .32 .23 .30 .34 
Proposition 9 (.14) (.15) (.15) (.15) 
Average Daily 1.99 1.48 1.98 1.88 
Attendance (.68) (.67) (.63) (.67) 
Proportion 
Reduction in Tax .13 .09 .11 .14 
from Utility (.06) (.07) (.06) (.07) 
Property 
Total Local -.000013 
Property Rate (.000013) 
(All Districts) 
County Tax Rate .00027 -.00029 
1932-33 (.00053) (.00058) 
Percentage Change 
in County Rate 
1929-30 to 32-33 
San Francisco -.27 
Dummy (.12) 
Adjusted R2 .32 .36 .32 .31 
Notes: Estimated by OLS over 58 counties. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Source: see text for detailed descriptions of variables. 
.55 
(.17) 
.32 
(.15) 
1.96 
(.63) 
.13 
(.06) 
0.10 
(.07) 
.31 
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TABLE 5 
GENERAL FUND BALANCE PER YEAR UNDER DIFFERENT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
With Riley-Stewart Tax Changes Without Riley-Stewart Tax Changes 
Constant 
Constant real No Riley- real per 
Fiscal Actual Constant real per capita Stewart Constant real capita 
Year expenditures expenditures expenditures expenditures expenditures expenditures 
1929/30 96 96 96 96 96 96 
1930/31 371 8954 7007 371 8954 7007 
1931/32 -16733 4817 1739 -16733 4817 1739 
1932/33 -26383 -1495 -3979 -26383 -1495 -3979 
1933/34 -24128 31603 28083 -24096 -1635 -5155 
1934/35 -2533 57116 53359 -27636 644 -3113 
1935/36 -15951 73651 68879 -40240 21317 16545 
1936/37 14763 104705 96673 -20475 42774 34742 
1937/38 13846 121083 110605 -36938 42902 32424 
1938/39 -36986 115373 104306 -86335 38328 27261 
1939/40 -22338 123045 110871 -77776 41350 29176 
Cumulative: 
1929/40 -115976 638947 577639 -356145 198051 136743 
Notes: All numbers are in thousands of dollars. 
Source: Authors' calculations (see text) and Report of the Assembly Committee on State and Local 
Taxation, 1947. 
Page 76- Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression 
K-12 EDUCATION 

--------------------------------~ 
K-12 EDUCATION 
by Amanda Meeker 
Overview of the History of Constitutional Provisions 
Dealing with K-12 Education 
Education has been a vital interest of the state 
government in California since the state drafted 
its first constitution. Through the years, as the 
culture has changed and politics have shifted, 
ideas about the state's role in education also 
have evolved. Over time, there has been an 
increasing belief in the importance of education. 
As the culture has become more sophisticated, 
the state has been called upon to provide an 
ever-widening array of educational 
opportunities for California's students. Where 
only an elementary education was once 
necessary, now Californians see a need for a 
strong state-provided university education. 
Another gradual trend, with a few minor 
setbacks, has been toward increasing local 
control over education. Where the Legislature 
once controlled everything from the 
organization of schools to choosing textbooks, 
now local districts have much greater authority.1 
The 1849 Constitution provided that the 
Legislature should "encourage by all suitable 
means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, 
moral, and agricultural improvements," and 
should maintain a system of free common 
schools to be kept open at least three months 
out of every year. It also specified various 
sources of money, such as revenues from lands 
granted by Congress, that were to be set aside 
as a permanent school fund. The article on 
education was similar to that of the Iowa 
Constitution. 
Though the education article was not lengthy, 
the subject was important to the framers at 
Monterey. They agreed that education was 
crucial to the future of the state, and that a free 
education (for the lower grades) was necessary. 
Not surprisingly, California's school system was 
poor in 1849, and those families that did have 
children with them often had to send their 
children to the States, Chile, or Peru to be 
properly educated? By 1850 the new state's 
educational system had been founded: one 
public school in Sonoma, with thirty-seven 
students, and another in Santa Barbara, with 
twelve? 
It was initially suggested that the Legislature 
should be allowed to appropriate monies out of 
portions of the school fund for other purposes 
as it saw fit. Some worried that the school lands, 
out of whose rents money was to come for the 
schools, might be located in the mining districts, 
in which case the "funds derived from them 
might rise to such an enormous amount that it 
might be doing the other parts of the State an 
injustice to appropriate all this revenue to 
school purposes." 4 The proviso was voted 
down, however, by a 31 to 5 margin by those 
who believed it was important that the money 
be inviolably set aside for education. They 
pointed out that "nothing will have a greater 
tendency to secure prosperity for our state ... 
than by providing for the education of our 
posterity" and that no amount of money could 
ever "secure too great a spread of knowledge." 5 
There were practical arguments too. The framers 
generally agreed that California would benefit 
from further immigration. For the state to 
prosper, it needed people to come who would 
stay, not just dig gold and then return home to 
their families.6 A liberal school fund, one man 
pointed out, would be "an inducement to a 
most valuable class of the population to come 
here-families having children." 7 Another 
encouraged the bachelors present to vote in 
favor of a liberal school fund as a means of 
attracting families with potentially marriageable 
daughters to California.8 
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The article on education stood the test of time 
better than some of the other articles, but still 
the revised Constitution of 1879 did make some 
changes to it. Like the framers of the original 
Constitution, the 1879 delegates thought 
education was a cornerstone of their state, and 
their changes were aimed at securing 
education's prominent place.9 One delegate 
summed up the general attitude of the 
convention: "it is a right that every child 
possesses, to be educated freely by the 
government." 10 The new constitution increased 
the number of months the schools were to 
remain in session from three months to six and 
added a preliminary sentence, taken from the 
constitution of Missouri, to the article, 
emphasizing the importance of education.11 
There was some argument on including the 
phrase, as some felt that a statement of principle 
had no place in a constitution. Among those 
who disagreed, one argued that it would 
provide the answer if anyone should question 
why the state furnished free educationY 
Despite their commitment to education, many of 
the delegates felt strongly that an elementary 
school education was all that was necessary. 
This attitude was evident in the section on the 
state school fund, which was retained from the 
1849 constitution. Although the new 
constitution provided that the public school 
system could include high schools, technical 
schools, and teacher training schools, it also 
specified that all revenue from the school fund 
was to go exclusively to the grammar and 
primary schools.13 While some argued that 
districts ought to be allowed to set up any kind 
of school they desired, the majority believed 
that funds should be guaranteed to educate 
children only in the lower grades.14 As one 
delegate explained, "if it is desired to educate 
beyond that point, I hold that it is the privilege 
of every parent to educate their children up as 
high as they choose . . . but I deny that the 
State owes that kind of education to the 
children." 15 The prevailing sentiment was: 
"every child in the State shall receive the 
benefits of a common school education-no 
more and no less." 16 
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The general attitude at the 1879 convention was 
one of distrust of the state government. 
Throughout the convention, the delegates 
sought to put strictures on the Legislature, 
making certain to specify various acts that 
should be forbidden. In that vein, the delegates 
agreed without debate that no religious doctrine 
could be taught in any public school.17 
Considerable discussion of prohibiting the 
teaching of foreign languages in the public 
schools was a feature of the debates, but no 
such provision was ultimately included. The 
delegates also gave local governments 
considerably more control over the schools in 
their districts than they had enjoyed 
previously.18 The prevailing opinion was 
expressed by the delegate who proclaimed his 
hope that all "amendments tending to centralize 
power will be voted down." 19 In keeping with 
that perspective, the new constitution gave the 
local boards of education, or boards of 
supervisors where there were no boards of 
education, the responsibility to choose textbooks 
for their district schools and to examine teachers 
and grant teachers' certificates, privileges 
formerly of the Legislature?0 By these actions, 
the delegates hoped to avoid the "corrupting 
influence attached to the private competition 
and speculation of the present system." 21 
Some were concerned that the relaxation of 
centralized authority would lead to standards 
being lowered in counties that lacked enough 
teachers?2 However, worries about the lack of 
uniformity that their restructuring might entail 
were generally put aside. One delegate voiced 
quite the reverse sentiment, asking, "How can 
you allow every one to develop their natural 
faculties if the study has to be equal and 
uniform for all?" 23 
Giving local authorities the power to choose the 
textbooks evidently did not work very well. 
During the late nineteenth century, there were 
many more school districts than there are today, 
with many of them being one-room schools. 
Teachers were not well trained and, as a 
dissenter at the 1879 convention had pointed 
out, many of the county supervisors, "selected 
with reference to their competency to deal with 
county roads and such subjects, are not the best 
--------------------------------~ 
men to deal with the schools." 24 As a result, an 
1884 constitutional amendment put the decision 
back at the state level, this time with a new 
State Board of Education, a body that several 
delegates had advocated in 1879.Z5 The board 
was to consist of the governor, the 
superintendent of schools, and the principals of 
the state normal schools. The State Printing 
Office would produce the textbooks and sell 
them at cost to the students, a measure that also 
had been suggested at the 1879 convention on 
the grounds that it would "forever put an end 
to the disgraceful squabble between rival book 
houses and the corrupting influence growing 
therefrom." 26 Teachers' examinations and 
certificates were left with the local boards. 
No important amendment to this section 
occurred until 1912, when it was specified that 
the State Board of Education should be elected 
and that textbooks for elementary schools 
should be provided by the state at no charge. 
The proponents of free textbooks argued that 
textbooks were the most necessary of supplies 
to the students and should be free, thus making 
the public schools "free in fact as well as 
name." 27 They also suggested that it would 
"remove the last excuse of selfish parents not to 
send their children to school." 28 
As schools improved and a good education 
became increasingly important in California 
society, a slow trend in constitutional 
amendments began toward supporting wider 
levels of education. A 1902 amendment 
authorized the Legislature to provide for a 
special tax to support high schools and technical 
schools. A 1920 amendment added 
kindergartens to the definition of the school 
system. It also specified teacher salaries and 
mandated that the Legislature provide at least 
$30 per student into the State School Fund and 
that it create a State High School Fund with the 
same amount of money per pupil.29 World War 
I inflation had made teachers' salaries less than 
adequate, while the war boom had brought new 
jobs to California. As a result, in 1920 there were 
more than 600 schools in the state that lacked 
teachers, mostly in the rural areas. The goal of 
the amendment was to "provide a more definite 
and adequate support for public schools," and 
thereby prevent families who could not find 
suitable instruction for their children in the rural 
districts from moving off their farms, which 
might then fall into disuse or be taken over "by 
Japanese and other Orientals." 30 By mandating 
the level of state contribution, the proponents 
argued, thE: amendment also halted a trend in 
which the state was shifting the economic 
burden of the schools onto the counties.31 In 
1946 the state school system was again revised, 
this time to include colleges, the amount to be 
provided in the School Fund was raised to 
$120 per student in kindergarten through the 
college level, and teacher salaries were again 
raised. War was again partially responsible for 
the amendment. Immigration to California 
during World War II was extremely brisk and 
birthrates also were rising. Retired teachers were 
re-enlisted, new teachers were recruited by 
lowering the credential standards, and others 
taught two separate shifts of students each day. 
As the amendment's proponents said, 
"California's public school system is confronted 
with the most serious crisis in its history." 32 
They sought to resolve it by increasing funding. 
In 1952 the amount was again raised, this time 
to $180. In 1964 another change was made, this 
time a deletion of the section that had been in 
the constitution since its beginnings in 1849 
regarding sources of school revenue. Most of the 
5.5 million acres granted by Congress in 1853 
had long since been sold, so the provision that 
their revenues should go into the school fund 
was obsolete. According to the argument in 
favor of deleting the provision, the move would 
not reduce funding for schools, but would 
merely eliminate "unnecessary accounting 
procedures." 33 
Such constant revisions of specifics made it clear 
to the 1960s Constitution Revision Commission 
that the article on education needed to be pared 
down to basic law. As one report to the 
commission concluded, "Article 9 contains 
much legislative detail" and much that is 
"outmoded and thus obsolete or 
meaningless." 34 Accordingly, the commission 
recommended deleting mention of grade levels, 
specific amounts to be provided to the school 
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fund, and teachers' salaries. The redrafted 
article was substantially shorter than it had 
been, but these three recommendations were not 
acted upon. 
True to the ever-expanding interest in higher 
education, much of the revision commission's 
debate centered on the colleges and universities. 
Nevertheless, the commission did take up 
various aspects of the article that centered on 
elementary and high school issues. One major 
topic of discussion, which never emerged from 
the discussion phase, was whether state funds 
should be provided for students who attended 
private schools. The ongoing debate over who 
should choose textbooks was renewed during 
the revision commission's work. Local control 
had again become a rallying cry, with argument 
that in a diverse state such as California, local 
agencies knew best what was desirable for the 
local children?5 The proponents of local choice 
argued, "the best textbook for a gifted child in 
Beverly Hills may not suit a rural child in 
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Coachella with an English language 
handicap." 36 A report to the commission 
pointed out that school districts were becoming 
increasingly sophisticated and capable of 
making wise choices for the schools. 37 On the 
other side, proponents of uniformity cited the 
advantage to a mobile population if a child 
could switch districts and still have the same 
texts?8 
Most of the revision commission's 
recommendations were accepted. In 1970, the 
voters approved providing free textbooks for 
students in grades one through eight. A 1976 
amendment permitted two or more county 
boards of education to merge to share 
responsibilities. Additionally, local voters 
received the right to choose whether their 
county superintendents of education should be 
elected or appointed. The county board of 
education was given the power to determine the 
county superintendent's salary. 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
by Amanda Meeker 
An Overview of the History of Constitutional 
Provisions Dealing with Local Government 
The 1849 Constitution gave the legislature 
considerable power over local government 
making it responsible for providing a uniform 
system of county and town governments. The 
Legislature, not the local authorities, had the 
power to incorporate cities and could restrict 
their power to tax, assess, borrow, and loan, 
provisions borrowed from the constitution of 
New York.1 The Legislature could provide for 
the election of county boards of supervisors, 
though all county officers were to be supported 
by their respective counties, a provision taken 
from the constitution of Wisconsin. The framers 
thought it more likely that the local 
governments might oppress the people than that 
the Legislature would do so? 
When the framers decided that the Legislature 
should never create corporations by special act, 
they added, "except for political or municipal 
purposes." Although there was considerable 
argument over this section, no one questioned 
the advisability of putting the power to create 
town governments in the hands of the 
Legislature.3 Again, there was precedent for 
their decision; the section had been taken nearly 
literally from the constitution of New York.4 
It was not long before various provisions in the 
new state's constitution began drawing 
criticism. The state was changing rapidly, and 
the constitution had been framed for another 
era. People began calling for a revision of the 
document as early as 1857.5 In 1877 the voters 
approved a measure providing for a new 
Constitutional Convention, which was held in 
1879. The Workingmen's Party, formed in 1877 
in San Francisco, played an important role in 
the convention preliminaries, and took 51 of the 
152 seats at the convention, carrying San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Nevada City.6 
Though there was a general anti-legislature 
sentiment at the convention, the Workingmen's 
delegates were perhaps the most adamantly 
opposed to centralized government. As the 
Workingmen, led by Dennis Kearney, had been 
holding their riotous anti-Chinese, anti-wealth 
meetings in the sand lots of San Francisco, the 
Legislature had been passing special legislation 
to, among other things, increase San Francisco's 
police force and to appropriate $20,000 in the 
interests of the city's public peace? At the 
convention, although the Workingmen made 
several proposals that garnered little 
enthusiasm, such as having a unicameral 
legislature and abolishing the office of 
lieutenant governor, their opposition to 
centralized power did find broad support 
among the delegates.8 
The 1849 Constitution's provisions for local 
government earned considerable criticism. 
Many delegates at the 1879 convention spoke 
strongly against special legislation, by which 
they primarily meant laws affecting singular 
matters on the local level. As one delegate put 
it, "there is nothing in the whole state that is 
more demanded" than "to cut off special 
legislation." 9 The legislature had been giving 
considerable time to deciding local matters, to 
the neglect of more important statewide affairs. 
According to one delegate, matters "of vast 
importance to the state" were pushed aside 
until the end of the session "and then passed, if 
at all, without any consideration." 10 In the most 
recent session, in fact, the legislature had passed 
572 laws, of which 503 were speciallegislation.U 
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Additionally, many people felt that the 
Legislature really had no sense of what was 
necessary on the local level, and should leave 
those matters to the people who lived there and 
did know what their communities needed. As 
one delegate argued, "special bills were passed 
often ... without any member of the legislature 
knowing anything about them except the 
member who introduced them." 12 Not only was 
special legislation, in their eyes, "detrimental to 
the interests of counties and townships," but it 
also was "one of the greatest sources of 
corruption ... in our legislative halls." 13 As a 
result, the new constitution included a 
prohibition against special legislation in 
thirty-three specific instances and in any other 
case in which a general law would apply.14 The 
provision was "designed to reduce [the 
legislature's] labors, so they will be confined 
almost entirely to the perfecting of the codes; to 
[stop it from] frittering away the people's 
money; to prevent jobbery, and to blot out of 
existence the lobby; and to reduce the 
Legislature to something like a fundamental 
body." 15 It was pointed out that "all the more 
recent Constitutions" were including similar 
provisions. 16 
Henceforth, the legislature was to provide only 
by general laws for the incorporation of cities 
and towns.17 A delegate from San Francisco 
explained that they hoped that this would "cut 
off the log-rolling around the Legislature by 
men who are scheming for the offices. One man 
wants to be County Judge, another Sheriff .... 
In former times the legislative power was 
unrestricted. But since then it has been found 
necessary to place restrictions upon the 
Legislature. It is the policy now to give the 
people more direct control, and take away from 
the Legislature the power to pass special 
laws." 18 Cities and towns were subject only to 
general laws. 
San Francisco came away from the convention 
with new powers of self government. Cities 
with populations over 100,000 (which included 
at the time only San Francisco) were permitted 
to frame charters for their own government. The 
provisions of the charter would supersede all 
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special laws that were inconsistent with it.19 
San Francisco was singled out because it was a 
unique entity. No other town even approached 
it in population. As one delegate explained, 
general laws could not "be broad enough to 
cover the interests of the people of San 
Francisco." Additionally, of course, the city 
vociferously called for rights of self-government. 
There was a large contingent of delegates from 
San Francisco, one of whom demanded 
indignantly, "What reason have these gentlemen 
to give why we should not manage our own 
affairs?" 20 The provision for San Francisco 
mimicked Missouri's provision for St. Louis. In 
deference to fears that a city might adopt an 
"injudicious" charter, and that they were 
making San Francisco into "an independent 
sovereignty ... entirely outside of the control 
and jurisdiction of the Legislature," however, 
the constitution did provide that the Legislature 
would have to approve the charter before it 
could take effect.21 Interestingly enough, the 
provisions favoring San Francisco were not 
enough to win its support; in the election, the 
city did not provide a majority vote for the new 
constitution, possibly because merchants, 
businessmen, and corporations, of which there 
were many in the city, generally opposed it.22 
While San Francisco and other cities that might 
grow to have populations over 100,000 were 
granted a notable increase in power, the 
counties did not receive equal rights. Unlike 
San Francisco, the counties were relatively 
lightly populated and were not well-organized. 
Many contained no incorporated cities and were 
composed largely of undeveloped land?3 No 
one at the convention was vocal in demanding 
rights for counties, so the issue was not 
discussed. The local government article 
recognized them as "subdivisions of this state," 
which has been restrictively construed to mean 
that they are nothing more than subsidiaries of 
the state?4 Additionally, it was the legislature's 
prerogative to establish a uniform system of 
county governments and to determine the 
duties and terms of office of county officials?5 
While it was suggested that the counties should 
determine the duties of their officers, that 
proposal was rejected. In opposition to the 
--------------------------------~ 
suggestion, one delegate complained, "the 
Legislature has been so entirely shorn of its 
power, that it's almost a useless 
organization." 26 In theory, the requirement that 
the rules be uniform would prevent any special 
legislation. To avoid any necessity for special 
legislation, the legislature was permitted to 
classify the counties by population in order to 
fix the salaries of the county officials?7 Putting 
salaries in the hands of the Legislature was 
partly due to the fear that if wages were left 
with the local boards, those boards might very 
well "so reduce the pay that these officers 
cannot afford to hold the office." 28 Recent 
financial troubles of one county had brought it 
to the point where "if they could have done it, 
they would not have had a single officer in the 
county." 29 Nevertheless, there were some 
objections to putting such broad powers into the 
hands of the legislature. A delegate pointed out 
that the counties had frequently petitioned to be 
able to form their own townships, and that 
"local matters should be determined by local 
officers." 30 
Despite giving these powers to the legislature, 
the perception remained that "the object of the 
people in having this convention called ... was 
to have as much of the local legislation taken 
away from the Legislature as possible, and 
given to the different counties and cities." 31 To 
address this object, the counties were granted 
the power to make and enforce all laws "not in 
conflict" with general state laws.32 Local laws 
could, however, be found in conflict with 
general laws for various reasons, including if 
they duplicated state laws in any way, making 
the grant of power a little less permissive than it 
appeared.33 Similar limited home rule 
provisions had been common in charters that 
had previously been granted in California, and 
appeared in the 1875 constitution of Missouri.34 
An additional restriction prohibited the 
legislature from imposing taxes for local 
purposes.35 
Several other provisions regarding counties 
restricted legislative power. For example, county 
seats were not to be moved except by a 
two-thirds vote of the people in the county?6 
This stipulation was intended to prevent the 
state of affairs in which, as one delegate put it, 
"the county seats have been almost on 
wheels." 37 As a later report has pointed out, 
moving county seats was an important issue, 
since in the nineteenth century the location of a 
county seat was critical to economic 
development. 
Another provision was that no new county 
could be created if it had less than 5,000 people 
or if its creation caused another county to have 
less than 8,000 people.38 Though there was some 
argument that the provision would in essence 
prevent any new counties from forming, the 
object was to prevent indiscriminate creation of 
new counties, in which "Carpetbaggers go to 
work and create a new county in order to place 
themselves in positions." 39 As a delegate 
explained the purpose of the prohibition, it was 
intended to "put the brakes on the very bad 
practice of dividing up counties for the purpose 
of making some gentleman's farm valuable, or 
affording places and positions for hungry 
politicians." 40 Another pointed out that the 
habit of forming new counties whenever a 
mining excitement occurred had been "a great 
detriment to the State." 41 Significant problems 
with the formation of new counties had in fact 
occurred. In 1874, for example, Klamath County 
was dissolved, having been so reduced by 
annexations to neighboring counties that, 
according to one report, "little remained ... 
except a mountainous area and an almost 
unpayable debt." 42 It was also pointed out that 
the new constitution should embrace current 
political thought on the issue of local versus 
state control so that it would not "be behind the 
age." 43 An opposing view that there were 
counties so large that a man might have to 
travel 100 miles to the county seat, and the 
county ought to be able to be divided whether 
or not it had 5,000 residents, did not sway the 
majority in their quest to rein in the 
Legislature.44 
The constitution had, of course, not pleased 
everyone, and amendments followed soon after 
its adoption. Most headed in the direction of 
increased powers for local governments. Not 
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surprisingly, other cities sought the same 
advantages given to San Francisco, and in 1887 
the ability to frame a charter was granted to 
cities of 10,000 or more. Still smaller towns then 
wanted the same rights, and in 1890 the 
provisions were extended to include cities of 
3,500 or more. Additionally, the charters were 
now to supersede all laws inconsistent with 
them, not just all "special laws." As the number 
of chartered cities grew, so too did questions 
regarding their status in relation to state 
government. An 1896 amendment provided that 
cities and towns were subject to general laws 
except in municipal affairs, a more liberal grant 
of power than had been in the section as 
originally adopted. A 1914 amendment placed 
the cities even farther from the reach of general 
laws by providing that chartered cities and 
towns could "make and enforce all laws and 
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, 
subject only to the restrictions and limitations 
provided in their several charters." 45 
In 1911 an amendment allowed chartered cities 
to establish borough systems of government, in 
which districts could be granted special 
municipal powers.46 A 1914 amendment 
specified that chartered cities might make and 
enforce all municipal laws and regulations, 
subject only to restrictions in their charters, 
though they were subject to general laws "in all 
other matters." 47 In 1922 it was provided that 
no city could be annexed to any other 
municipality unless a majority of its voters 
agreed.48 
In the stipulations about forming new counties, 
increasing population soon outdated the 
numbers specified in the 1879 constitution. A 
1910 amendment provided that the number of 
residents in a new county could not be less than 
8,000 and no county could be reduced to a 
population of less than 20,000.49 The 
amendment came partly in response to a recent 
supreme court decision that had held that a 
special law making a county line change was 
constitutional.50 The amendment's purpose was 
to "make it more difficult to organize new 
counties within the state." Several new counties 
had been created over the last twenty years, and 
Page 90- Local Government 
the amendment's proponents argued that 
"sometimes the new county is promoted largely 
as a real estate venture by residents of a locality 
that is ambitious to become a county seat." The 
amendment, they said, would "put a stop to 
efforts to cut the state up into small and 
impecunious political subdivisions." 51 In that 
statement they were correct; no new counties 
were formed after Imperial in 1907.52 
In a reflection of the trend toward more powers 
for the cities, counties also began gaining more 
autonomy. In 1911 counties were finally given 
the right to adopt charters for their 
organization.53 In part, this addressed problems 
that had persisted since before 1879. Chief 
among these was that legislators were passing 
laws affecting counties about which they knew 
nothing. According to one witness, "By a time 
honored custom of courtesy the framing of the 
county bills is left to the member or members 
from each county without inquiry." 54 The 
proponents of county charters saw the measure 
as a "logical growth from the successful 
administration of 'charter cities'." They pointed 
out that although the delegates in 1879 had 
believed that the "uniform system" of county 
government would be "impregnable to the 
assault of those demanding special laws," such 
was not the case. The legislature had used the 
permission to classify counties to "put each 
county in a class by itself," thus evading the 
prohibition against special legislation while 
achieving the same effect. The amendment's 
backers believed that "if the people had a voice 
in their county government ... special favors 
and political 'plums' ... would not be parceled 
out." 55 The move was in accord with the new 
progressive politics in California. Those in favor 
of the amendment believed that the citizens, 
newly armed with the initiative, referendum, 
and recall, could and should actively shape their 
county government. 
Amendments in 1933 further strengthened home 
rule. The provision that the legislature was to 
establish a uniform system of county 
governments (Sec. 4) was repealed. Additionally, 
the county boards of supervisors were given the 
power to determine the salaries of all county 
-----------------------------------~ 
officers other than themselves and the district 
attorneys and auditors. The intention was to 
"bring flexibility, efficiency, and economy to 
county government" while also bringing "the 
matter closer home." 56 
With such constant revisions having added 
greatly to the length and complexity of the local 
government article, when the constitution 
revision commission began its work in the 1960s 
it found plenty to change. Even without the 
amendments, the article had been unwieldy, 
since in their attempt to check the power of the 
legislature, the delegates to the constitutional 
convention of 1879 had loaded the article with 
prohibitions and specifications. As the revision 
commission pointed out, the local government 
article was longer than the entire United States 
Constitution, full of obsolete provisions, and 
laden with detail that properly belonged in 
statutory law. 57 The rewritten article, approved 
by the voters in 1970, pared the article down 
from 22,000 words to 6,000.58 Most of the 
excisions dealt with procedure, such as the steps 
to frame a charter, or detail, such as the specific 
instances in which special legislation was 
forbidden. As a report to the commission noted, 
such "minute particularization" on these topics 
"perhaps reflects a somewhat anachronistic 
distrust of the state legislature." 59 While 
keeping most of the overall meaning intact, the 
new article did make some changes, mostly in 
the direction of granting more power to county 
governments. 
The role of counties had changed considerably 
since the constitution was adopted. A report to 
the commission noted, "the power now 
exercised by county governments goes well 
beyond the original conception of the county as 
a local entity administering state functions. A 
modern urban county ... can't be accurately 
called a mere 'legal subdivision of the state'." 60 
As the population of the state increased, 
especially after 1940, and the trend toward 
suburbanization began, the counties began to 
shoulder responsibilities formerly in the hands 
of city governments. Such duties as water 
conservation, flood control, health services, and 
library services, once in the realm of the 
municipal government, became necessary in the 
counties as well.61 An author as early as 1947 
pointed out that "today county government in 
California operates neither exclusively as an 
instrumentality of the state nor as a unit of local 
self-government. It is in transition with its 
future course to a certain extent uncharted." 62 
Recognizing counties' increasingly irr.portant 
functions, the new article strengthened local 
government and allowed it greater flexibility.63 
For example, it allowed counties, instead of the 
legislature, to fix the salaries of district attorneys 
and county auditors, allowed counties to 
establish new departments without legislative 
approval, and required voter approval for a new 
county to be formed or for counties to be 
consolidated. It also made many of the article's 
provisions applicable to both cities and 
counties.64 City government was also 
strengthened; the revised article allowed all 
cities, not just those with populations greater 
than 3,500, to adopt charters and allowed a 
majority vote, instead of a two thirds vote, to 
repeal a charter. 
Local powers were further strengthened after 
the June 1970 overhaul. An amendment to the 
new article came only a few months later, at the 
November 1970 general election. County 
governments, instead of the legislature, were 
given the power to determine the salaries of 
their members, subject to referendum. The 
proponents of the amendment emphasized the 
importance of "home rule," pointing out that 
without the amendment, "salaries are borne by 
local taxpayers, yet state legislators tell you how 
much you should be taxed." 65 In 1974 an 
amendment allowed cities and counties to 
adopt, amend, or repeal their charters by a 
majority vote without legislative approval. The 
goal was pragmatic: to eliminate the need for 
the legislature to spend time approving charters, 
none of which had been rejected in the years 
since the provision had been included in the 
1879 constitution, and to save the costs of 
printing the bills approving the charter actions. 
Another amendment, approved at the next 
election, allowed county school superintendents 
to be either elected or appointed, gave the right 
to determine their salaries to the county boards 
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of education instead of the legislature, and 
allowed counties to establish joint boards of 
education. Such changes might have pleased the 
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constitution's framer who said, "You cannot 
bring government any too near to the 
people." 66 
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Creatures of Statute . . . Children of Trade: 
The Legal Origins of California Cities 
by Peter M. Detwiler 1 
The current tensions between the California 
Legislature and municipal leaders over taxation, 
special legislation, home rule, and the two 
groups' respective roles is nothing new. From 
the first days of the Legislature in December 
1849 to the present, legislators and city officials 
have argued over these issues. Remarkably, the 
range of topics remains the same. This brief 
review traces the statutory beginnings of 
California cities to explain the long-standing 
differences between the Legislature and cities. 
A legacy of legislative interference. Mistrust 
and meddling marked the California 
Legislature's relationship with its cities and 
towns during the first 30 years of statehood. The 
California Constitution of 1849 permitted a 
series of abuses that grew worse until the 
principle of home rule entered the Constitution 
of 1879. To understand how the need for 
municipal home rule came about, one must first 
understand the cities' difficult beginnings? 
Local rule before statehood. When California 
joined the Union in 1850, it had to transform the 
institutional remnants of Mexican rule and the 
de facto city governments of the Argonauts into a 
regular system of local government. The 
alcalde - an office that combined the powers of 
mayor, magistrate, and sheriff- dominated 
Mexican institutions. The Rev. Walter Colton 
was Monterey's alcalde, with substantial 
authority over not only the town, but also for 
300 miles around. The Yankee notions of 
separation of powers and constitutionally-
delegated power were not evident in a system 
that relied on personal rule and few written 
statutes. As more Americans entered California, 
they characterized the alcaldes as capricious and 
instead installed the public values of their home 
states.3 
As California's population exploded from 10,000 
in 1846 to 92,500 in 1850, it exacerbated the 
problems of a society without legitimate civil 
government. American immigrants became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the Mexican 
institutions they inherited and with the failure 
of a succession of military governors to create a 
system of civilian government. Commodore 
Stockton, the second military governor, ordered 
existing local governments to continue in office.4 
Although Stockton prepared a plan for a 
territorial government, including the annual 
election of local officials, he never set it in 
motion.5 Miners' districts organized themselves 
in eclectic blends of remembered civil law and 
often violent frontier justice. "In brief the new 
mining camp was a little republic," wrote Josiah 
Royce, "Practically independent for a time of 
the regular state officials." 6 In the absence of 
formal civil government, residents of San 
Francisco and other communities simply 
ignored the military authorities and created 
their own local institutions. During this 
"No-Government period," San Francisco elected 
a 15-member Legislative Assembly which 
General Bennet Riley declared illegal in June 
1849 when he called for the first constitutional 
convention? 
The race to be first. Several of the existing 
settlements attempted to legitimize their civic 
institutions when the Legislature met in 
December 1849. These local governments were 
ad hoc arrangements like Sacramento's, or the 
inheritors of pueblo government as in Los 
Angeles and San Jose. Sacramento residents had 
adopted their own charter on October 13, 1849.8 
Los Angeles residents claimed that Mexican law 
had conferred charter status on them.9 
Sacramento's was the first attempt and a close 
examination of its pursuit of cityhood explains 
the way that California's first municipalities 
dealt with the Legislature. Assemblyman P. B. 
Cornwall broached the subject on December 20, 
1849, by announcing that he intended to 
introduce a bill before Christmas to incorporate 
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a City of Sacramento. The next day, in the first 
"State-of-the-State" message, Governor Peter H. 
Burnett charged the Legislature with the issues 
he thought needed resolution, including the 
adoption of a "comprehensive system" for 
providing city government. 10 Governor Burnett 
noted the Legislature's responsibility under the 
California Constitution.11 California's first 
governor had a strong interest in 
intergovernmental relations. 
Cornwall duly introduced his bill for 
Sacramento's incorporation on Christmas Eve, 
and on December 28 introduced a citizens' 
petition for incorporation. A second petition 
arrived New Year's EveY The Assembly 
Committee on Corporations considered all three 
proposals and rapidly reported back on January 
9, 1850. The Committee recommended two bills: 
a specific incorporation bill for Sacramento and 
a bill creating a uniform procedure for 
incorporating cities and villages. Although it 
recognized the "evils" of special incorporation 
bills, the Committee said that a separate act was 
justified in Sacramento's case because the 
uniform procedure for forming a "small inland 
village" did not fit the needs of "a large 
commercial sea-port town." The Committee 
concluded that the uniform bill would mean 
that very few special acts would be neededY 
The Assembly Committee's argument against 
special incorporation acts must not have 
persuaded everyone because Senator Alexander 
W. Hope introduced a special bill for Los 
Angeles on January 14.14 The fate of Hope's bill 
for Los Angeles became closely linked with 
Cornwall's Sacramento bill which the Assembly 
tabled the next dayY Further amendments 
resulted in the Assembly approving the 
Sacramento bill unanimously on January 21.16 In 
what appears to have been a race to incorporate 
the first city, the Senate approved the Los 
Angeles bill on January 24, sent it to the 
Assembly which considered it, amended it, 
suspended the deadline rules, and passed it. 
The Senate reciprocated by passing the 
Sacramento bill, all on the same dayY 
Curiously, the rapid tandem progress of the two 
special incorporation bills slowed down with 
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the Los Angles bill reaching Governor Burnett 
on February 1, but the Sacramento bill not until 
February 11.18 This delay, however, actually 
helped Sacramento's cause. 
Governor Burnett vetoed the Los Angeles 
special incorporation bill on February 8 with 
two main objections: expediency and 
constitutionality.19 The Governor's lengthy veto 
message noted the experience of other states 
where special acts produced "great and serious 
evils." Comparison of special incorporation acts 
shows, Burnett argued, that they "are the same 
in substance" and the repetition just raises 
legislative costs as members must either waste 
time studying each one, or vote "at random and 
thus permit abuses to creep in." Instead, Burnett 
wanted a "comprehensive Act" to save "time, 
labor, and expenses, and in the end be far more 
beneficial and understood." 
Not content merely to exhort, the Governor 
outlined his own recommendations for a 
uniform procedure. Such a law, Burnett wrote, 
should distinguish between villages and cities 
and that cities would have "to contain a given 
population." The notion of a minimum 
population for incorporation would persist in 
state laws until 1977?0 Noting that 
incorporation attempts would arise when the 
Legislature was not meeting, Governor Burnett 
suggested that the Legislature delegate the 
review of incorporations to the County Courts. 
This move would not be a delegation of the 
legislative power over incorporation to the 
judiciary, he claimed, because a Court would 
only check the size of the population; an 
investigation, not a legislative act. 
Six years later, when the issue reached the 
California Supreme Court, the justices swiftly 
rejected Burnett's reasoning. 21 Burnett's veto 
message went on to recommend two classes of 
municipalities based on location: "cities upon 
navigable waters" and "cities inland," because 
they needed different powers. There was no 
reason to give all cities the same powers, he 
said, because some of "those powers would 
simply remain dormant." If a specific need 
arose, "a short special act could be passed for 
that additional purpose." 
---------------------------------~ 
Burnett's second objection to the Los Angeles 
special incorporation bill was the limited power 
to taxation that it conferred on municipal 
officials. Referring to Article IV, Section 3 of the 
1849 Constitution, the Governor argued that 
only the Legislature had the power to tax and 
that the bill's requirement for a majority of 
voters to approve a city tax rate failed to protect 
minority rights. He also worried that the power 
to widen city streets without compensation to 
property owners was confiscation. In closing, 
Burnett said that he vetoed the Los Angeles bill 
only because of his objection to unlimited 
taxation, and would not have vetoed it 
otherwise. 
The Senate was apparently unimpressed with 
Burnett's reasons because five days later it 
overrode his veto by a vote of 11 to 0.22 The 
Assembly failed to gain the two-thirds vote 
needed to override the veto. On February 14 the 
vote was 14 to 11, and the next day it was 16 to 
12.23 
Following the success of his veto of the Los 
Angeles bill, Governor Burnett also vetoed the 
Sacramento incorporation bill on February 21 
with a veto message that was nearly identical to 
the first.24 The significant difference was the 
addition of a new constitutional argument. The 
Governor cited Article IV, Section 31 of the 1849 
Constitution which permitted special act 
municipal incorporations and reached three 
conclusions: (1) a municipal corporation is the 
only type of corporation that the Legislature 
could create by special act; (2) only municipal 
corporations and not private corporations may 
levy taxes; and, (3) the Legislature must restrict 
municipal corporations' tax powers because no 
one else can. Despite the Governor's additional 
concerns, on February 26 the Assembly 
overrode the veto by a vote of 16 to 5, as did the 
Senate on a 9 to 2 vote.25 Sacramento became 
California's first incorporated city.26 
Uniform laws. The Legislature took Governor 
Burnett's advice seriously, however, and 
proceeded to pass two uniform laws: one for 
cities, the other for towns. The Cities Act 
required new cities to have a minimum of 2,000 
residents and limited their area to four square 
miles. The Act described two procedures for 
incorporation: the Legislature could create new 
cities, or residents could petition the County 
Court. The inclusion of both methods 
represented a compromise between 
incorporation by special act and the Governor's 
recommendation for Court participation. 
Regardless of their initiation, all new cities 
would be governed according to the uniform 
powers in the Act. The new law gave 
communities some latitude regarding the size of 
their Common Council which could have as few 
as seven or as many as 20 members. The 
Governor's objection to unlimited taxing power 
was countered by restricting cities' property 
taxes to 2% of assessed valuation.27 The 
historical irony is discovering one of local 
government's earliest controversies re-enacted 
130 years later in 1978 when Proposition 13 
limited all local property taxes to 1% of assessed 
val ua tion.28 
Communities immediately took advantage of 
the new uniform law and the Legislature 
created three new cities under the Act: Sonoma 
and Los Angeles on April 4 and Santa Barbara 
on April 9.29 But even after the uniform Act's 
adoption, the Legislature passed special 
incorporation acts for Beneda, San Diego, San 
Jose, Monterey, and San Francisco.30 Governor 
Burnett did not veto these special acts probably 
because many of them included the restrictions 
that he called for in his earlier veto messages. 
The San Diego and San Jose bills, for example, 
limited property taxes to 1% of assessed value, a 
restriction tougher than the limit in the uniform 
law. 
The Towns Act was similar to the uniform law 
for cities in many respects. A town required at 
least 200 inhabitants and could cover up to three 
square miles. A petition to incorporate could be 
presented to the County Court.or to the 
Governor if the Court had yet to be organized. 
The local governing body was a five-member 
Board of Trustees. The law limited a town's 
taxing authority to one-half percent of assessed 
value.31 In 1855, the Legislature raised this limit 
to 1% and, reflecting the needs of the times, 
allowed towns to regulate bars, levy a $6 annual 
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tax on dogs, and elect a town recorder to judge 
infractions of local ordinances.32 
In 1856, the California Supreme Court declared 
the Towns Act unconstitutionat dismantling the 
compromise that Governor Burnett had built 
with the Legislature. The Court held that the 
Legislature improperly delegated the power to 
incorporate towns to the County Courts; 
impermissible because the courts are not part of 
the legislative branch. The Supreme Court 
instead suggested that the Legislature delegate 
this legislative responsibility to the county 
board of supervisors or some other body with 
similar powers?3 First reprimanded by 
Governor Burnett in 1850 for passing special 
acts, the Legislature took his advice and 
assigned the duty to the County Courts, only to 
be rebuked by the Supreme Court in 1856 for 
improperly delegating a legislative 
responsibility. In response, the Legislature 
repealed the 1850 statute and adopted a new 
Towns Act. Virtually identical to its predecessor, 
the 1856 version delegated the incorporation 
power to county boards of supervisors.34 The 
essence of this arrangement persists?5 
Legislative interference. After the Legislature 
settled the early controversies of how to form 
cities, it succumbed to pressures by economic 
interests and enacted special legislation for 
cities. Neither the 1849 Constitution nor case 
law from other states precluded the Legislature 
from meddling in local affairs. Four cases 
exemplify the Legislature's abuses in this 
period. They also explain why the 1879 
Constitution curbed those practices and how 
subsequent legislation evolved into the home 
rule doctrine.36 
The 1859 case of Pattison v. Board of Supervisors of 
Yuba County37 shows the Legislature's 
willingness to substitute its judgement for local 
officials'. The Legislature mandated the Yuba 
supervisors to place on the county ballot a 
proposition that required the County to invest 
in a railroad. When the Board complied, Mr. 
Pattison sued. Pattison, a local landowner, 
feared that Yuba County might have to raise his 
property taxes if the railroad went bankrupt and 
defaulted on the County's investment. County 
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attorneys argued that the Legislature could do 
anything it wanted as long as the California 
Constitution did not specifically prohibit it. 
Because counties were the state's agents, they 
had no powers that were inherently their own. 
Pattison's attorney countered that the 
Constitution precluded the state government 
from investing in railroads. Further, the counties 
were merely agents of the state. Therefore, the 
Legislature could not require the County to do 
what it could not do itself. This relationship 
distinguished counties from cities, they argued, 
because "municipal corporations, on the other 
hand, are creatures of statutes, but they are also 
children of trade." 38 
While Mr. Pattison's attorneys were willing to 
carve out a more independent role for cities, the 
Supreme Court was not. Later in 1859 the Court 
ruled in People v. Burr that it was constitutional 
for the Legislature to authorize the payment of 
clai:ms against San Francisco in a manner that, 
in effect, created a new city debt exceeding the 
charter limitations on the amount of municipal 
debt.39 This conclusion is all the more surprising 
because San FranCisco's charter, like all others of 
the period, was itself a legislative act.40 The 
Legislature's action had the effect of telling local 
officials how to spend the City's treasury, even 
though they had to exceed the debt limits the 
Legislature itself had set in the earlier 1850 and 
1855 San Francisco charters. 
The complicated 1871 case of Sinton v. 
Ashbury41 produced a similar outcome for San 
Francisco. The Legislature directed the county 
judge to pay private individuals out of the 
City's treasury for the cost of extending 
Montgomery Street.42 The Legislature overrode 
the Governor's veto, but the assessor still 
refused the judge's order. The Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of the statute that permitted 
the Legislature to control municipal funds for 
individuals' gains. 
The City of Stockton faced one of the most 
egregious cases of legislative meddling that 
eventually led to home rule charters. In 1869-70, 
the Legislature directed the City to ask voters to 
donate $300,000 from the municipal treasury to 
the Stockton and Visalia Railroad Company to 
--------------------------------~ 
build its line.43 The bill actually named three 
private individuals to the board of trustees 
which handled the payment. The Court's 
decision in The Stockton and Visalia Railroad v. 
The Common Council of the City of Stockton is 
significant in its length, covering nearly 60 
pages when most of the other decisions in 1871 
were less than ten pages.44 Each of the four 
participating Supreme Court justices submitted 
his own, separate opinion and each seemed torn 
between the structure of the law and his own 
sense of fairness. Justice Wallace's lead opinion 
even noted the allegations of corrupt 
manipulation of the Legislature.45 Nevertheless, 
he wrote, the law was constitutional and 
Stockton cannot defend its treasury by invoking 
the "spirit of the constitution." Justice Crockett 
relied heavily on the principle of stare decisis, 
that is, deciding a case from an unbroken line of 
precedents. Crockett remarked on Wallace's 
recital of rulings in other states.46 Justice 
Sprague took a similar tack and looked back to 
the 1859 Pattison decision.47 Reluctantl:ft Justice 
Temple joined his colleagues in invoking stare 
decisis, but wrote that he would like to agree 
with Stockton.48 Good intentions 
notwithstanding, the City lost and the S.&V.R.R. 
won its $300,000. 
Home rule at last. With legislative meddling 
constitutionally protected, the only permanent 
remedy was to change the Constitution. The 
1879 constitutional convention offered the 
opportunity, and the resulting document carried 
the needed home rule power. The conference 
delegates consulted several examples and the 
home rule authority came from the Missouri 
Constitution which had just been adopted. The 
California Constitution of 1879 prohibited 
special legislation, banned special act 
incorporations, and granted the power to frame 
freeholder charters to communities with at least 
100,000 people. Only San Francisco qualified in 
1879 and local politics kept it from adopting a 
freeholders' charter until 1898. When the 
Supreme Court reviewed this power in 1880, it 
noted that it was "manifestly the intention of 
the Constitution to emancipate municipal 
government from the authority and control 
formerly exercised over them by the 
Legislature." 49 
The issues remain. The issues that divided city 
officials and legislators in 1849 are still key 
points in the debate over the proper roles of 
state and local government: property taxes, 
special bills, and home rule powers. Local 
property tax limits troubled Governor Peter 
Burnett in 1849 as much as it has vexed 
governors in our own time. Burnett's principal 
reason for vetoing Los Angeles' attempt to be 
the state's first city was his fear of unbridled 
municipal taxes. How ironic to find California's 
first intergovernmental controversy re-enacted 
130 years later in 1979 as the Jarvis-Gann 
Initiative, Proposition 13. Burnett's insistence on 
regular procedures for incorporating new cities 
finally produced a uniform law, but the tide of 
special legislation has never really stopped. 
Even though uniform standards inevitably 
require adjustment to accommodate unique 
circumstances, the California Legislature still 
adopts special bills that promote limited 
interests. The flagrant abuses before 1879 are 
merely the most infamous; today' s special bills 
are exceedingly mild by comparison. 
The 30 years' legacy of legislative interference 
produced constitutional protections for home 
rule. This home rule doctrine has become a 
powerful political myth, invoked to protect 
certain interests or to promote others.50 
Nevertheless, home rule would not have 
emerged in California without the necessary 
evils of legislative mistrust and meddling. 
California's cities have two origins: a statutory 
basis of legal authority and an economic 
justification. Their statutory basis is clear from 
the legislative history in this brief review. That 
cities are centers of economic activity is as 
obvious as the history of human settlement. 
The early struggle to mate these dual forces 
produced municipalities that reflect the 
·characteristics of both parents. 
California cities truly are creatures of statute 
and children of trade. 
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